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Abstract 
In the field of explosion and fire protection, the assessment of individual risks often 
bases on qualitative or indexing methods because a full-scale probabilistic approach 
is infeasible in many cases for chemical enterprises. This established procedure 
undermines efforts of quantitative risk assessment to assess frequencies of 
undesired events and their consequences as accurately as possible. 
Though classical risk assessment techniques are still actively applied and are 
reasonable for an assessment of hazards and risks of separate technological 
processes, they are generally labor-consuming and do not always give an overall or 
semi-quantitative assessment estimate. With the foundation of the European Union a 
new concept for harmonizing the legal regulations was developed taking a 
standardized European internal market into consideration. This new concept called 
“new approach” only uses fundamental requirements as a set target. Therefore, such 
an approach has certain disadvantages one of them being the qualitative 
assessment and thus calls for considerable knowledge while carrying out the audits.  
The dissertation at hand seeks to give an overview concerning the current situation 
available for semi-quantitative and indexing approaches and application programs 
which leads to the conclusion that there is no universal method of fire and especially 
explosion risk assessment which would be accepted as obligatory in the standard 
documentation regulating questions of explosion and fire protection. 
The result of the dissertation consists of two developed solution approaches for a 
coherent probabilistic assessment of explosion and fire safety at the chemical 
process industries. 
The first method is a combination of the semi-quantitative and indexing approaches 
and allows to carry out an assessment which is based on weighting procedures 
utilizable for risk rating and benchmarking for individual risk quantification. The main 
focus of this method is the development of an equation which calculates the risk 
considering hazards and protection measures. This allows a more exact calculation 
of all possible worst case and best case scenarios and parallel to the quantitative risk 
value, the common class of hazard. The consideration of the deviations while 
calculating is important because due to a probability of an error which comes from 
the conditional values, involved in the risk calculation.  
The complexity of the dependencies and interrelations between the hazards and 
safety measures asks for an additional transfer of the extended semi-quantitative 
V 
approach for individual risk assessment into a MS Excel prototype tool. A practical 
application of the developed method for the chemical industries serves as a further 
step in its development. The extended semi-quantitative approach evaluates the 
individual risk from the side of the acceptance.     
After preceding semi-quantitative approach for individual risk assessment it is 
advisable to follow the causes-effect chain, because the calculated probability value 
of the individual risk does not give a statement about the consequence of a possible 
worst case scenario(s). 
The second developed quantitative method for consequence assessment gives the 
option to calculate the physical effects of hazardous substances based on an 
approach from the Russian ordinances. This is recommended after a comparison 
with one of in the European Union leading approaches which is based on the Dutch 
CPR-guidelines used in fields of labor safety, transport safety and fire safety. A 
developed MS Excel prototype tool, which is based on the Russian approach, is also 
applied for its future application.  
The provided methods, semi-quantitative approach for individual risk assessment and 
quantitative approach for consequence assessment give the opportunity for a 
coherent probabilistic assessment of explosion and fire safety for facilities at the 
chemical process industries. 
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1 Introduction  
The chemical process industries (CPI) are a significant sector with a good position in 
economic and, of course, mainly in political terms closely to the nuclear industry. The 
nuclear industry and CPI are examples of safety critical industries. The CPI have 
undergone considerable changes in the process conditions. Plants have grown in 
size and contain large items of equipment; the high technological processes are more 
interconnected with each other.  
CPI are subject to manifold risks. There are different chemical-specific risks at the 
German national regulations and standards level, as well as at the European level 
(fig. 1). Some examples of the chemical-specific risks at the German national level 
are use-specific risks, risks from plants and facility, natural risks, organizational and 
other risks, explosion and fire risks etc. 
 
 
Figure 1. Example of the chemical-specific risks in CPI. 
 
These risks can be divided into hazards and exposures in which the explosion, fire 
and risks from hazardous substances are explicitly stressed, e.g. in the METRIK-
Method for risk classification (Schönbucher 2002). In the field of risk assessment 
explosions and fires are depended on properties of substances and therefore have 
the same cause (fig. 2): 
 
 
Figure 2. Comparison of the event determining factors in case of fire and explosion. 
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From the literature research and own personal experience these two chemical-
specific risks have a great potential for loss both in economic and in human terms 
therefore they have to be considered as equivalent from the perspective of explosion 
and fire protection (EFP). Thus, one of the most important reasons of these risks 
have the potential to cause big damages, e.g. for the environment, financial aspects, 
losses of company approvals, political as well as public perception. Historical loss 
statistics show that fires have a bigger probability as explosions, but fires can be a 
subsequent event of an explosion or vice versa. 
In practice the assessment of the chemically-specific risks in CPI could be divided 
into: common unspecific risks regarding the type of risk and especially fire risks (fig. 
3): 
 
 
Figure 3. Assessment of the chemical-specific risks in CPI. 
 
In the last decades the European countries initiated a change from strict 
standardized safety regulations to a more flexible normalization (Hasofer et al. 2007, 
Meacham 2008, Rasbash et al. 2004, Yung 2008). In the area fire safety this recently 
introduced “new approach” therefore calls for basic requirements as aims concerning 
risk assessment in the European Union. Thus, there is a lot of flexibility regarding the 
qualitative process of risk assessment whereas support is no longer supplied from 
the methodological side in the area of fire protection. The essence of such approach 
concentrates more on the individual demands and consists of the so-called 
performance-based codes. These codes are based on the actual performance of a 
task. Performance-based codes concentrate on the purposes (aims) of the fire safety 
system of an object and need to be in accordance with it. However design decisions 
for their achievement are not regulated. Therefore, restrictions in the object device 
are minimized. The use of such new approaches to ensure fire safety is stimulated 
and finally, higher economic efficiency of design decisions (Молчанов et al. 2001) is 
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provided. Considering that the established approach of the rigid application of norms 
is now replaced with more flexible ones allowing alternative design decisions there is 
clearly a need for the development of new methods. The use of practicable methods 
for the assessment of the fire risk of an object needs to be refined. Hence these new 
flexible approaches base on qualitative risk assessment methods which are 
admittedly disadvantageous in comparison to their quantitative counterparts. 
However it is not said that this method has only benefits; besides, the approaches 
which concentrate on performance-based codes depend on the enclosed calculation 
method. Unfortunately this method is not expedient for a risk assessment of CPI 
which are concerned with dangerous and hazardous substances either transported, 
stored or processed and which are capable to oxidizing reactions (explosions, fires, 
etc.) with each other or with air oxygen. The literature research shows that there is no 
universal method of fire and especially explosion risk assessment which would be 
accepted as obligatory in the standard documentation regulating questions of 
explosion and fire safety (Hall 2006, Hall 2008). Moreover there is also no general or 
standardized method of explosion risk assessment for CPI. In the majority of the 
European countries the risk analysis (e.g. FMEA, HAZOP, Markov models, fault and 
event trees etc.) described in (IEC/FDIS 31010 2009), and concrete methods and 
approaches of its assessment are legally established solely for the objects 
representing the increased danger — nuclear power plants, storages and terminals of 
the liquefied natural gas, productions of explosives substances etc.. However all 
these methods are rather labor-intensive and taking up the author’s preliminary 
studies (Leksin et al. 2013, Mock et al. 2012). 
Moreover a risk analysis, respectively a probabilistic analysis, has to give answers to 
the three main questions:  
1) That can happen? 
2) What are the potential consequences of these scenarios? 
3) What are the probabilities of such scenarios? 
 
and as an inference from above-mentioned three questions: 
 
Are the calculated risks acceptable? 
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However the implementation of this kind of analysis needs a detailed and extensive 
data input, suitable mathematical approaches and last but not least an adequately 
qualified auditor.  
The first question: 
1)  “That can happen?” comprises the system analysis of the considered object. 
The second question: 
2) “What are the potential consequences of these scenarios?” comprises the 
identification of safety measures and hazards.  
The third question: 
3)  “What are the probabilities of such scenarios?” comprises the calculation of 
the risk.  
The result of such risk assessment process in the end phase is the risk evaluation, in 
other words the comparison of the calculated risk value with an acceptable risk 
criterion.  
The required knowledge and skills when using various approaches can differ 
fundamentally as well as the answers to each of the three questions regarding the 
needs of the object they were answered for. These general statements are also 
applicable to explosion and fire risks as to a special case of technological hazards 
(SFPE 2002). Therefore, it is important to have a clear idea of what scope, 
advantages and disadvantages of the available approaches involved are. The 
disadvantages of existing approaches will be considered in the next chapters. 
This dissertation seeks to contribute to the support and the development of explosion 
and fire risk and consequence assessments based on a semi-quantitative method. 
With regard to explosion and fire hazards it is important to note that they have to be 
assessed and estimated alike (Lottermann 2012). Thus, the developed coherent 
method closes a gap in the field of explosion risk analysis and optimizes the fire risk 
assessment. The requirements of the developed method for CPI are: 
 
 applicability for both chemical-specific risks: explosion and fire 
 supporting with semi-quantitative approach 
 substantiation of the values used by the evaluation and assessment 
 consideration of the deviations by the risk calculation 
 calculation of the individual risk 
 risk evaluation with an acceptable risk criterion 
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 definition of the common class of hazard 
 consequence assessment for the worst case scenarios 
 
Before a detailed description of the developed method is given some definitions 
concerning terminology have to be considered. One of these will comprise the topic 
of acceptable criteria for understanding and classifying the overall aim of this 
dissertation. The level of knowledge of available explosion and fire risk assessment 
applications are discussed. The aim of this survey is to examine the conformity of 
existing methods regarding requirements as well as additional specification criteria 
especially focusing on the comprehensibility, effort, level of detail, application range, 
objectivity and quality of the outcome.  As a result of the examination the gap in 
knowledge becomes obvious. 
Subsequently the objective target will be formulated with the detailed structure of the 
developed method. It is the aim of the author to increase the transparency of the 
methodological procedure and thus facilitate the readers’ comprehension. 
After that the presentation, explanation and critical reflection of the extended semi-
quantitative approach for individual risk assessment follows. The reader will be led 
through the single development steps of the semi-quantitative method in combination 
with the indexing approach under consideration of the deviation values of the 
calculation resulting in the actual risk calculation.  
The conclusion summarises the significant findings and gives an outlook concerning 
the benefits of the extended method. 
Following the extended quantitative approach for consequence assessment is 
developed in order to assess the worst case scenarios. This is necessary because 
the calculated risk in the presented semi-quantitative method only considers 
acceptance but does not refer to the time frame of a possible incident. Therefore, the 
comparison of the Russian and Dutch approaches concerning the range of 
applicability, objectivity and quality of the calculated consequence value show that 
the Russian approach needs to be stressed for the consequence assessment.  
The results discuss the benefits and drawbacks and give an outlook regarding the 
development of explosion and fire risk and consequence assessments based on 
semi-quantitative and quantitative methods. 
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2 Terms and definitions 
The dissertation at hand aims to improve the basic knowledge concerning risk 
analysis. An intensive preoccupation with risk management in general and risk 
analysis in particular therefore becomes an obligatory part of conceptual and 
methodological basics. 
When talking about risk assessment it is of core importance to use unambiguous 
terminology. Therefore, this chapter seeks to determine as well as explain these 
terms. 
Based on experiences and R & D-project (Mock et al. 2012) a problem occurs among 
engineers regarding the understanding of the risk term. A classical characterisation of 
risk according to (ISO 31000 2009) is the combination of the frequency F of an 
(undesired) event and its (negative) consequence C: 
 
 R F C   (1) 
 
It remains to be said that the well-used equation is much reduced and a technical risk 
assessment concept becomes: 
 
Possibility of influence of 
“striking factors”                        
λn – surface area of the 
influence of the striking factors;   
τp - share of time during which 
the object is in an area of 
coverage of negative factors of 
the dangerous phenomenon in 
case of its realization
Possibility of the dangerous 
phenomenom                            
λdp frequency of dangerous 
phenomenom and its U-force
Possibility of destruction            
q
Refusal of a security system   
qpa  - probability of 
development of emergencies 
into accident
Damage                                         
qd
Frequency of an undesired event F  Negative consequence Cx
Danger
Threat
Risk
Security, 
firmness 
(vulnerability)
Efficiency of 
security 
systems
 
Figure 4. Probabilistic model of risk assessment. 
 
where: 
1. the dangerous phenomenon on the considered area characterized by 
frequency λdp or an expected value Edp(Δt) = λdp · Δt  (2) for time interval Δt 
2. hits in an area of coverage of negative factors of the dangerous phenomenon 
which for stationary objects is as a first approximation characterized by a part 
αn the surface area, which is affected by the striking factors (thus, using as 
basic data of frequency of the dangerous phenomena in concrete point,         
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αn = 1). For the moving objects (e.g. persons) it is necessary to consider a 
time factor kt - part of time during which the object is in an area of coverage of 
negative factors of the dangerous phenomenon in case of its realization 
3. destruction of objects as a result of action of the striking factors of the 
dangerous phenomenon characterized by conditional probability q their 
destructions 
4. refusal of a security system because of various combinations of insufficiency 
of reliability, the human factor and other reasons, characterized by probability 
qpa of development of emergencies into accident (it is estimated by means of 
the probabilistic analysis of safety for various scenarios of development of 
accident) 
5. damnification (causing damage) qd 
 
As described in (Ridder 2015), the classical risk equation (1) cannot be specified a 
priori depending on the nature of the connection of the probability of occurrence and 
the severity of the damage. Thus, the risk is considered as the complex event 
occurring at a joint approach of a number of casual events and, as a result, a 
negative scenario.  
(Kaplan et al. 1980) prefer the definition: 
 
Risk: probability and consequence. 
 
In order to emphasise the significance of scenario analyses in EFP, the extended 
definition of risk according to The National Fire Protection Association can be also 
used:  
 
Risk: the set of probabilities and consequences for all possible accident 
scenarios associated with a given plant or process (NFPA 2003). 
 
The NFPA definition of risk fits well to the use of (generic) event trees as suggested 
in chapters 7.1 and 7.2. Other terms in use are:  
 
Hazard: source of potential harm (ISO-GUIDE 73 2009). 
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Also the synopsis of scientific literature and normative documents in the field of 
explosion and fire shows an inconsistent terminology in quantitative risk assessment 
(QRA). The dissertation follows the definition of (DIN EN ISO 13943 2010): 
 
Fire hazard: physical object or condition with a potential for an undesirable 
consequence from fire, whereas 
 
Fire risk: probability of a fire combined with a quantified measure of its 
consequence (it is often calculated as the product of probability and consequence). 
 
Other definitions can be found, e.g. in the British (PAS 79 2011) or in the Russian 
(GOST 12.1.033-81 1982). 
 
The definitions of explosion hazard and explosion risk are limited even more on 
account of the specificity of this topic. The dissertation follows (Dic. Academic 2013):  
 
Explosion hazard: set of the factors causing possibility of formation of the 
explosive atmosphere in volume, exceeding 5% of room volume, and its ignition. 
Such factors are: combustible substance, oxidizer and an ignition source (translated 
from Russian by the author).   
 
A definition of explosion risk was not found in international standards. For this 
explosion risk is defined by analogy to fire risk. 
 
By the discussion of a risk criteria for third parties at major hazard establishments 
there are various relevant ways to express risks. The most common terms are 
individual risk and societal risk. 
Because the presented and developed semi-quantitative method in this dissertation 
is concentrated on the “Individuals”, the understanding of “Individual risk” is 
expressed by (I.Chem.E 1992):  
 
as the frequency at which an individual may be expected to sustain a given level of 
harm from the realization of specific hazards. It is usually taken to be the risk of 
death, and normally expressed as risk per year. 
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That is why it is important to note that individual risk is the risk experienced by a 
single individual in a given time period. It reflects the severity of hazards and the 
amount of time the individual is in proximity to them. There are typically three 
different types of individual risks which are described in (I.Chem.E 1992): 
 
“·  Location-Specific Individual Risk (LSIR) 
Risk for an individual who is present at a particular location 24 hours a day, and 365 
days a year. LSIR is not a realistic risk measure because an individual does not 
usually remain at the same location and is not exposed to the same risk all the time. 
·  Individual-Specific Individual Risk (ISIR) 
Risk for an individual who is present at different locations during different periods. 
ISIR is more realistic than LSIR. 
·  Average Individual Risk (ASR) 
AIR is calculated from historical data, the number of fatalities per year is divided by 
the number of people at risk.” 
 
The newly developed method of this dissertation takes the time factor and the 
personnel presence into consideration. Thus, the Individual-Specific Individual Risk 
(further: individual risk) is considered and will be calculated in the developed 
approach. 
Other terms and definitions follow (ISO 31000 2009). 
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3 Individual risk. Acceptable criteria 
For an evaluation of the individual risk it is important to understand that there are 
acceptable criteria for an individual. For the most common situations the accepted 
risk values are not given. The requirements for acceptance criteria are either kept 
very general (e.g. in a qualitative form) or absent in a regulatory context (especially 
for a quantitative form/analysis). Basically there are only qualitative definitions of the 
risk acceptability limit. 
Organizations establish their risk decision basing criteria on a multitude of 
benchmarks including industry standards, local and foreign government regulations, 
practices of industrial partners and qualitative assessment of what is fair and 
reasonable. Though, most EU-Countries do not have an available risk acceptance 
criteria, e.g. on how safety distance should be determined using the available 
qualitative risk analysis methods (IRGC 2005).  
This chapter attempts to provide information on existing acceptance criteria and what 
value could be chosen / suggested as the acceptable criteria in the presented 
method. 
 
3.1 Terminology and conception 
Before accepting the plausible risk criterion its definition should be formulated. The 
definition is based on (UN/ISDR 2009): 
   
Acceptable risk: the level of potential losses that a society or community considers 
acceptable giving existing social, economic, political, cultural, technical and 
environmental conditions. 
 
Based on the definition, risk acceptable criteria have to protect human life and health, 
as well as environmental resources and natural areas. In other words, acceptable risk 
criteria is a criterion ensuring the safety measures in place are reasonable in 
proportion to the risk of accident. 
Socially acceptable risk estimates not only and not so much absolute values of risk 
considering many aspects of activity, but the existing tendencies of growth or 
decrease in risks of various conservative and new kinds of activity assumed by 
society. It is pertinent to define the acceptable risk at various levels - from the 
organization of a branch of economy to the state. 
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Need of formation of the concept of the acceptable risk is caused by the impossibility 
of the creation of an absolutely safe activity (e.g. technological process). The 
acceptable risk combines technical, economic, social and political aspects. In 
practice it is always a compromise between the safety level reached in society 
(proceeding from indicators of mortality, incidence, traumatism, disability) and 
opportunities of its increase by economic, technological, organizational and other 
methods. Economic opportunities of increase of safety and the socio-technical of 
systems are not boundless. So, concerning production, spending excessive funds for 
increase of safety of technical systems, it is possible to weaken financing of social 
programs of production (reduction of costs of acquisition of overalls, medical care, 
sanatorium treatment, etc.). 
The example of a definition for the acceptable risk is presented in (fig. 5) by 
increasing the costs of improvement of the equipment, the technical risk decreases, 
but the social risk grows. The total risk has a minimum at a certain ratio between 
investments into the technical and social sphere. This circumstance should be 
considered as a choice of the acceptable risk. Approaches to an assessment of the 
acceptable risk are very broad. So, accept the schedule presented in (fig. 5) is 
accepted both for necessary state regulations as well as for the concrete 
organization. The main thing there is in the first case a choice of the acceptable risk 
for society, in the second - for staff of the organization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Definition of the acceptable risk of the organization. 
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The typical well-known acceptance value which can be found in different literatures 
and numerous regulations worldwide in the field of fire risk (in general) is 1 · 10-6 per 
year and per person. This value is internationally comparable and was determined 
via a socio-political consensus for example in the Netherlands. Whereby this value 
corresponds to the average life risk (Duijm 2009, Trebojevic 2005, CPR 18E 2005). 
But this value is to general and must be defined for every country and their 
enterprises in detail. Based on a literature research further chapter presents some 
examples of acceptable risk criteria’s for different countries. 
 
3.2 Acceptable criteria in different countries 
As mentioned earlier “organizations have moral, legal and financial responsibilities to 
limit risk. Whether the potential receptors are employees or members of the public, 
they cannot be exposed to a level of risk that is bigger than what is morally tolerable. 
In addition to the risk for people, the risk given to environment […] should be 
considered. [By setting] a good risk management program, with [strictly] selected risk 
tolerance criteria, will balance between these three responsibilities (fig. 6)” (Marszal 
2001): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Risk management responsibilities (Marszal 2001). 
 
Make plant as safe as 
possible, disregard costs 
Build lowest cost plant; keep operating 
budget as small as possible 
Comply with regulation as written, 
regardless of cost or actual level of risk 
Moral 
Financial Legal 
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The easiest way to approach a definition of risk criteria is by determining a single risk 
level, which separates the acceptable from the unacceptable risk. Considering this, 
only a few countries have accepted and endorsed specific numerical values for this 
risk level (Kauer et al. 2002). Table 1 reviews some qualitative and quantitative 
criteria’s that has been used by governments and industries of various countries, 
based on (SFK-GS-41 2004, Kauer et al. 2002, CPR18E 2005, Trebojevic 2005, 
Duijm 2009, HSE 1989, HSE 2004, Salvi et al. 2004). 
 
Table 1. Comparison of individual risk criteria and methods. 
 
 
3.3 Summary  
“… it is strictly necessary to properly understand which risks have to be measured 
and the acceptance criteria that should be used to get external (authorities, public, 
etc.) and internal (management, operation department, inspection, department, 
financial department, etc.) acceptance. This should be decided at the earliest stage 
Country 
Qualitative 
evaluation 
Quantitative 
evaluation 
[1/a] 
Additional information 
 
Netherlands 
 
X 
10
-5
 Existing process/structure 
  
10
-6
 New process/situations 
Switzerland √ 10
-5
 - 10
-6
 Cantonal regulations 
UK X 10
-6
 Broadly acceptable level of risk 
  
10
-5
 
Risk has to be reduced to the level As Low As 
Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) 
USA √ 4 
.
 10
-4
 
"de manifestus risks" from regulatory 
(supervisory) authority or defined by 
enterprises for itself (have an by influence on 
insurance) 
Denmark √ 10
-6
 exceeding approx. 
France √ 10
-5
 - 10
-6
 
… in almost the same way as in the 
Netherlands 
Belgium √ 10
-5
 
Flanders (region of Belgium) commercial 
activities permitted outside the 
establishment’s boundary line 
Germany √ X 
The unofficial value is 
 
10
-5
 - 10
-6 
 [1/a] which 
is not part of the national legislation (SFK-
GS-41 2004) 
Finland √ X 
3 zones qualitative catergories (safety 
Technologys Authority TUKES) 
Hungary √ 10
-5
 - 10
-6
 
… in almost the same way as in the 
Netherlands 
Czech Republic √ 10
-5
 - 10
-6
 
… in almost the same way as in the 
Netherlands 
Russia X 10
-6
 required in National level by orders 
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of the risk-based decision-making process …. Any actions taken and the results 
which follow must be based on these criteria. It should be clear that there is a 
difference in using risk assessment to minimize the expenditure on maintenance and 
in using it to reduce overall safety, health and environmental risks for the personnel 
and the public, without overspending” (Kauer et al. 2002). 
 
 
Figure 7. Dependences between hazard, vulnerability, damage, risk and as a result the possible total 
annual expected costs. Adapted from (Coburn et.al. 1992). 
 
To review the qualitative criteria which can be evaluated to determine what amount of 
risk can reasonably be tolerated some recommendations are made. These criteria 
can fulfil requirements regarding: 
 
 Analysis and statistics of accidents 
 Consistency, proportionality and transparency 
 All accident possibilities   
 Specific safety measures of the establishment. 
 
Every country has to determine its own value of acceptable risk criteria according to 
the national regulations. As a first step the real figures of the accidents have to be 
considered and they must be adapted and optimized after a certain time. This should 
be applied individually. Based on (table 1) this dissertation uses as an acceptable risk 
criterion value of 1 · 10-6 per year.  
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4 Risk analyses in explosion and fire protection 
In the area of CPI the objectives of risk analyses studies can be different. There are 
numerous qualitative, semi-quantitative and quantitative methods, subjacent the 
deterministic, heuristic (indexing) and probabilistic methods, which are used in CPI, 
e.g. in the field of fire protection these three methods are distinguished and classified 
according to (NFPA 551 2007). In last decades different methods have been 
developed for risk assessment. They can be divided in applications to support the 
risk assessment for buildings and applications for chemical facilities. In most cases 
these applications evaluate the risk only for fire protection. Risk from a possible 
explosion scenario is evaluated only for chemical facilities. Further presented 
literature research gives an overview about the findings of comprehensive survey of 
methods and applications.  
 
4.1  Survey of applications for explosion and fire risk assessment in buildings 
4.1.1 Quantitative methods 
The surveys of (Leksin et al. 2014, Leksin et al. 2013, Mock et al. 2012), give a first 
impression of risk related application programs and services in fire protection as 
already offered by, e.g. engineering companies. The findings of this survey shrink to 
a manageable amount of applications following a certain method, when concentrating 
solely on risk assessing approaches: 
 
 CRISP (UK) “… is a Monte-Carlo model of entire fire scenarios. The sub-
models, representing physical ‘objects’, include[ing] rooms, doors, windows, 
detectors and alarms, items of furniture •...•, hot smoke layers and people. The 
stochastic aspects include starting conditions, such as windows and doors 
open or closed, the number, type and location of people within the building, 
the location of the fire and type of burning item” (Fraser-Mitchell et al. 1993). 
The fire and smoke spread are simulated by a two layer zone model. The 
simulation uses a variable time step in order to achieve maximum efficiency 
while still maintaining a numerically stable solution. 
And CRISP2 (UK) … fire zone model in which people are represented as 
individuals. “The list of object classes in CRISP2 includes: items of furniture, 
hot gas layers, cold air layers, vents between rooms and leading to the 
outside, walls, rooms, smoke detectors and occupants. It is based on object 
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oriented programming techniques. It means that a system can be treated as a 
collection of objects. The objects usually correspond to a physical component 
of a real-world system. A section of the program, which defines the object’s 
behaviour in response to input data, represents each object. The objects may 
interact in many ways, depending on the mutual exchange of information. 
Thus, the system is complex due to the large number of interactions occurring 
simultaneously” (Björkmann et al. 2011). 
 FIERAsystem (Canada) “…is a computer model for evaluating fire protection 
systems in industrial buildings. The model has been developed as a tool to 
assist fire protection engineers, building officials, fire service personnel and 
researchers in performing fire safety engineering calculations. It can be used 
to conduct hazard and risk analyses, as well as to evaluate whether a selected 
design satisfies established fire safety objectives. … is primarily designed for 
appliance in warehouses and aircraft hangars, it can be modified for 
application to other industrial buildings” (Benichou et al. 2005). 
 FiRECAM (Fire Risk Evaluation and Cost Assessment Model) (Canada) 
developed by The National Research Council of Canada (NRCC) in 
collaboration with Public Works and Government Services Canada (Dutcher et 
al. 1996) “…calculates the expected number of deaths and fire losses. These 
values are then combined with the probabilities of occurrence for the fire 
scenarios to obtain the following two decision-making parameters: expected 
risk to life (ERL) … and fire cost expectation (FCE)” (Hadjisophocleous et al. 
2004). 
 AssessNET. Fire Risk Assessment Module: “… allows to split the workplace 
into different zones […]. Generic questions allow to answer in a yes / no 
format and AssessNET finally identifies the corrective remedial actions that 
need to be taken.” (AssesNET). 
 COSSH Assessment Software: This “Risk Assessment Software is used to 
help companies to manage Health and Safety and fire safety. It can also be 
used to help remain compliant and to manage environmental health and safety 
and assess fire risks. Apart from the obvious safety implications this can also 
be important for insurance purposes” (COSSH 2013). 
 TAM: “… is a web-based, flexible and scalable Health and Safety 
management system …”. The company offers templates, e.g. in the areas of 
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“Health and Safety Risk Assessment” namely “Fire Risk Assessment 
Template, Fire Safety Policy Template, Fire Precautions and Maintenance”. 
(TAM Software Ltd. 2007). 
 Synergi Life Risk Management “…provides a scenario-based evaluation of risk 
level as a function of likelihood of occurrence and potential severity of impact 
towards the organisations objectives.” (DNV 2012).  
 
These methods seemingly show the current practice in the area of quantitative risk 
assessment in fire protection as all of them use the risk term. However when looking 
at details, the approaches are restricted to hazard evaluation purposes. Enterprises 
often apply the risk terminology in a market-oriented manner whereas a clear 
definition of a risk remains rather fuzzy especially to the public. In this respect, 
Synergi Life Risk Management stays a risk assessment approach without a doubt. 
Another application program with reference to risk is: 
 
 FRAME (Fire Risk Assessment Method for Engineering). The application 
program is used to define a “…fire safety concept for new or existing 
buildings”.  “…one can calculate the fire risk in buildings for the property and 
the content, for the occupants and for the activities in it.” “ … The Fire Risk for 
the building and its content is defined as the quotient of the Potential Risk P by 
the Acceptance Level A and the Protection Level D”. (FRAME 2013). 
 
Hence, the FRAME approach is not in concordance with the common risk definition. 
The survey also yields a tool basing on Bayesian approaches: 
 
 AgenaRisk is a “Bayesian network and simulation software for risk analysis 
and decision support” It “… supports both diagnostic and predictive reasoning 
about uncertainty using risk maps, otherwise known as Bayesian networks” 
(AGENA 2012).  
 
An additional comprehensive survey of computer models for fire and smoke can be 
found in (Stephen et al. 2003). But they cannot be used in the field of CPI. Moreover 
for the majority of the presented methods the auditor needs an appropriate training in 
the use of this application program. 
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In the end it is difficult to come to a final conclusion about possibilities of fire 
protection risk assessment applications. The understanding of risk terms as well as 
fields of operation vary significantly and, hence, comparable results cannot be taken 
for granted. One of the best examples is FIERAsystem and FiRECAM which provide 
several calculation options, which allow the user to conduct a risk analysis. As 
described in (Benichou et al. 2005) “if information on the probabilities of different fire 
scenarios occurring is available and the reliabilities of fire protection systems are 
known, then a full risk assessment can be conducted using information from the 
hazard analyses of all of the possible fire scenarios.” If it is not possible, the 
computer model uses only the “Life Hazard Model” for the calculation of the time-
dependent probability of death, based on the probit function. 
 
4.1.2 Indexing methods 
Where the strict quantitative analysis of risk by probabilistic methods is difficult or 
impossible, analysts appreciate fast heuristics. Such methods are fire risk indexing, 
performance-based codes and scoring methods (Hall et al. 2008, Watts 2002). 
However it should be noted that these methods are only practical when carrying out a 
fast analysis at the level of fire protection equipment, as well as to determine the 
necessity of additional fire prevention measures. 
The literature survey also shows the current practice in the area of indexing point 
scheme audits: 
 
 Dow Chemical Method – developed by The Dow Chemical Company (USA) 
“… provides a simple method of rating the relative acute health hazard 
potential to people in neighboring plants or communities from possible 
chemical release incidents. Absolute measures of risk are very difficult to 
determine, but the CEI system will provide a method of ranking one hazard 
relative to another. It is not intended to define a particular design as safe or 
unsafe. 
The CEI is used: 
o For conducting an initial Process Hazard Analysis (PHA). 
o As a screening tool for further study 
o In Emergency Response Planning  
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It is a simple method for predicting dispersion of vapors/gases from process 
leaks, and the Index is used as part of Dow Risk Assessment” (Dow Chemical 
Method 2013). For a detailed description see (Chemical exposure index 2006). 
 FRIM (Fire Risk Indexing Method) for Multistory Apartment Buildings. This 
method adjusts fire-prevention systems of wooden houses by comparison of 
an index of fire risk with a similar index for buildings with nonflammable 
bearing designs. This method is in fact a method of hazard assessment as no 
likelihoods are considered (Karlsson 2002). 
 FSES (Fire Safety Evaluation System) evaluates the overall level of the fire 
safety of buildings. It provides means of comparing the effectiveness of 
proposed improvements by producing a comparative baseline and shows the 
relative gain in fire safety for proposed improvements (NFPA 101A). 
 SIA 81 or Gretener method and its modifications “… is used to evaluate and 
compare the level of fire risk of alternative concepts by grading the elements 
of a building and their performance. The grading factors are claimed to be 
based on expert knowledge, a large statistical survey and tested by a wide 
practical application. The calculated risk is compared to the accepted risk, 
where the latter is a function of the number and the mobility of the persons 
involved and of the location of the relevant fire compartments within the 
building” (Larsson 2000). Methods like, ERIC - Evaluation du Incendie par le 
Calcul (Cluzel et al. 1979), Fire Risk Assessment Method for Engineering 
(FRAME 2013) etc. are modifications of SIA 81. 
 
The literature survey testifies that probabilistic and indexing methods are beneficial 
applications, which take their own place in the range of approaches to a problem with 
regard to QRA. However when carrying out the application the auditor needs a 
profound expert knowledge about the individual requirements of the industrial branch 
in question. The advantages and disadvantages of the presented methods are 
summarized in the next table 2: 
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Table 2. Comparison of risk assessment applications for buildings. 
Methods Consider 
the risks 
Consider 
the 
hazards 
Regard 
to fire 
risk 
Regard to 
explosion 
risk 
Potential 
applicable in CPI 
Semi-
quantitative 
(SQ) or 
heuristic 
(Indexing) 
(HI) 
CRISP+CRISP2 ± + + - ± SQ 
FIERAsystem + + + - + SQ 
FIRECAM ± + + - + SQ 
AssessNET - + + - - SQ 
COSSHAssessment 
Software 
± + + - ± SQ 
TAM ± ± + - ± SQ 
Synergi Life Risk 
Management 
+ + + ± + SQ 
FRAME - + + -   SQ 
Agena Risk ± + + - + SQ 
Dom Chemical 
Methods 
± + + + + HI 
FRIM - + + - - HI 
FSES - + + - ± HI 
SIA81 ± + + - + HI 
 
The summary shows that these methods are only applicable to fire risks and do not 
consider explosions risks. Next chapter gives an overview about the survey of 
applications for chemical facilities, where the explosion and fire risks are considered.  
 
4.2  Survey of QRA applications for chemical facilities  
If the risk analyses for chemical facilities are considered, QRA is only one of several 
inputs to the decision-making process. It depends on the questions which aims are 
pursued the enterprise and how they should be balanced with the engineering 
judgement and company values. There is a range of different well known methods in 
the qualitative approach, such as the check lists (Giannini et al. 2006), the Hazard 
and Operability analysis (HAZOP) (Lawley 1974), Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
(FMEA) (NUREG/CR-2815 1983) and more overs described in (ISO/IEC 31010 2009, 
Lewis 2005). Approaches concerning the consequence and frequency assessments 
are commonly used without a full QRA study to guide engineering solutions, hazard 
identification and control, safety system design, emergency planning etc. However 
CPI consider also the use of QRA to attempt and specify the estimation of absolute 
risk level of a system, plant or the effects on the facilities or processes, which could 
have an impact on the environment, business markets or other areas of interest. In 
order to continuously improve safety engineering in general, it is a major task of 
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industry, insurance and academia to build up a sound knowledge base about the 
potential accident scenarios. In order to be able to do this, a number of approaches 
exist, which support an enterprise (auditors) in the QRA for chemical facilities. The 
advantage is that the QRA for CPI, as a risk assessment method, enhances 
systematic identification and evaluation of possible accidental events, e.g. physical 
effects of accidental releases of hazardous materials, including their causes and 
consequences. ”QRA has over the years established itself as a standard component 
of the risk management programme for offshore” (DNV GL 2016) and onshore 
facilities and in the field of CPI. 
The summary of the available application programs is based partially on the paper 
(Lewis 2005), which “presents the findings of a comprehensive survey of [application 
programs] currently available for undertaking QRA for onshore and offshore oil and 
gas facilities” (Lewis 2005). As (Leksin et al. 2013) have already stated, the number 
of commercial QRA assisting application programs is surprisingly small and from an 
initial list of applications (over 80 application programs) in the field of CPI, only a 
handful of application program products could undertake full QRA, what is confirmed 
auxiliary with the specified paper (Lewis 2005). 
“From this list, a subset of ‘leading‘ software providers was selected based on criteria 
including: user base, validation of the software model, ease of use and resources 
required, quality of product support, and continuous improvement” (Lewis 2005). 
From the methodological point of view, three approaches adopted for risk 
assessment can be distinguished. A total of 19 consequence, 19 frequency and 8 
QRA leading applications were selected and presented in table 3 from (Lewis 2005) 
with addition of some Russian approaches: 
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Table 3. Leading application programs. 
Methods Consider 
the  
risks 
Consider 
the 
hazards 
Regard 
to fire 
risk 
Regard to 
explosion 
risk 
Potential  
applicable 
in CPI 
Semi-
quantitative 
(SQ) or 
heuristic 
(Indexing) 
(HI) 
AERMOD/ISC PRO (C) + + + + + SQ 
AUTOREAGAS (C) + + + + + SQ 
BLOWFAM (F) ± + + + + SQ 
CAMEO (ALOHA) (Q) + + + + + SQ 
CAFTA (F) ± + + + + SQ 
CANARY (C) + + + + + SQ 
CAPTREE (F) ± + + + + SQ 
CARA (F) ± + + + + SQ 
CEBAM (C) + + + + + SQ 
CIRRUS (C) + + + + + SQ 
COLLIDE (F) ± + + + + SQ 
CRASH (F) ± + + + + SQ 
DAMAGE (C) + + + + + SQ 
DDMT (F) ± + + + + SQ 
EFFECTS (C) + + + + + SQ 
FAULT & EVENT TREE (F) ± + + + + SQ 
FAULT TREE+ (F) ± + + + + SQ 
FAULTREASE (F) ± + + + + SQ 
FIREX (C) + + + + + SQ 
FLACS (C) + + + + + SQ 
FRED (C) + + + + + SQ 
FT PROFESSIONAL (F) ± + + + + SQ 
HAZ FIRE/EXPLOSION (C) + + + + + SQ 
HAZ PROFESSIONAL (C) + + + + + SQ 
KAMELEON FIREX (C) + + + + + SQ 
LEAK (F) ± + + + + SQ 
LOGAN F&ETA (F) ± + + + + SQ 
NEPTUNE (Q) + + + + + SQ 
OILMAP (C) + + + + + SQ 
OSIS (C) + + + + + SQ 
PHAST (C) + + + + + SQ 
PLATO (Q) + + + + + SQ 
PSA PROFESSIONAL (F) ± + + + + SQ 
RISKCURVES (Q) + + + + + SQ 
RISKMAN (F) ± + + + + SQ 
RISKPLOT GRAPHIC (Q) + + + + + SQ 
RISKSPECTRUM (F) ± + + + + SQ 
SAFETI (Q) + + + + + SQ 
SAPHIRE (F) ± + + + + SQ 
SCOPE (C) + + + + + SQ 
SHEPHERD (F) ± + + + + SQ 
TOXI+Hazop (F) ± + + + + SQ 
TOXI+Risk (Q) + + + + + SQ 
TRACE (C) + + + + + SQ 
СИТИС: Блок+ 3.00 (C) + + + + + SQ 
СИТИС: Спринт 1.50 (Q) + + + + + SQ 
C = Consequence modelling; F = Frequency assessment; Q = Quantitative risk assessment 
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The consequence approaches (table 4) can be used in the first step and shows the 
consequence area for lethal effects and serious injuries resulting from the scenarios 
assessed (hazard identification and probability calculation of the injury based on the 
probit function).  
 
Table 4. Leading Consequence approaches (Lewis 2005). 
Empirical models 
FRED 
PHAST 
TRACE 
CIRRUS 
EFFECTS 
CANARY 
HAZ PROF 
Release, fire, 
explosion and gas dispersion 
 
The analyses of frequency are not often used in the CPI due to absence of frequency 
and/or probabilities data of several system components.  
QRA approaches tend to concentrate on determining risk for facilities and plants. In 
the last years the majority of countries are starting to use active QRA based methods 
to quantify risk. The problem of the resulting risk criteria is that they are often not 
even transparent or traceable. The technical leaders of the QRA approaches are 
presented in the table 5: 
 
Table 5. Leading QRA approaches (Lewis 2005). 
Onshore QRA 
RISKCURVES 
EFFECTS 
DAMAGE 
RISKPLOT GRAPHIC 
SAFETI 
 
Although, EFFECTS (TNO 2015) is a one of the leading consequence and QRA 
approaches, advantages and disadvantages are even discussed by (TNO 2015) itself 
in (Boot 2013): 
“TNO has been working on a complete revision of its QRA tool, and much effort has 
been put in the usage of a standardized method to obtain transparent, traceable 
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results in terms of the resulting quantified risk values itself. Unfortunately, while 
comparing the results with other [application programs], it appeared that substantial 
differences could be associated with several steps of the calculation, due to 
differences in the consequence models used, the damage (lethality) relations 
applied, the typical governing parameters used in the models, and last but not least, 
the risk calculation method itself.”  
It should be noted that due to the absence of the description of the Russian 
approaches in English, their comparisons with other worldwide application programs 
was not found in the English literature survey, as SITIS (SITIS 2015) based on 
(GOST 12.1.004-91 1992) and TOXI+ (TOXI 2015) based on (RD-03-26-2007 2008). 
 
4.3  Potential of the available QRA applications 
The synopsis of the literature survey is that the applications, which support the risk 
assessment for buildings, only consider fire scenarios. This means that the process, 
which allows the possibility of an explosion scenario in a building, cannot be 
evaluated by applications mentioned in the previous chapters. The possibility of using 
these applications for the evaluation of the fire risk of buildings in CPI is not excluded.  
Explosion risk is not considered by such application programs. Additionally the 
findings show that only a few of the presented applications for chemical facilities are 
suitable for a qualified risk assessment. A combination of approaches, which could 
evaluate the individual risk and consequences, does not exist. Therefore, a 
methodological gap in the field of explosion and fire risk assessment for CPI will be 
covered by the developed semi-quantitative approach, presented in this dissertation. 
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5 Objective target 
The primary aim of this dissertation consists in the development of a new method, 
which will be based on the combination of semi-quantitative and indexing 
procedures, for the calculation of the individual risk in CPI in the field of EFP. The 
method will evaluate the explosion and fire risks. Also the method should be simple 
to use for the auditor, should not demand special training courses and be fast in 
respect of calculations. Such a semi-quantitative approach gives a quantitative 
numerical value as a calculated result, which can be used for different aims. One of 
them could be, e.g. comparison with the acceptable risk criteria for the concrete 
audited enterprise or an audited area of the enterprise to define the acceptability or 
non-acceptability of the individual risk. 
Chapter 4 describes the existing methods and application programs as well as their 
benefits and drawbacks. Thus, the gaps in the calculation of the individual risk in CPI 
in the field of EFP were identified. 
The results of this research lead to the conclusion that the method developed in this 
dissertation has to focus on two areas: on a semi-quantitative approach for individual 
risk assessment and a quantitative approach for consequence assessment. However 
these areas have to be considered separately, that means that the developed 
method has to carry out the assessment of the risk in two phases. This is summed up 
in the following table 6: 
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Table 6. Structure of the developed method. 
Results Semi-quantitative approach for 
individual risk assessment 
Quantitative approach for consequence 
assessment 
Calculated 
individual risks 
The “actual” individually risk is 
calculated based on a new 
developed risk equation 
 
 
Does not consider (in the right sense) the 
classical terminology of risk, but rather the 
evaluation of dangerous phenomenon 
from a fire, explosion, fireball or  tourch 
fire: this according to a probit function 
 
Assessment of 
scenarios 
Due to the assessed “actual” risk, a 
worst case and also best case 
scenarios are considered in the 
calculation 
 
Due to the evaluation restriction of the 
proportions, or respectively based of the 
result from an event, e.g. an explosion 
which already accrued, those data will be 
considered in the consequence according 
the calculation of the probit function.  This 
is viewed as the worst case scenario (if-
when…) 
 
Aspects which are 
considered in the 
calculation  
 time factor  
 safety index 
 safety coefficient 
 frequencies of a fire for 
different enterprises 
 weighting factors (for safety 
measures & hazards) 
 material characteristic 
 process characteristic 
 based on an existing Russian 
approach which is then implemented 
in MS Excel prototype tool 
 comparison with the one of the world  
leading tools “TNO Effects” to proof 
(argument) the advantages of the new 
developed MS Excel prototype tool 
 calculation of the consequences 
based on probit function with the 
consideration of the impacts/effects 
parameters of the scenario 
 
 
Such an extended method contributes to enhance the scientific knowledge 
concerning significant phenomena in terms of risk. It serves the development of 
concepts as well as principles for the assessment and the assessment of risks. 
In the end of the developed method, two MS Excel prototype tools are additionally 
developed. This leads to a better visualization of the risk calculation process and a 
simpler and at the same time automatic calculation of the individual risk and 
consequences as well as of hazard and safety factors.  
With other words the concept of the procedure of the individual risk and consequence 
assessment can be introduced with the following (fig. 8): 
   
 
 
27 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Procedure of individual risk and consequence assessment of the developed method.
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6 Principle of risk assessment processes in the extended semi-
quantitative approach 
The academia and the practitioners follow approaches of their own. The academia 
problem-solving approach pursues universality of (risk analysis) methods in the first 
instance while the practitioners’ approaches concentrate on practical convenience. 
However the academia and the practitioners pursue also the same aim in the risk 
assessment process: 
“... an application-oriented interpretation considers risk as probability of coincidence 
(i.e. areal, temporal) or completion of a functional chain: occurrence of danger → 
causing hazard → effecting impairment → resulting harm. It also takes into account 
the effectiveness and availability of both types of essential risk reducing measures. 
Measures to safeguard antagonise the hazard, whereas measures to protect work 
against the vulnerable subject (i.e. person, building, facility and environment). This 
context is outlined in (fig. 9)” (Mock et al. 2012): 
 
 
Figure 9. Interaction of functional risk chains and risk reducing measures. 
 
Thus, the developed method follows the risk management process of (ISO 31000 
2009) with some adjustments concerning the risk assessment process (fig. 11): 
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Figure 10. Risk management process (ISO 31000 2009). 
 
The points “communication & consultation” and “monitoring & review” are not the 
object of this work and are not discussed. The risk assessment area (fig.11) is 
considered in the developed method and support the reader step-by-step through the 
descriptions in the following chapters. 
 
Identify safety measures & 
hazards 
Risk analysis 
Risk evaluation
Estimate frequency
Risk calculation
Risk assessment
 
Figure 11. Risk assessment process. 
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7 Extended semi-quantitative approach for individual risk 
assessment 
By consideration of an individual risk assessment in the CPI with regard to the EFP 
the auditor faces an industrial building with different plants and devices, pipelines, 
reactors with unit processes and protection facilities (fig. 12). Hazards are primarily 
posed by hazardous substances which are able to change their substantial properties 
depending on the processes and the conditions of the respective unit processes. 
 
 
Figure 12. Forming of a functional structure by splitting up a whole function in part functions modified 
by Leksin-Barth (Pahl 2007) 
 
To ensure a better traceability of the issue to be presented, the next (fig. 13) 
illustrates an example of a paint manufacturer who has to carry out a risk analysis. 
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Sprinkler System
Reactor
Fire alarm system
Fire alarm system
Gas detection
Emergency exit
Automatic 
interruption of 
process
Pump
Storage of 
solvents
Ventilation
Fire alarm system
Storage of 
aluminium dust
Q-Box. Constructive 
explosion protection
Filter
Mixer
Storage
 Figure 13. Example of a risk analysis by a paint manufacturer 
 
The building, processes, plants etc. are components of a system which have to be 
considered during the risk assessment. They are the most important elements 
concerning risk analysis. It is the aim to carry out the risk and hazard assessment of 
the paint manufacture production as a first step, and secondly apply a consequence 
assessment of the separate parts of the whole system.  
This chapter describes the developed method which is based on the mixing of semi-
quantitative and indexing approaches for the calculation of an individual risk in the 
field of EFP. The concept is structured in the following steps: 
 
 short introduction of the problem identification in the field of the usage of the 
Event Tree Analysis (ETA) in risk assessment,  advantages and 
disadvantages of the involvement 
 development of the semi-quantitative approach in the extended method 
 development of the indexing approach in the extended method 
 connection of both approaches and development of the extended method 
 gradual description of the risk calculation steps 
 summary of the developed semi-quantitative method for individual risk 
assessment 
 
 
System analysis
Risk assessment
Consequence 
assessment
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7.1 Problem identification  
“As mentioned […], EFP audits are often compliance checks in order to judge the 
condition of fire protection equipment on the base of (e.g. national) fire regulations. 
However QRA approaches are also needed to prioritise safety optimisation 
measurements.  
The simultaneous consideration of operating and non-operating safety barriers within 
a single diagram finally gives a pronounced risk characterisation beyond pure hazard 
evaluation. This comprehension also shifts the audit from a pure expert judgment to 
proven probabilistic risk assessment approaches. Hence the ETA enriches the audit 
process.  
However pure ETA method is not a risk assessment approach and has to be 
adjusted to the risk [assessment]  principles. The way out is to define generic 
scenarios as typical in EFP. Figure 14 shows a simplified generic event tree” (Leksin 
et al. 2013): 
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system
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0.2
and/or
0.1
0.5
0.2
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Figure 14: Simplified ETA (I.E.: initiating event) (Leksin et al. 2013). 
 
The use of this knowledge base as well as the introduction of pre-defined criteria 
(e.g. weighing factors) to generic event trees allows to optimize the risk evaluation 
toward of a semi-quantitative field. 
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7.2 Semi-quantitative approach 
In practice, the common QRA approaches are unable to cope with individual risks on 
a level of needful, e.g. for business and insurance purposes. Taking up the authors’ 
preliminary studies (Leksin et al. 2013, Mock et al. 2012) a semi-quantitative 
approach is used and integrated within a common check list approach. Hazards and 
safety measures are considered and developed in form of an alternative check list. 
Attachment “Example of a check list survey” gives an example of how such a check 
list can look like and discusses the problem of its formulation. 
The check list contains indicators of hazards: explosion hazards, fire hazards and 
factors (designated as: further factors) which have influences on the explosion and 
fire hazards or are interconnected with these, designated as macro parameters. 
Every macro parameter has a number of micro parameters, which are evaluated by 
an auditor. The same applies for the safety measures. This context is outlined in 
table 7. 
 
Table 7. Check list of parameters. 
1. Further factors 
1.1 Amount of dangerous substance 
1.2 Room category  
1.3 Technological process 
1.x … 
Value of Further factors                          
2.Fire hazards 
2.1 Dangerous goods 
2.y … 
Value of Fire hazards 
3. Explosion hazards 
3.1 Instability/Reactivity  
3.2 Classification of combustible substances  
3.z … 
Value of Explosion hazards 
I. Architects measures 
I.I  
I.II 
II. Technical measures 
III. Organization measures 
 
This kind of check list characterizes all scenarios of an event tree, which enriches the 
risk assessment process and takes into account the worst and best case paths of this 
ETA, as shown in (fig. 15):  
34 
 
Fire Frequency 
Measures 1 Measures i Measures ni
Consequence
I. E.
Worst Case
Worst Case
Worst Case/ 
Best Case
Best Case
Best Case
0,8
1/0
0,5
Szenario 1
Yearm /1020,1 25
Szenario 2
0,5 Szenario 3
0,2
1/0
0,8
0,2
Szenario n1
Szenario n2
Szenario n3
Szenario ni
Worst Case/ 
Best Case
Worst Case/ 
Best Case
 
Figure 15. ETA in the audit process (I.E.: initiating event). 
 
The next step in the semi-quantitative approach is the evaluation of the macro and 
micro parameters (hazards and safety measures). For this, determined weighting 
factors are used. The weighting factors of table 8 are used for safety parameters: 
 
Table 8. Weighting factors for safety parameters. 
Compliance Weighting Factors 
Irrelevant 0.95 
Unacceptable 0.50 
Acceptable 0.20 
Accepted 0.05 
 
Every micro parameter is assigned a compliance level by the auditor. However the 
weighting factors are not mentioned explicitly. Furthermore the weighting factors are 
defined and fixed, thus the auditor cannot change the features. The given values of 
the weightings factors mirror their respective percentage figure (e.g. if the auditor 
evaluates one of the micro parameter as “Acceptable”, it means that this micro 
parameter is secure up to 80%). 
For hazard parameters (e.g. amount of dangerous substances), there are weighting 
factors for both, worst case and best case. 
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Table 9. Weighting factors for best and worst case scenarios. 
Compliance Best Case Worst Case 
Hazard free 0.95 0.05 
Low 0.75 0.25 
Average 0.50 0.50 
High 0.25 0.75 
Maximum 0.05 0.95 
 
The weighting factors represent an important step for an objective evaluation of the 
calculated risk as the auditors cannot manipulate the factors. 
Procedures, which give information about the risk spectrum of estimates as well as 
the standard deviation, are taken into account and are described in chapters 7.4.2.2 
and 7.4.2.3. Due to the complexity of equations and the dependency among the 
factorial indicators, the mathematical context is presented in chapter 7.3 “Indexing 
approach”. 
In addition to the weighting factors, which are used by the auditor, there are 
suggested correction factors (e.g. emergency exit - escape route - 0.8 and 0.2) to get 
more exact statements about the risk. 
The dependency of hazard factors and safety measures is taken into consideration in 
the same way. By these mathematical combinations between factorial indicators and 
weighting factors of the evaluated scenario, more exact statements about the 
calculated risk values are possible. 
In this case, the developed check list actually takes a position about the scenario and 
thereby about the complete event tree, which can only be visualized in form of a 
complex graph. Figure 16 shows, how such a graph might look like. 
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Figure 16. Schematic diagram of a risk analysis (explanation see text). 
 
Figure 16 use the following notation: mic/mac = micro and macro parameters of 
hazard and safety measures; F = fire, e.g. for an I.E.; E = existing violations; 
t = presence of personnel; i = fire frequency of industry branch; 
s = substance/material (dust, liquefied gas, etc.); S = area of testing zone; 
S1-Sn = scenarios; R = risk.  
Although, such ETA approach in a form of a complex “dynaxity” graph as well as the 
use of apriority knowledge gives “promising figures”, the audit still bases on ad-hoc 
estimates (tables 8 and 9).  The components of a technical system or technological 
processes are interconnected. These are internally including control systems and 
devices linked with each other as well. Consequently, the system becomes even 
more complex. By means of (fig. 16), the risk assessment process must consider 
different possibilities, as from the side of hazards as well as from the side of actual 
measures. It means that the dependency of hazard factors and measures must be 
taken into consideration in the same way. By this combination the developed 
scenario can only be visualized in form of a complex graph. 
Quantitative risk analysis in general lacks sufficient statistical database. In case of 
the offered semi-quantitative approach, which is integrated in form of a check list and 
evaluated by the fixed weighting factors presented in (tables 8 and 9), the lack of 
proof of expediency and applicability of these, has to be explained. For this the 
Bayesian network approach to objectivise the result evaluation of the weighting 
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factors – as conditional probabilities – which are determined in the presented method 
can be used. 
An example of how the expediency of the submitted weighting factors can be proved 
is to be found in Attachment “Possible role of the Bayesian network in the determined 
weighting factors” of this dissertation. 
 
 
Thus, the presented combination of the approaches (check list, ETA, weighting 
factors) is the first step in the development of the extended semi-quantitative method 
(fig. 17): 
 
 
Figure 17. Stepwise development of the extended semi-quantitative method. 
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7.3 Indexing approach 
The set of hazards and protection measures are considered as factorial indicators 
which define an indexing equation.  
To each factorial indicator of the system, a specified number of points are attributed 
by rules, i.e. the assessment of a condition of the system is made from various points 
of view.  
The common indexing method is developed to assess explosion hazards supported 
by factorial indicators which consider aspects causing explosions (e.g. maximum 
explosion pressure, upper explosive limit etc.) as well as measures to mitigate 
explosion hazards (e.g. gas detection system, lightning protection etc.). The 
calculated index of explosion risk expresses a level of explosion hazards. A level of 
fire hazards is calculated identically and is supported by factorial indicators which 
consider aspects causing fires (fire loading, ignition sources etc.) as well as 
measures to mitigate fire hazards (availability of fire extinguishing systems, fire 
resistance of design, existence of an alarm system and evacuation ways, etc.). The 
formal goal of the suggested method is to comprise index calculations into QRA.  
By combining the risk equation R F C   (i.e. risk R is a function of frequency F and 
consequence C of an undesired event (ISO-Guide-73 2009)) with the indexing 
model, the resulting equation of individual risk becomes: 
 
 Ind F SR F P C    (3) 
 
where 
Ind
R = individual risk [1/a]; FF = frequency of a fire at the enterprise [m
2/a]; 
P
  
= probability of presence of the personnel; SC  = safety coefficient. 
  
7.3.1 Influence of the fire frequency 
As mentioned in (Leksin et al. 2013), risk values are industry specific. The frequency 
FF of a fire at the enterprise is derived from statistical data for the analyzed 
enterprise. Average values can be obtained from international statistical data and 
standards like (CPR18E 2005, FZ 1994). Table 10 exemplifies branches and 
frequencies in use. 
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Table 10. Fire frequencies of branches (Leksin et al. 2013). 
Industry Frequency 
10
-5
 [m
2
/a] 
Literature 
Power generation 1.20 1,14-16,19 
Storage (chemical production) 1.38 1-3,4,7-12,14-16,19 
Storage 9.99 1,14-16,19 
Manufacturing companies 
Chemical enterprises (synth. rubber, fiber) 
Smelting & casting enterprises 
Food industry 
7.30 
2.65 
1.70 
1.89 
1-3,8,10,14-16,19 
14-16,19 
1-3,8,10,14-16,19 
1-3,8,10,14-16,19 
Metal industry 1.78 1,8,10,14-16,19 
 
(
1 
CPR 18E 2005; 
2 
Covo 1981; 
3 
Lees 1986; 
4 
OREDA 2002; 
5 
1nd Guidelines 1989;  
6 
2nd Guidelines 
2000; 
7 
Hauptmann 2003; 
8 
Offshore hydrocarbon  2001; 
9 
Spouge 2006; 
10 
TAA‐GS‐03 1994; 11 HSE‐
REPORT 1978; 
12 
Beernes et al. 2006; 
13 
Руководство по оценке пожарного риска для 
промышленных предприятий 2006; 
14 
GOST 12.3.047-2012 2012; 
15 
 GOST 12.1.004-91 1992; 
16 
РД 
03‐418‐01 2001; 17 FZ 1994; 18 Федеральный закон № 184 2002; 19 ППБ 01‐03 2003) 
 
 Using accident databases to enhance probabilistic risk assessment 7.3.1.1
Frequency data are generally assigned using historical-statistical criteria. There is a 
range of different accident databases which can be used to estimate the fire 
frequencies of branches. Possibly in combination with expert judgment these data 
must be updated and adapted for every country individually.  
There are some examples of different databases: 
 
 MHIDAS (Major Hazard Incident Data Service) - is no longer updated and is 
no longer hosted by HSE-Health and Safety Executive (United Kingdom) 
(http://www.hse.gov.uk/) 
 "HSE Public Register of Notice History" - complementary information at UK 
Health and Safety Executive, especially about major accident hazard 
(http://www.hse.gov.uk/pipelines/hseandpipelines.htm) 
 CSB - U.S. Chemical Safety Board - Completed Investigations 
(http://www.csb.gov/) 
 European Commission / MHAB - Major Accident Hazards Bureau 
(https://minerva.jrc.ec.europa.eu/en/content/f4cffe8e-6c6c-4c96-b483-
217fe3cbf289/chemical_accident_analysis) 
 FACTS - Failure and Accidents Technical information System 
(http://www.factsonline.nl/) 
 ZEMA  - Database Germany (http://www.infosis.uba.de/) 
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These databases contain information on incidents involving hazardous materials, 
explosions and fires in the area of CPI and so-called (in Germany) “Industry 4.0”. 
Each incident includes: date and place; hazards (e.g. explosion, fire etc.); material 
name and united nations code; incident type (e.g. fire, fireball, vapour cloud  
explosion); origin (e.g. process plant, store, rail tanker); general and specific causes; 
number of people killed, injured or evacuated and other information. 
Therefore, the auditor can differentiate between industry specific frequencies or also 
use some data for specific plants, e.g. for storage tanks, as described in (Risk 
assessment data directory 2010) in combination with experiment judgments of his 
country. 
 
7.3.2 Influence of the personnel presence 
The calculation of individual risk needs to consider the probability of personnel 
presence at an endangered zone: 
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P


  (4) 
 
where  = working time of a person [h] 
 
7.3.3 Influence of the safety coefficient 
Risk to a single person depends on a number of hazards and safety measures. The 
set of hazards and protection measures is considered as a variety of factorial 
indicators which define a function based on the indexing method. These factorial 
indicators are considered by the calculation of the safety coefficient: 
 
 S S HRiskC F F   (5) 
 
where 
S
F  = factorial indicator of safety, which depends on the safety measures; 
Hrisk
F  
= factorial indicator of hazard, which is dependent on the worst case path of an 
event tree (relative to indexing factor, which is dependent on the hazards). 
Because risk considers the frequency F of an event and its consequence C, we have 
a scale from the best case to the worst case scenario which is also considered in 
ETA. 
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In order to consider all scenarios of the event tree and to achieve a more exact 
calculation of the individual risk, factorial indicators of hazards for the worst case and 
best case scenarios are developed. Figure 15 had shown this approach (chapter 
7.2).  
 
7.3.4 Influence of the safety factorial indicator 
The influence of the safety factorial indicator FS is  
 
 , , ,
1 1 1
1 1 1
arch
n m k
tech org
S i arch i tech i org
i i i
F M M M M M M
n m k  
         (6) 
 
where archM  = arithmetic mean of safety architectural measures; techM  = arithmetic 
mean of safety technical measures; orgM  = arithmetic mean of safety organizational 
measures; , ,n m k  = number of micro parameters of architectural, technical and  
organizational measures respectively; i  =  index of summation. 
 
7.3.5 Influence of the hazard factorial indicator 
The influence of the hazard factorial indicator FHRisk  is 
 
 , , ,
1 1 1
1 1 1yx z
fut f ex
HRisk i fut i f i ex
i i i
F H H H H H H
x y z  
         (7) 
 
where futH  = arithmetic mean of further factors which have an influence on explosion 
and fire hazards (e.g. amount of dangerous substance, room category, technological 
process etc.); fH  = arithmetic mean of fire hazards; exH = arithmetic mean of 
explosion hazards; , ,x y z  = number of micro parameters of further factors, explosion 
and fire hazards respectively. 
As the proposed method bases on the classical risk equation, the risk decreases 
automatically by simple multiplication of the measure factors. Therefore, it is 
important to use the arithmetic mean of all micro parameters, which form the macro 
parameter. 
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7.3.6 Influence of the safety index 
Parallel to the individual risk estimation the safety index IS is calculated. Its function is 
to additionally assess and evaluate the calculated risk adequately:  
 
 
S
S
HIndex
F
I
F
  (8) 
 
where 
S
F  = factorial indicator of safety, which depends on the safety measures;  
HIndex
F  = factorial indicator of hazard, which is dependent on the best case path of 
ETA (relative to indexing factor, which is dependent on the hazards). 
The safety index is based on the classical indexing method – weighting the hazards 
and safety measures (which are dependent on the best case path of an event tree). 
As consider the spent time of the personal in the endangered area, the calculated 
risk can be acceptable if the probability of the presence of personnel is very small. 
On the other hand, the frequency of a fire at the enterprise is also small but safety 
measures can be unacceptable. This gives a signal to the auditor that safety 
measures have to be raised. 
 
Thus, the indexing approach described above presents the next step in the 
development of the extended semi-quantitative method (fig. 18): 
 
 
Figure 18. Stepwise development of the extended semi-quantitative method. 
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7.4  Operational application 
The combination of semi-quantitative and indexing methods results in a probabilistic 
approach, which bases on weighting procedures. The auditor uses an input mask. 
First, a parameters check has to be carried out and some audit specific data are 
entered.  
The mathematical equations that serve as the basis of risk calculation and are 
described in chapter 7.3 are simple, but the relationships between input and output 
values are not always immediately apparent. Thus, the purely textual description of 
the method gets complex rather rapidly.  
The following chapters present the calculation example for the assessment of 
individual risk functions serves as an example for procedure in form of extract tables 
from the MS Excel prototype tool and describes the calculation step-by-step. 
 
7.4.1 I step. Input of specific data 
 
 
Figure 19. I step of the risk assessment. 
  
In the first step the auditor has to enter some audit specific data: 
 branch of industry by using the statistical data of the fire frequency, e.g. from 
(table 10) [m2/a] 
 area of the considered object [m2] 
 personnel presence [h]  
Equally, the auditor has to evaluate the existing violations and amount of dangerous 
substances. Behind the actual check list with the count “Evaluated by auditor”, are 
the specified values “Value_0”. 
 
 
I Evaluated by auditor Value_0
1 Branche of industry Branche 15 1,90E-05
2 Area of the considered object, m2 1000
3 Personnel presence, h 8 0,333333
4 Existing violations Be absent 0,5
1 Combustible solids (CS) Many 7,5
2 Combustible dust (CD) Middle 5
3 Combustible liquids (CL) A lot of 10
4 LPG/ LNG A lot of 10
5 Combustible gas (CG) A lot of 10
8,5
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 Evaluation of the weighting factors for “Existing violations” 7.4.1.1
For the evaluation of the “existing violations” 
E
V  fixed weighting factors are used: 
 
Table 11. Weighting factors for evaluation of the existing violations. 
Compliance Weighting Factors 
Be absent 0.5 
Are insignificant 1 
Are present 2 
In large volume 3 
 
These weighting factors are considered for the calculation of the common class of 
hazard
CC
H  (chapter 7.4.7): 
 
 
1.0
1
1.5
0
0.0
S
Ind AC
CC E S
Ind AC
S
I AC
R R
H V I AC
R R
I AC
 
  
     
    
   (9) 
 
where 
E
V  = existing violations; 
Ind
R  = individual risk; 
AC
R  = risk acceptance criteria; 
AC  = acceptance criteria for the safety index (..); 
S
I  = safety index. If there were no 
existing violations, the Safety measures are “accepted” and all Hazards are 
evaluated as “hazard free”, the common class of hazard is 0.5. By calculated  
values < 1 (as in this example) the value for the common class of hazard = 1. 
If there were some existing violations (weighting factors 1, 2 or 3), the common class 
of hazard would rise respectively of this factor. If in the past the violations existed and 
were not eliminated, the auditor would have the possibility to evaluate the risk relying 
on experience of previous audits, violations and the estimated risk. 
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 Evaluation of the weighting factors for “dangerous substances” 7.4.1.2
The auditor also estimates the amount of dangerous substances with the help of 
fixed values in a scale from 1 to 10 (table 12).  
 
Table 12. Weighting factors for evaluation of the dangerous substances. 
Compliance Weighting factors 
A lot of 10 
Many 7.5 
Middle 5 
Few 3 
Very few 1 
 
Values of the evaluated dangerous substances on the basis of given weighting 
factors in (table 9) can be used for the technical measures (chapter 7.2). 
Potential risks and threats which are coming from the dangerous substances on the 
audited places are dependent on the technical measures. These technical measures 
can be observed or not observed, or as the other option, they can be observed, but 
do not correspond to the existing substance. 
Some technical measures are very effective for one substance and are ineffective for 
other substances. There can be different substances at an enterprise; one substance 
can be bigger in quantity and others in smaller quantity. The existing technical 
measures can be effective for the substance which is smaller in quantity and 
ineffective for the substance which is bigger in quantity. This means that the technical 
measures are not laid out well.  
Practical example: if the enterprise works with a gas, so there is no present special 
sense to have a good sprinkler fire system; a special air-technical system and gas 
detection system are of greater importance. Thus, the technical measures have to be 
estimated based on the area of minimization of potential threats of the dangerous 
substances. 
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7.4.2 II step. Evaluation of hazards 
As described in chapter 7.2, the auditor has also to do the compliance check of hazard parameters: 
 
     Figure 20. II step of the risk assessment (II.1 Further factors). 
The auditor estimates the hazards with the compliances (table 9). The prototype tool evaluates automatically the worst case and best 
case scenarios with the weighting factors, which are behind the evaluation check list. Further in the dissertation the worst and best 
case scenarios are designated as “hazard factorial indicator” respectively “For Index” and “For Risk”. For the calculation of the “hazard 
factorial indicator” (chapter 7.3.5), the calculating values, e.g. in this II step, Normal value are used: 
 For Index = 0.275  
 For Risk = 0.725 
Table 9. Weighting factors for best and worst case scenarios. 
Compliance Best Case Worst Case 
Hazard free 0.95 0.05 
Low 0.75 0.25 
Average 0.50 0.50 
High 0.25 0.75 
Maximum 0.05 0.95 
 
            
For a better overview about the correlations between the Excel cells for this step see in Attachment “Correlations between the Excel cells for II step” 
 
II.1 Further factors Evaluated by auditor Value_0 Coeff. True value_0C*TV_0 Deviation +ACD -ACD
1 Substance temperature Hazard free 0,95 1 0,95 0,95 0,342225 0,05 0,05 0,05 5,1529
2 Amount of dangerous substance / fire loading Hazard free 0,95 1 0,95 0,95 0,342225 0,05 0,05 0,05 5,1529
3 … Low 0,75 1 0,75 0,75 0,148225 0,25 0,25 0,25 4,2849
4 … Average 0,5 10 0,5 5 0,018225 0,5 0,5 5 7,1824
5 … High 0,25 1 0,25 0,25 0,013225 0,75 0,75 0,75 2,4649
6 … Maximum 0,05 10 0,05 0,5 0,099225 0,95 0,95 9,5 51,5524
7 … Maximum 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,099225 0,95 0,95 0,95 1,8769
8 … Maximum 0,05 5 0,05 0,25 0,099225 0,95 0,95 4,75 5,9049
9 … Maximum 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,099225 0,95 0,95 0,95 1,8769
10 Ambient temperature (rooms, technol. process) Maximum 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,099225 0,95 0,95 0,95 1,8769
11 …
Maximum value 0,448 0,999 0,365 3,2 0,88 9 2,32 9
Normal value 0,275 0,725 0,275 0,123 0,448 0,102 0,725 0,985 1,760 -0,310
Minimum value 0,102 0,001
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Figure 21. II step of the risk assessment (Value_0). 
 
Behind the check list, Value_0 (
i
v ) has the weighting factor of each evaluated by the auditor micro parameter (table 9). Further the 
arithmetical mean of the Values_0 is calculated: 
 
  _ 0
1
1 1
0.95 0.95 0.75 0.5 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.365
10
x
i
i
V v
x 
              (10) 
 
II.1 Further factors Evaluated by auditor Value_0 Coeff. True value_0C*TV_0 Deviation +ACD -ACD
1 Substance temperature Hazard free 0,95 1 0,95 0,95 0,342225 0,05 0,05 0,05 5,1529
2 Amount of dangerous substance / fire loading Hazard free 0,95 1 0,95 0,95 0,342225 0,05 0,05 0,05 5,1529
3 … Low 0,75 1 0,75 0,75 0,148225 0,25 0,25 0,25 4,2849
4 … Average 0,5 10 0,5 5 0,018225 0,5 0,5 5 7,1824
5 … High 0,25 1 0,25 0,25 0,013225 0,75 0,75 0,75 2,4649
6 … Maximum 0,05 10 0,05 0,5 0,099225 0,95 0,95 9,5 51,5524
7 … Maximum 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,099225 0,95 0,95 0,95 1,8769
8 … Maximum 0,05 5 0,05 0,25 0,099225 0,95 0,95 4,75 5,9049
9 … Maximum 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,099225 0,95 0,95 0,95 1,8769
10 Ambient temperature (rooms, technol. process) Maximum 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,099225 0,95 0,95 0,95 1,8769
11 …
Maximum value 0,448 0,999 0,365 3,2 0,88 9 2,32 9
Normal value 0,275 0,725 0,275 0,123 0,448 0,102 0,725 0,985 1,760 -0,310
Minimum value 0,102 0,001
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 Correction coefficient in combination with weighting factors 7.4.2.1
Correction coefficient 
.Coeff
C  has a scale from 1 to 10. Such scale can be used in the 
tool calculations because these numerical values are transferred into parts.  
 
 
Figure 22. II step of the risk assessment (Coeff. & New Values). 
 
While assessing the check list the auditor has the possibility to evaluate the hazard 
parameters with the help of a so-called correction coefficient (designated in fig. 22: 
Coeff.)   
If one or the other micro parameter has a large impact on the individual risk, it can be 
enlarged with a correction number.  
If there is no special influence of the one or other micro parameters to the individual 
risk, then the correction coefficient remains as "1". If the correction coefficient 
changes, designated as "C * TV_0" in (fig. 22) from "1" to "10", the "Value_0" (also 
designated as "True Value" in fig. 22) is multiplied by the correction coefficient. 
The arithmetical mean of the correction coefficient 
.Coeff
C  is calculated too: 
 
 . .
1
1
3.2
x
Coeff Coeff i
i
C C
x 
   (11) 
 
This arithmetical mean of the correction coefficient will be also considered by the 
calculation of maximum and minimum values of the “hazard factorial indicator” - “For 
Risk”. 
 
II.1 Further factors Evaluated by auditor Value_0 Coeff. True value_0C*TV_0 Deviation +ACD -ACD
1 Substance temperature Hazard free 0,95 1 0,95 0,95 0,342225
2 Amount of dangerous substance / fire loading Hazard free 0,95 1 0,95 0,95 0,342225
3 … Low 0,75 1 0,75 0,75 0,148225
4 … Average 0,5 10 0,5 5 0,018225
5 … High 0,25 1 0,25 0,25 0,013225
6 … Maximum 0,05 10 0,05 0,5 0,099225
7 … Maximum 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,099225
8 … Maximum 0,05 5 0,05 0,25 0,099225
9 … Maximum 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,099225
10 Ambient temperature (rooms, technol. process) Maximum 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,099225
11 …
Maximum value 0,448 0,999 0,365 3,2 0,88 9
Normal value 0,275 0,725 0,275 0,123 0,448 0,102
Minimum value 0,102 0,001
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Figure 23. II step of the risk assessment (Coeff. & New Values). 
 
Further step is the multiplication of the Values_0 with the correction coefficient 
.Coeff
C 1:  
 
 ._ 0 ii Coeff iC TV C v  
 
(12) 
 
After the arithmetical mean the “new” Value_0 is calculated by: 
 
 
 1
1
_ 0 _ 0
x
i
i
C TV C TV
x 
    (13) 
1
_ 0 (0.95 0.95 0.75 5 0.25 0.5 0.05 0.25 0.05 0.05) 0.88
10
C TV            
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
Note: the multiplication symbol in MS Excel is designated as * (i.e. C*TV_0)
II.1 Further factors Evaluated by auditor Value_0 Coeff. True value_0C*TV_0 Deviation +ACD -ACD
1 Substance temperature Hazard free 0,95 1 0,95 0,95 0,342225
2 Amount of dangerous substance / fire loading Hazard free 0,95 1 0,95 0,95 0,342225
3 … Low 0,75 1 0,75 0,75 0,148225
4 … Average 0,5 10 0,5 5 0,018225
5 … High 0,25 1 0,25 0,25 0,013225
6 … Maximum 0,05 10 0,05 0,5 0,099225
7 … Maximum 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,099225
8 … Maximum 0,05 5 0,05 0,25 0,099225
9 … Maximum 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,099225
10 Ambient temperature (rooms, technol. process) Maximum 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,099225
11 …
Maximum value 0,448 0,999 0,365 3,2 0,88 9
Normal value 0,275 0,725 0,275 0,123 0,448 0,102
Minimum value 0,102 0,001
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 Calculation of the „Normal value” and consideration of the deviation  7.4.2.2
The calculation of the „Normal value” and other parameters is described as follows. 
 
 
Figure 24. II step of the risk assessment (calculating of Normal Value). 
 
The „Normal value” is: 
 
.
_ 0 0.88
0.275
3.2
Coeff
C TV
NV
C

    (14) 
 
Further this “Normal value” will be participate in the calculation of the hazard factorial 
indicator FHRisk  which is: 
 
 , , ,
1 1 1
1 1 1yx z
fut f ex
HRisk i fut i f i ex
i i i
F H H H H H H
x y z  
         (7) 
 
where futH  = arithmetic mean of further factors which have an influence on explosion 
and fire hazards (e.g. amount of dangerous substance, room category, technological 
process etc.); fH  = arithmetic mean of fire hazards; exH = arithmetic mean of 
explosion hazards; , ,x y z  = number of micro parameters of further factors, explosion 
and fire hazards respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
II.1 Further factors Evaluated by auditor Value_0 Coeff. True value_0C*TV_0 Deviation +ACD -ACD
1 Substance temperature Hazard free 0,95 1 0,95 0,95 0,342225
2 Amount of dangerous substance / fire loading Hazard free 0,95 1 0,95 0,95 0,342225
3 … Low 0,75 1 0,75 0,75 0,148225
4 … Average 0,5 10 0,5 5 0,018225
5 … High 0,25 1 0,25 0,25 0,013225
6 … Maximum 0,05 10 0,05 0,5 0,099225
7 … Maximum 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,099225
8 … Maximum 0,05 5 0,05 0,25 0,099225
9 … Maximum 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,099225
10 Ambient temperature (rooms, technol. process) Maximum 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,099225
11 …
Maximum value 0,448 0,999 0,365 3,2 0,88 9
Normal value 0,275 0,725 0,275 0,123 0,448 0,102
Minimum value 0,102 0,001
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Figure 25. II step of the risk assessment (consideration of the deviation error by the calculation). 
 
Due to the determined scale of the weighting factors (table 9) for the best and worst 
case scenarios  0.05, 0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 0.95scenariosv   and for the evaluation of the 
safety parameters (table 8)  . 0.05, 0.20, 0.50, 0.95safetyparv   exists a probability of an 
error in the calculation of the “Normal value” and, as a consequence, of the individual 
risk. 
To avoid these errors in the calculation, deviations of each calculated value C*TV_0 
were considered. In the first step every deviation is calculated by arithmetical mean: 
 
 
 
2
2
_ 0
1
1 x
i i i i
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x 
 
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An example of the calculation:  
 
2
10
2
1 1
1
1
0.95 0.365 0.342225
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i
i
Dev v v

 
     
 
  
Further the so-called experimental standard deviation of the mean or, also known as 
the uncorrected sample standard deviation, or sometimes called as the standard 
deviation of the sample, is defined as follows: 
 
 

 

n
2
1
(X X)
nn
i
i
x
S
S  
(16) 
 
where the  1 2, ,..., nX X X  are the observed values of the sample items and X  is the 
mean value of these observations, while the denominator n stands for the size of the 
II.1 Further factors Evaluated by auditor Value_0 Coeff. True value_0C*TV_0 Deviation +ACD -ACD
1 Substance temperature Hazard free 0,95 1 0,95 0,95 0,342225
2 Amount of dangerous substance / fire loading Hazard free 0,95 1 0,95 0,95 0,342225
3 … Low 0,75 1 0,75 0,75 0,148225
4 … Average 0,5 10 0,5 5 0,018225
5 … High 0,25 1 0,25 0,25 0,013225
6 … Maximum 0,05 10 0,05 0,5 0,099225
7 … Maximum 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,099225
8 … Maximum 0,05 5 0,05 0,25 0,099225
9 … Maximum 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,099225
10 Ambient temperature (rooms, technol. process) Maximum 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,099225
11 …
Maximum value 0,448 0,999 0,365 3,2 0,88 9
Normal value 0,275 0,725 0,275 0,123 0,448 0,102
Minimum value 0,102 0,001
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sample: this is the square root of the sample variance, which is the average of the 
squared deviations about the sample mean. 
In this case the corrected sample standard deviation must be used, denoted by
.Dev
S , 
because 30n  , thus “taking square roots reintroduces bias (because the square root 
is a nonlinear function, which does not commute with the expectation), yielding the 
corrected sample standard deviation, denoted by”: 
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n 1
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(17) 
 
Calculation example on basis of (fig. 25): 
 
Table 13. Calculation of the experimental standard deviation of the mean 
n  
i
v   
2
_ 0i
v V  
1 0.95 0.342225 
2 0.95 0.342225 
3 0.75 0.148225 
4 0.5 0.018225 
5 0.25 0.013225 
6 0.05 0.099225 
7 0.05 0.099225 
8 0.05 0.099225 
9 0.05 0.099225 
10 0.05 0.099225 
arithmetical 
mean 
 0.136025 
 
 
.
0.136025
0.123
10 1Dev
S  

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 Additional consideration of the standard deviation by the calculations 7.4.2.3
Additionally to the consideration of the experimental standard deviation of the mean, 
the "three-sigma rule" is equally considered in the calculations. Due to the large 
number of possible interconnections between the nodes (of an event tree), which 
build the worst and best case scenarios and limited ability of the weighting factors 
(tables 8, 9), the consideration of the "three-sigma rule" is expediently. 
“In statistics, the so-called "three-sigma rule" is a shorthand used to remember the 
percentage of values that lie within a band around the mean in a normal distribution 
with a width of one, two and three standard deviations, respectively …: 68.27%, 
95.45% and 99.73% of the values lie within one, two and three standard deviations of 
the mean, respectively. In mathematical notation, these facts can be expressed as 
follows, where x is an observation from a normally distributed random variable, μ is 
the mean of the distribution, and σ is its standard deviation” 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/68%E2%80%9395%E2%80%9399.7_rule 2016): 
 
 
 
 
Pr 0.6827
Pr 2 2 0.9545
Pr 3 3 0.9973
x
x
x
   
   
   
    
    
    
 
 
The decision of the consideration of two standard deviations was made by the author 
referring on (Ниворожкина et al. 2005; Кремер 2006; Белько et al. 2004). Thus, a 
deviation of 5% is implemented in the calculations (fig. 26: +ACD, -ACD) and gives 
the chance to evaluate the calculated result with maximum and minimum values 
(± 0.05): 
 
 
Figure 26. Consideration of two standard deviations: maximum and minimum values. 
 
 
 
II.1 General hazard Evaluated by auditor Value_0 Coeff. True value_0C*TV_0 Deviation +ACD -ACD
1 Substance temperature Hazard free 0,95 1 0,95 0,95 0,342225
2 Amount of dangerous substance / fire loading Hazard free 0,95 1 0,95 0,95 0,342225
3 … Low 0,75 1 0,75 0,75 0,148225
4 … Average 0,5 10 0,5 5 0,018225
5 … High 0,25 1 0,25 0,25 0,013225
6 … Maximum 0,05 10 0,05 0,5 0,099225
7 … Maximum 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,099225
8 … Maximum 0,05 5 0,05 0,25 0,099225
9 … Maximum 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,099225
10 Ambient temperature (rooms, technol. process) Maximum 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,099225
11
Maximum value 0,448 0,999 0,365 3,2 0,88 9
Normal value 0,275 0,725 0,275 0,123 0,448 0,102
Minimum value 0,102 0,001
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Thus, considering the deviation and the "three-sigma rule" by the calculations leads to a further component of the extended semi-
quantitative method in development (fig. 27): 
 
 
Figure 27. Stepwise development of the extended semi-quantitative method. 
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7.4.3 Synopsis of the II step. Evaluation of hazards 
This section generalizes the II step of the risk assessment:  
 Evaluation of the micro parameters by the auditor (substance temperature, amount of dangerous substance etc.),  
 Calculation of The Normal value (0.365)  
 Recalculation of The Normal value if for certain micro parameters the correction factor will by defined (the Normal value 
C*TV_0)  
 Calculation of the deviations for each micro parameter 
 Consideration of the two standard deviations and calculation of the maximum and minimum values. 
Thus, the calculated values are determined in other calculations of "hazard factorial indicator - for Index"  
 
Figure 28. II step of the risk assessment (“Factor of hazard - for Risk“ (Worst case scenarios)). 
 
Values for further calculations of “hazard factorial indicator - for Risk“ are determined identically. For the worst case scenario the 
weighting factors from table 9 are used automatically here, e.g. for the micro parameter “Substance temperature” the weighting factor 
is 0.05. Other mathematical calculations are the same as before.  
 
 
 
For a better overview of the interconnections see Attachment “Overview of the interconnections and function of the II step”
II.1 Further factors Evaluated by auditor Value_0 Coeff. True value_0C*TV_0 Deviation +ACD -ACD
1 Substance temperature Hazard free 0,95 1 0,95 0,95 0,342225 0,05 0,05 0,05 5,1529
2 Amount of dangerous substance / fire loading Hazard free 0,95 1 0,95 0,95 0,342225 0,05 0,05 0,05 5,1529
3 … Low 0,75 1 0,75 0,75 0,148225 0,25 0,25 0,25 4,2849
4 … Average 0,5 10 0,5 5 0,018225 0,5 0,5 5 7,1824
5 … High 0,25 1 0,25 0,25 0,013225 0,75 0,75 0,75 2,4649
6 … Maximum 0,05 10 0,05 0,5 0,099225 0,95 0,95 9,5 51,5524
7 … Maximum 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,099225 0,95 0,95 0,95 1,8769
8 … Maximum 0,05 5 0,05 0,25 0,099225 0,95 0,95 4,75 5,9049
9 … Maximum 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,099225 0,95 0,95 0,95 1,8769
10 Ambient temperature (rooms, technol. process) Maximum 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,099225 0,95 0,95 0,95 1,8769
11 …
Maximum value 0,448 0,999 0,365 3,2 0,88 9 2,32 9
Normal value 0,275 0,725 0,275 0,123 0,448 0,102 0,725 0,985 1,760 -0,310
Minimum value 0,102 0,001
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7.4.4 Synopsis of the II step. Evaluation of Explosion and Fire hazards, Further 
factors which have an influence on the explosion and fire hazards 
The Explosion and Fire hazards are calculated identically as Further factors. 
Therefore, the following calculated values are defined in the II step: 
 
Macro parameters for Further factors:  
Table 14. Further factors (cf. figure 28, yellow fields) 
 For Index For Risk 
Maximum value 0.448 0.999 
Normal value 0.275 0.725 
Minimum value 0.102 0.001 
 
Macro parameters for Fire hazards:  
Table 15. Fire hazards. 
 For Index For Risk 
Maximum value 0.737 0.647 
Normal value 0.545 0.455 
Minimum value 0.353 0.263 
 
Macro parameters for Explosion hazards:  
Table 16. Explosion hazards. 
 For Index For Risk 
Maximum value 0.867 0.507 
Normal value 0.680 0.320 
Minimum value 0.493 0.133 
 
Based on these macro parameters, the “hazard factorial indicators - for Index” are 
calculated as: 
 
 , , ,
1 1 1
1 1 1yx z
fut f ex
HRisk i fut i f i ex
i i i
F H H H H H H
x y z  
         (7) 
 
• Maximum value of the “hazard factorial indicators - for Index”: 
0.448 0.737 0.867 0.28619
HIndex
F    
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• Normal value of the “hazard factorial indicators - for Index”: 
0.275 0.545 0.680 0.10192
HIndex
F    
 
• Minimum value of the “hazard factorial indicators - for Index”: 
0.108 0.353 0.493 0.01777
HIndex
F    
 
 
Similar calculations are carried out for the “hazard factorial indicators - for Risk”: 
• Maximum value of the “hazard factorial indicators - for Index”: 
   0.999 0.647 0.507 0.32776
HRisk
F
 
• Normal value of the “hazard factorial indicators - for Index”: 
0.725 0.455 0.320 0.10556
HRisk
F    
 
• Minimum value of the “hazard factorial indicators - for Index”: 
50.001 0.263 0.133 3.49 10
HRisk
F     
 
 
These values will be considered by the calculation of the safety index IS (eq. 8) and 
safety coefficient CS (eq. 5), described as follows in chapter 7.4.7. 
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7.4.5 III step. Evaluation of Safety measures 
As in the steps described before, the auditor has to do the compliance check of the safety parameters: 
 
Figure 29. III step of the risk assessment (III.2 technical measures). 
The main distinction of the evaluation of the technical measures to others parameters (e.g. explosion hazards etc.) or organizational 
measures and space-planning activities, is that the auditor does not evaluate the correction coefficient 
.Coeff
C described in chapter 
7.4.2.1. This correction coefficient 
.Coeff
C is based on the dangerous substances. In the I step the auditor estimates the amount of 
dangerous substances with the help of default values (chapter 7.4.1.2): 
                                                                
                 Figure 30. Extract from III step 2. Technical measures            Figure 31. Extract from I step evaluation of the evaluated dangerous substance
III.2 Technical measures CS CD CL LPG/LNG CG CS CD CL LPG/LNG CG
1 Gas detection system Irrelevant 0,95 3,117647 0,95 2,961765 0,2025 1 1 10 1 1 7,5 5 100 10 10
2 Lightning protection Irrelevant 0,95 1 0,95 0,95 0,2025 1 1 1 1 1 7,5 5 10 10 10
3 Fire alarm system Irrelevant 0,95 1 0,95 0,95 0,2025 1 1 1 1 1 7,5 5 10 10 10
4 Fire suppression system Irrelevant 0,95 1 0,95 0,95 0,2025 1 1 1 1 1 7,5 5 10 10 10
5 Emergency control systems Irrelevant 0,95 1 0,95 0,95 0,2025 1 1 1 1 1 7,5 5 10 10 10
6 Fire extinguisher, Fire hydrant etc. Irrelevant 0,95 1 0,95 0,95 0,2025 1 1 1 1 1 7,5 5 10 10 10
7 Electrical installations and systems Accepted 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,2025 1 1 1 1 1 7,5 5 10 10 10
8 Emergency light Accepted 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,2025 1 1 1 1 1 7,5 5 10 10 10
9 Heat and Smoke Vents / Positive Pressure Accepted 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,2025 1 1 1 1 1 7,5 5 10 10 10
10 Emergency Power Supply Accepted 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,2025 1 1 1 1 1 7,5 5 10 10 10
11 Special extinguishing systems and equipment Accepted 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,2025 1 1 1 1 1 7,5 5 10 10 10
12  Air-technical systems Accepted 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,2025 1 1 1 1 1 7,5 5 10 10 10
Maximum value 0,753 0,5 1,176471 0,667647 11
Normal value 0,568 0,568 0,136 0,753 0,382
Minimum value 0,382
CS CD CL LPG/LNG CG
7,5 5 100 10 10
7,5 5 10 10 10
7,5 5 10 10 10
7,5 5 10 10 10
7,5 5 10 10 10
7,5 5 10 10 10
7,5 5 10 10 10
7,5 5 10 10 10
7,5 5 10 10 10
7,5 5 10 10 10
7,5 5 10 10 10
7,5 5 10 10 10
I Evaluated by auditor Value_0
1 Branche of industry Branche 15 1,90E-05
2 Area of a fire compartment, m2 1000
3 Personnel presence, h 8 0,333333
4 Existing violations Be absent 0,5
1 Combustible solids (CS) Many 7,5
2 Combustible dust (CD) Middle 5
3 Combustible liquids (CL) A lot of 10
4 LPG/ LNG A lot of 10
5 Combustible gas (CG) A lot of 10
8,5
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The auditor has to establish the interrelation between dangerous substance(s) (and 
proceeding from the substance of resulting threat) and the technical measures, which 
exists. These interrelations must be evaluated by the auditor in a table (“blue” colored 
in fig. 32): 
 
                                          
Figure 32. Extract from III step. Interrelation between technical measures and the threats of the    
dangerous substances. 
 
The evaluation of the interrelations uses the scaling  1,2,3,...,10Interrelation  . Thus, 
efficiency of operation of the protection system against this substance is estimated. In 
(fig. 32) only one interrelation factor was changed from 1 to 10 (CL = Combustible 
liquids). This factor has an influence on the weighting factor, which was evaluated in 
the I step - amount of dangerous substance(s): 
 
 
Figure 33. Extract from III step. Influence on the weighting factors, which was evaluated for the 
dangerous substances (arrow). 
 
The interrelation factor is multiplied with the weighting factor, characterised by the 
amount of dangerous substance(s): (10 ∙ 10= 100). This value has an influence on 
the correction coefficient 
.Coeff
C : 
 
 
   
 

.
7.5 5 100 10 10
3.11764
8.5 5
Coeff
C  (18) 
III.2 Technical measures
1 Gas detection system Irrelevant
2 Lightning protection Irrelevant
3 Fire alarm system Irrelevant
4 Fire suppression system Irrelevant
5 Emergency control systems Irrelevant
6 Fire extinguisher, Fire hydrant etc. Irrelevant
7 Electrical installations and systems Accepted
8 Emergency light Accepted
9 Heat and Smoke Vents / Positive Pressure Accepted
10 Emergency Power Supply Accepted
11 Special extinguishing systems and equipment Accepted
12  Air-technical systems Accepted
CS CD CL LPG/LNG CG
1 1 10 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
CS CD CL LPG/LNG CG CS CD CL LPG/LNG CG
1 1 10 1 1 7,5 5 100 10 10
1 1 1 1 1 7,5 5 10 10 10
1 1 1 1 1 7,5 5 10 10 10
1 1 1 1 1 7,5 5 10 10 10
1 1 1 1 1 7,5 5 10 10 10
1 1 1 1 1 7,5 5 10 10 10
1 1 1 1 1 7,5 5 10 10 10
1 1 1 1 1 7,5 5 10 10 10
1 1 1 1 1 7,5 5 10 10 10
1 1 1 1 1 7,5 5 10 10 10
1 1 1 1 1 7,5 5 10 10 10
1 1 1 1 1 7,5 5 10 10 10
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Thus, the correction coefficient is calculated as the sum of weighting factors, characterised by the amount of all dangerous 
substances, divided by the arithmetical mean of these weighting factors (
1
1
weighting factors of amount dangerous substances
m
mm 
 ) and their 
quantity (q=5) :                                                                                                                            
 
Figure 34. Extract from III. Step. Influence on the correction coefficient (in this example equal 3.117647). 
 
The auditor estimates the technical measures with the compliances (table 8). Further calculations of the “new” Value_0 for the 
technical measures (in this example “Gas detection system”) are calculated identically as described in chapter 7.4.2.1: multiplication of 
the Values_0 with the correction coefficient 
.Coeff
C
 
(in fig. 34 designated as C*TV_0): 
 
     
.
_0 3.117647 0.95 2.96176
ii Coeff i
C TV C v  
After the arithmetical mean of the “new” Value_0 is calculated: 
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_ 0 _0 2.961765 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.66764
10
m
i
i
C TV C TV
m
III.2 Technical measures Value_0 Coeff. True value_0C*TV_0 Deviation +ACD -ACD CS CD CL LPG/LNG CG CS CD CL LPG/LNG CG
1 Gas detection system Irrelevant 0,95 3,117647 0,95 2,961765 0,2025 1 1 10 1 1 7,5 5 100 10 10
2 Lightning protection Irrelevant 0,95 1 0,95 0,95 0,2025 1 1 1 1 1 7,5 5 10 10 10
3 Fire alarm system Irrelevant 0,95 1 0,95 0,95 0,2025 1 1 1 1 1 7,5 5 10 10 10
4 Fire suppression system Irrelevant 0,95 1 0,95 0,95 0,2025 1 1 1 1 1 7,5 5 10 10 10
5 Emergency control systems Irrelevant 0,95 1 0,95 0,95 0,2025 1 1 1 1 1 7,5 5 10 10 10
6 Fire extinguisher, Fire hydrant etc. Irrelevant 0,95 1 0,95 0,95 0,2025 1 1 1 1 1 7,5 5 10 10 10
7 Electrical installations and systems Accepted 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,2025 1 1 1 1 1 7,5 5 10 10 10
8 Emergency light Accepted 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,2025 1 1 1 1 1 7,5 5 10 10 10
9 Heat and Smoke Vents / Positive Pressure Accepted 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,2025 1 1 1 1 1 7,5 5 10 10 10
10 Emergency Power Supply Accepted 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,2025 1 1 1 1 1 7,5 5 10 10 10
11 Special extinguishing systems and equipment Accepted 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,2025 1 1 1 1 1 7,5 5 10 10 10
12  Air-technical systems Accepted 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,2025 1 1 1 1 1 7,5 5 10 10 10
Maximum value 0,753 0,5 1,176471 0,667647 11
Normal value 0,568 0,568 0,136 0,753 0,382
Minimum value 0,382
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“Normal, maximum and minimum values” are calculated identically as for the 
hazards, describes in the chapters before. 
 
 Explanation of the influence of the Interrelation factor  7.4.5.1
This chapter describes the influence of the Interrelation factor on the calculated 
“Normal value” and, as a result, on the risk criteria. This description is presented by 
an example, which includes the changes of the interrelation factor and the “Normal 
value” (table 17): 
 
Table 17. Explanation of the influence of the interrelation factor. 
 Accepted technical measure 
(installation) 
Irrelevant technical measure 
(installation) 
Interrelation factor 10 1 10 1 
Normal value 0.369 0.425 0.568 0.5 
 
If the auditor evaluates the technical measure (installation) as “accepted” and this 
installation has a big influence on the threat of the dangerous substance, the risk 
decreases (0.369). If the installation is “accepted” but has a small influence on the 
substance, the risk increases (0.425).  
If the auditor evaluates the technical measure (installation) as “irrelevant” and this 
installation has a high influence on the threat of the dangerous substance, the risk 
increases (0.568). If the installation is “irrelevant” but has a small influence on the 
substance, the risk decreases in comparison to the scenario described before (0.5).  
Thus, it is possible to draw a conclusion that the offered interrelation factor has a 
logical function in the calculation of the values. 
 
 Interrelations and their evaluation 7.4.5.2
The check list of the technical measures can include different micro parameters, 
which can have an influence on the one or other substance. An example of such 
scenario is given in (fig. 35), with the 12 micro parameters (fig. 34) and the maximal 
possible number of dangerous substances: 
 
62 
1
CS
III.2
Number of 
technical 
measures
Max. number of 
dangerouse 
subctances
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
CS CS CS CS
 
Figure 35. Possibilities of the interrelations. 
 
Due to the increasing experience concerning such interrelations an alternative 
system can be developed later. Such a system could support the auditor giving him 
concrete advice with which interrelation factor the assessment should be carried out. 
However when assessing specific substances (e.g. dusts) this advice should only be 
considered as an example because these factors are dependent on substance 
properties. 
 
7.4.6 Synopsis of the III step. Evaluation of Space-planning, Technical and 
Organisational measures 
The Space-planning and Organizational measures are calculated identically as 
hazards. The Technical measures are equally calculated, except with some 
differences, described in the chapter before.  
Therefore, the following calculated values are defined in the III step: 
 
Macro parameters for Space-planning activities:  
Table 18. Space-planning activities. 
Maximum value 0.868 
Normal value 0.500 
Minimum value 0.132 
 
Macro parameters for Technical measures:  
Table 19. Technical measures. 
Maximum value 0.753 
Normal value 0.568 
Minimum value 0.382 
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Macro parameters for Organisational measures:  
Table 20. Organisational measures. 
Maximum value 0.686 
Normal value 0.500 
Minimum value 0.314 
 
Based on these macro parameters, the safety factorial indicator FS  is calculated as: 
 
 , , ,
1 1 1
1 1 1
arch
n m k
tech org
S i arch i tech i org
i i i
F M M M M M M
n m k  
         (6) 
 
• Maximum value of the safety factorial indicator FS : 
0.868 0.753 0.686 0.44837
S
F    
 
• Normal value of the safety factorial indicator FS : 
0.500 0.568 0.500 0.14188
S
F    
 
• Minimum value of the safety factorial indicator FS : 
0.132 0.382 0.314 0.01582
S
F    
 
 
These values will be considered by the calculation of the safety index IS and safety 
coefficient CS described as follows in chapter 7.4.7. 
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7.4.7 IV step. Calculation of individual risk, safety index and common class of 
hazard 
For the calculation of the individual risk: 
 
 Ind F SR F P C    (3) 
the equation (3) needs to know the next parameters: 
F
F = frequency of a fire at the 
enterprise [m2/a]; P = probability of presence of the personnel; SC  = safety 
coefficient. 
As mentioned in chapter 7.3.1 the frequency of a fire at the enterprise is dependent 
on the frequency of the fire at the corresponding industry branch and the area of the 
considered object (I step, chapter 7.4.1): 
 
5 21.90 10 1000 1.90 10
F
F        
The probability of personal presence (chapter 7.3.2) is:  
 
8
0.3333
24 24
P


  
 
This information is given in the output table automatically (visualised as an extract 
from MS Excel prototype tool in fig.36): 
 
 
Figure 36. Extract from IV step. Output data. 
 
The calculated values of the hazards (II step) and safety measures (III step) are also 
summarized in the output table (visualised as an extract from MS Excel prototype tool 
in fig.37): 
 
Figure 37. Extract from IV step. Output data. 
Frequency of the fire 1,90E-02
Probability of personnel presence 0,3333
For Index For Risk
Maximum value of hazard factorial indicator 0,28619 0,3277609
Normal value of hazard factorial indicator 0,10192 0,10556
Minimum value of hazard factorial indicator 0,01777 3,492E-05
Maximum value of safety factorial indicator 0,44837
Normal value of safety factorial indicator 0,14188
Minumum value of safety factorial indicator 0,01582
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The 
S
C  safety coefficient is calculated automatically: 
 S S HriskC F F   (5) 
 
 Maximum value of the safety coefficient:  
    10.44837 0.32776 1.47 10
S
C
 
 Normal value of the safety coefficient:  
20.14188 0.10556 1.50 10
S
C    
 
 Minimum value of the safety coefficient:  
5 70.01582 3.492 10 5.52 10
S
C      
 
 
This information is given in the output table automatically (visualised as an extract 
from MS Excel prototype tool in fig.38): 
 
 
Figure 38. Extract from IV step. Output data of the safety coefficient and its correlation to the safety 
factorial indicator and hazard factorial indicator - for Risk. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For Index For Risk
Maximum value of hazard factorial indicator 0,28619 0,3277609
Normal value of hazard factorial indicator 0,10192 0,10556
Minimum value of hazard factorial indicator 0,01777 3,492E-05
Maximum value of safety factorial indicator 0,44837
Normal value of safety factorial indicator 0,14188
Minumum value of safety factorial indicator 0,01582
Maximum value of the safety coefficient 1,47E-01
Normal value of the safety coefficient 1,50E-02
Minimum value of the safety coefficient 5,52E-07
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The resulting risk prioritization and safety index IS values and their evaluation are 
given in tables 21, 22: 
 
Table 21. Data output mask of individual risk. 
Individual risk 
RInd 
 Compliance 
indicator for 
risk 
Maximum value of the individual risk 9.31·10
-4
 [1/a] 1 
Normal value of the individual risk 9.49·10
-5
 [1/a] 1 
Minimum value of the individual risk 3.50·10
-9
 [1/a] 0 
 
Overview of the calculated individual risk: 
 Maximum value of the individual risk:  
 2 1 41.90 10 0.3333 1.47 10 9.31 10   1 / aInd F SR F P C
             
 Normal value of the individual risk: 
 2 1 41.90 10 0.3333 1.50 10 9.49 10   1 / aInd F SR F P C
             
 Minimum value of the individual risk: 
 2 7 91.90 10 0.3333 5.52 10 3.50 10   1 / aInd F SR F P C
             
 
If RInd > value of the acceptable risk, e.g. 10
-6 [1/a], then the compliance factor for risk   
is 1. 
If RInd ≤ value of the acceptable risk, then the compliance factor for risk is 0. 
 
Parallel to the individual risk estimation the safety index IS is calculated. Its function is 
to additionally assess and evaluate the calculated risk adequately:  
 
 
S
S
HIndex
F
I
F
  (8) 
where 
HIndex
F  = factorial indicator of hazard, which dependents on the best case path 
of ETA (thus, the “hazard factorial indicators - for Index” is considered by the 
calculation). 
As mentioned in chapter 7.3.6 the safety index bases on the common indexing 
method – weighting the safety measures and hazards.  
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The main distinction of the calculation of safety index IS to the CS safety coefficient, is 
in the weighting: 
 The minimum value of the safety factorial indicator FS must be divided by the 
maximum value of the “hazard factorial indicators - for Index” FHIndex 
and vice versa 
 The maximum value of the safety factorial indicator FS must be divided by the 
minimum value of the “hazard factorial indicators - for Index” FHIndex 
Such calculation gives more exact results of the maximum and minimum value of the 
safety index. In other words, for the determination of the highest safety, the maximum 
value of the safety factorial indicator, which is dependent on the macro and micro 
parameters of the safety measures, must be weighted with minimum value of the 
hazard factorial indicator. The same rule applies for the determination of the lowest 
safety: the minimum value of the safety factorial indicator must be weighted with 
maximum value of the hazard factorial indicator. 
The auditor can see the output data of this calculation in a table (in this example 
table 22):   
 
Table 22. Data output mask of safety index. 
Safety index 
IS 
 Compliance 
indicator for 
index 
Maximum value of the safety index 25.23328 1 
Normal value of the safety index 1.39209 1 
Minimum value of the safety index 0.05527 0 
 
Overview of the calculated safety index: 
 Maximum value of the safety index: 
 
0.44837
25.23328
0.01777
S
I  
 Normal value of the safety index: 
 
0.1488
1.39209
0.10192
S
I  
 Minimum value of the safety index: 
 
0.01582
0.05527
0.28619
S
I  
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Figure 39. Extract from IV step: Output data of the safety index and it’s correlation to the safety 
factorial indicator and hazard factorial indicator - for Index. 
 
If IS > 1, then the compliance indicator for index is 1. 
If IS = 1, then the compliance indicator for index is 0.5.  
If IS < 1, then the compliance indicator for index is 0. 
The common class of hazard is the sum of existing violations (example of I step) and 
the compliance indicators for risk and index. 
 
Table 23. Data output mask of Common class of hazard 
Common class of hazard Middle 4.5 
 
For the definition of the common class of hazard a rating scale exists and the input 
table is as shown in table 24: 
 
 
Frequency of the fire 1,90E-02
Probability of personnel presence 0,3333
For Index For Risk
Maximum value of hazard factorial indicator 0,28619 0,3277609
Normal value of hazard factorial indicator 0,10192 0,10556
Minimum value of hazard factorial indicator 0,01777 3,492E-05
Maximum value of safety factorial indicator 0,44837
Normal value of safety factorial indicator 0,14188
Minumum value of safety factorial indicator 0,01582
Maximum value of the safety coefficient 1,47E-01
Normal value of the safety coefficient 1,50E-02
Minimum value of the safety coefficient 5,52E-07
Maximum value of the individual risk 9,31E-04 1
Normal value of the individual risk 9,49E-05 1
Minimum value of the individual risk 3,50E-09 0
Maximum value of the safety index 25,23328164 1
Normal value of the safety index 1,392091449 1
Minimum value of the safety index 0,055270987 0
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Table 24. Common class of hazard. 
Common class of hazard Sum of existing violations 
and the compliance 
indicators 
Minimal 1 
Low 2 
Moderate 3 
Middle 4 
Increased 5 
High 6 
Maximum 7 
Maximum 8 
Maximum 9 
 
 
Thus, the last component of the extended semi-quantitative approach is presented in 
(fig. 40): 
 
Figure 40. Stepwise development of the extended semi-quantitative method. 
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7.4.8 IV step. Graphical visualization of the calculated results 
For a better overview, the auditor can draw conclusions about: 
 
 the rate between calculated risk and index 
 which hazard has a higher influence on the calculated risk  
 the rate among the existing measures  
  
with the help of additional diagrams. 
 
 Diagram of the rate between risk and index 7.4.8.1
For the creation of the diagram, which shows the rate between risk and index, the 
calculated values of the individual risk and safety index are used.  Because these 
values differ in their mathematical role (e.g. the calculated maximum value of the 
individual risk is RInd= 9.31∙10
-4 [1/a] and the calculated maximum value of the safety 
index is IS= 25.23328), the following equations (19 to 25) allow to recalculate these 
values in a form, which is adequate to build the requested diagram (fig. 41): 
 
 
Figure 41. Extract from IV step: graphical overview of the calculated values. 
 
Calculated data, presented in the table 25 are used: 
 
 
 
 
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
0 0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5 3 3,5
Risk Index Existing violations
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Table 25. Recalculated values for the diagram. 
 Risk Index Exist. violations  
G1 -2.96883 -1.40197 0.5  
G2 -1.97704 -0.14367 0.5  
G3 2.45616 1.25750 0.5  
 2 2 0 4 
 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 4 
 
The data for risk are obtained by: 
 
4
.max
10 106 6
9.31 10
1 log log 2.96883
10 10
ind
R
G

 
  
       
   
 (19) 
 
 
5
.norm
10 106 6
9.49 10
1 log log 1.97704
10 10
ind
R
G

 
  
       
   
 (20) 
   
 
9
.min
10 106 6
3.50 10
1 log log 2.45616
10 10
ind
R
G

 
  
      
   
 (21) 
The data for index are obtained by: 
    10 .max 101 log log 25.23328164 1.40197SG I       (22) 
 
    10 .norm 101 log log 1.392091449 0.14367SG I       (23) 
 
        10 .min 101 log log 0.055270987 1.25750SG I  (24) 
The data for existing violations are obtained by: 
 
    1, 2, 3 1 weighting factor 1 0.5 0.5G G G       (25) 
 
As presented in chapter 7.4.7 the auditor has output tables with the calculated results 
of the individual risk and safety index, which are used in the equations described 
above: 
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Table 26. Data output mask of individual risk. 
Individual risk  
RInd 
 Compliance 
indicator for 
risk 
Maximum value of the individual risk 9.31·10
-4
 [1/a] 1 
Normal value of the individual risk 9.49·10
-5
 [1/a] 1 
Minimum value of the individual risk 3.50·10
-9
 [1/a] 0 
 
Table 27. Data output mask of safety index. 
Safety index 
IS 
 Compliance 
indicator for 
index 
Maximum value of the safety index 25.23328 1 
Normal value of the safety index 1.39209 1 
Minimum value of the safety index 0.05527 0 
 
The compliance indicator for risk and index can be also found in (table 28) in the 
results column: 
 
Table 28. Extract from: Recalculated values for the diagram. 
 Risk Index Exist. violations  
 1+1=2 1+1=2 0 4 
 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 4 
 
The values of the existing violation are determined as follows: 
 
Table 29. Weighting factors for evaluation of the existing violations. 
Compliance Weighting Factors Recalculated value 
for graph 
Be absent 0.5 0 
Are insignificant 1 1 
Are present 2 2 
In large volume 3 3 
 
Based on these recalculated values, which are represented as parts, the 
recalculation in percent is also conducted and presented in a diagram (fig. 42):  
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Figure 42. Extract from IV step: overview diagram of the risk, index and existing violations. 
 
The auditor can draw a conclusion from the relation of the percent distribution of the 
calculated risk and index. 
 
 Synopsis: diagram of the rate between risk and index 7.4.8.2
 
 
 
Figure 43. Extract from IV step: graphical overview of the calculated values. 
 
The auditor can see in the diagram how the risk is spread. As in the example output 
table of the common class of hazard shows, the calculated hazard is evaluated as 
“middle”: 
Table 30. Data output mask of common class of hazard. 
Common class of hazard Middle 4.5 
50,0% 
50,0% 
0,0% 
Risk
Index
Existing violations
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
0 0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5 3 3,5
Risk Index Existing violations
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At the same time, the curve “Risk” in the diagram can be lower or higher as the zero 
line (x-axis) of the actual calculation of the common class of hazard. It means that, if 
the main part of the “Risk” curve is below the zero line, the danger is higher.  
A better overview can be provided via a comparison of the relation of the rate with the 
risk and index. The “Index” curve only considers the evaluated macro and micro 
parameters by the auditor, while the “Risk” curve additionally considers the area of 
the considered object and the time of personnel presence, that in turn increases the 
hazards and threats.  
Consequently influencing on one or another parameter, the auditor can change the 
results of the common class of hazard or manage the hazards and threats in detail.  
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 Graphical overview of hazards and safety measures 7.4.8.3
Additional support for the auditor is visualised in diagrams: 
 
 
Figure 44. Extract from IV step: overview of hazards. 
 
 
Figure 45. Extract from IV step: overview of safety measures. 
 
With the help of such diagrams the auditor can influence certain micro parameters to 
change the results of the calculated individual risk. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18,3% 
36,3% 
45,3% 
Further factors
Fire hazard
Explosion hazard
31,9% 
36,2% 
31,9% 
Space-planning
activities
Technical measures
Organizational
measures
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7.5 Conclusions of the extended semi-quantitative approach for individual risk 
assessment 
The field of quantitative or semi-quantitative risk analysis is comprehensive, multi-
layered and complex. A systematic consideration of the research subject has been 
missing until today. Therefore, this dissertation seeks to develop a systematic 
method. The developed and presented method of a semi-quantitative risk analysis for 
the support of the risk calculation could be the subject of a discussion carried out 
from different points of view. The following aspects mentioned are a summary of the 
most important arguments which were discussed with the author at length.  
The survey about operative indexing and QRA methods and applications in the field 
of EFP showed that a knowledge gap existed as well as an adequate implementation 
is missing until today. The number of commercial indexing and QRA application 
programs is surprisingly small. Furthermore these tools are only applicable for fire 
risks and do not consider explosion risks and hazards. Currently there is no clarity 
which of the specified application programs are more preferable to the quantitative 
analysis. Often, these approaches do not asses risk but hazards (i.e. ignoring the 
frequency parameter of risk) or only weight and evaluate the overall levels of fire 
safety of buildings, which is characteristic for indexing methods. 
The methodological deficit lies in the fact of the change to a more flexible 
normalization of the regulations in the European countries. This includes a qualitative 
risk assessment aspect, which allows more flexibility regarding the audit. 
Nevertheless, such a so-called “new approach” has its advantages and 
disadvantages. The minimized restrictions in the field of explosion and fire risk 
assessment quickly result in the danger of a superficial and rough estimate of risk. 
Thus, the actual risk will not be assessed correctly. Among others there is no other 
approach to support the auditor to determine the explosion risk parallel to the already 
considered fire risk. Considering that the traditional approach of the rigid application 
of norms is now replaced with more flexible ones allowing alternative design 
decisions there is clearly a need for the development of new methods.  
Due to the above mentioned problem definition a method was developed by the 
combination of the semi-quantitative and indexing approaches, which cannot only be 
applied in the field of fire risk assessment but also in the field of explosion risk 
assessment. By combining the two methods the resulting probabilistic method allows 
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to carry out an audit, which bases on weighting procedures utilizable for risk rating 
and benchmarking. 
The probabilistic model of the individual risk assessment discussed in this 
dissertation considers the most important aspects in the field of EFP such as:  
 
 semi-quantitative risk assessment, based on the developed extended risk 
equation of the author 
 controls probability of hazard and safety measures, based on an 
implemented ETA approach which is transformed into a more complex 
graph with an interconnection of different worst and best case scenarios and 
which is therefore implemented in a check list procedure that gives 
information about the risk spectrum of estimates 
 the evaluation of the existing requests of the check list is supported by the  
determined weighting factors which place a great emphasis on the 
probabilistic approach concerning the whole concept 
 
The expediency of the submitted weighting factors is discussed and the proof of the 
possibility of their applicability will be proposed in a reasonable way by a Bayesian 
network. 
A problem still exists in the database of the frequencies of undesired events, in this 
respect the frequencies of a fire or of an explosion for a specific enterprise. The value 
of such a frequency is considered in the risk calculation. Therefore, 
recommendations were given by this critical examination. Among others examples of 
different useful databases were presented.  
The uniqueness of the presented method lies in the robust, easy to understand 
approach that combines various parameters into a more stringent decision making 
process. The transformation of the ETA approach into a check list allows the 
consideration of a big number of scenarios, which are dependent from aspects 
causing explosions and fires, as well as aspects reducing explosion and fire hazards. 
Additional advantages of the developed method are: 
 
 the implementation of mathematical approaches as for instance the 
experimental standard deviation of the mean, also known as the 
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uncorrected sample standard deviation or the standard deviation of a 
sample 
and 
 the consideration of the standard deviation or error ratios in the calculation 
of the individual risk values. None of the existing approaches or tools 
considers these. In turn such deviations must be duly considered due to the 
fact that the auditor cannot use the complete scale from 0 to 100% for the 
assessment of the check list. 
 
The developed method is still depending on expert judgment. However the auditor is 
supported with data and weightings factors. 
The presented method only calculates the individual risk but it can be used for other 
field of risk estimation such as material damage, building damage and interruption 
damage. To phrase it differently the optimization of the developed application or 
combination of it with other existing tools allows the auditor to evaluate the risk of 
undesired events, e.g. Crystal Ball® software as offered by (Kustosz 2013) for the 
monetary assessment of damage events (explosions). 
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8 Extended quantitative approach for consequence assessment  
After preceding semi-quantitative approach for individual risk assessment it is 
advisable to follow the causes-effect chain by (Compes 1974) (fig. 46) because the 
calculated probability value of the individual risk does not give a statement about 
“When?” the undesirable scenario can happen. Therefore, it is important to assess 
the worst case scenarios, in other words to estimate the consequences. Thus, the 
auditor should additionally estimate the risk with regard to the potential accident 
scenarios and their impact (if → when…).   
 
 
Figure 46. Cause-effect chain by (Compes 1974). 
 
The part “Extended quantitative approach for consequence assessment”  gives the 
auditor an option to calculate the physical effects and consequences (e.g. pool fire, 
explosion, fireball, jet fire) of hazardous substances, e.g. by releasing them from 
industrial plants, such as vessels, reactors, pumps and pipelines. “Although, the [CPI] 
has brought off measurements in industrial safety for a long time, there are still major 
accidents caused by technical failures of devices and systems, human errors, 
intentional acts, external events among many others.  
In order to continuously improve safety engineering in general, it is a major task of 
industry, insurance and academia to build up a sound knowledge base about the 
potential accident scenarios” (Leksin et al. 2015). 
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There is a range of application programs (chapter 4.2) for risk assessment to 
calculate physical effects. Differences of the application programs are in their 
mathematical models, which are described in various standards.  
However “from a quantity of different international technical standards, guidelines and 
ordinances, which describe the calculation of the physical effects of hazardous 
substances, no existing universal method is accepted as obligatory in the 
international or European-standard regulations in the field of [EFP]. Therefore, in 
some countries such as the Netherlands documents, e.g. the CPR-guidelines which 
are used in fields of labor safety, transport safety and fire safety exist. In Russia there 
are standards alike. 
[…] authorities, enterprises and insurance companies use a bundle of different 
standards or [approaches]. As a consequence, the difference between standards 
complicates the point-by-point comparison of results and their representativeness” 
(Leksin et al. 2015). 
 
8.1 Principle of the consequence assessment 
As already designated in (chapter 4.2) the EFFECTS (TNO 2015) is a most common 
instrument on the European level for consequence assessment. This application 
program is based on different approaches described in the Dutch CPR-guidelines. 
Maintenances, optimisations as well as improvement of the EFFECTS (TNO 2015) 
have developed historically and have been supported for many years. 
The extended quantitative approach for consequence assessment is based on a 
comparison of standards of two different legislative bodies:  the Russian “Method to 
define the computed value of fire risks in industrial facilities” (Order No. 404 2009, 
Order No. 649 2010) and the TNO EFFECTS (CPR14E 2006) framework and the 
associated tool TNO EFFECTS using the YAWS Database (TNO EFFECTS 2014). 
The comparison of these two legislative bodies compares the accident scenarios as 
pool fire models (fig. 47) and the explosion model (fig. 48). The results of this 
comparative study are considered to improve risk assessment procedures in EFP. 
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Figure 47. Fire models. 
 
There are different types of explosions, but the most common accident scenario in 
the CPI is the confined or unconfined vapour cloud explosion, which will be 
presented in the comparison between the Dutch and Russian standards in chapter 
8.5. 
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explosion
BLEVE
 
Figure 48. Explosion model. 
In dependence of a substance and its aggregation state (liquid; gas; gas compressed 
to a liquid) in the vessel under specific conditions, one distinguishes between 
different accident scenarios. These are the paths of an event tree and the initiating 
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event of this tree demands the release of the hazardous substance (see also 
Attachment “Event trees”). The most probable and most dangerous scenarios must 
be calculated and analysed. 
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Figure 49. Example of different scenarios. 
The remaining chapters are structured as follows: chapter 8.2 compares the pool fire 
models, chapter 8.3 compares the fire ball models, chapter 8.4 compares the jet fire 
model and chapter 8.5 compares the explosion models of the Russian and Dutch 
approaches. 
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8.2  Comparison of the pool fire models 
The standards, described in chapter 8.1, consider cylindrical pool fire models and 
base on analogous models, i.e. the thermal parameters and atmospheric 
characteristics are comparable to each other. 
Following chapters 8.2.1 – 8.2.7 are a quotation from (Leksin et al. 2015). 
 
8.2.1  Russian approach  
All notations in this chapter are translated and harmonized by the author from the 
Russian ordinance, i.e. (Order No. 404 2009) and its addition (Order No. 649 2010). 
All references and data are from this ordinance unless specified otherwise. 
The heat radiation (heat flux) q [kW/m2] of the pool fire of flammable liquids, 
combustible liquids and liquid petroleum gas (LPG) is determined by: 
 
f q
q E F     (26) 
where Ef = actual surface emissive power (SEP) of the flame [kW/m
2] (notation 
according to (CPR14E 2006)); Fq = view factor;  = atmospheric transmissivity. 
The Ef can be defined on the basis of the available experimental data or with the help 
of table 31: 
 
Table 31. SEP depending from the pool diameter d and the burning flux at still weather conditions m. 
Fuel 
Ef [kW/m
2
] at d [m] m 
[kg/m
2⋅s] 10 20 30 40 50 
LPG (Methan)  220 180 150 130 120 0.08 
LPG (Propan‒Butan) 80 63 50 43 40 0.10 
Gasoline  60 47 35 28 25 0.06 
Diesel 40 32 25 21 18 0.04 
Note: For pool fire diameters < 10 [m] or > 50 [m], the SEP is identical to the diameter of 10 [m] and 
50 [m] respectively. 
 
In absence of data for oil and oil products Ef  can be defined as follows: 
 
  
0.2 0.12140 20 1d dE e e
f
         (27) 
 
where d = pool fire diameter [m]. 
In absence of data for one-component liquids it is allowed to define Ef  as follows: 
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(28) 
where m = burning flux at still weather conditions [kg/m2⋅s]; HSG = heat of 
combustion [kJ/kg] (in the Russian original HСГ); L = average height of the flame [m]. 
In the absence of data for one-component liquids it is allowed to define m as follows: 
 
  

 
 
0.001
SG
H
m
L C T Tg aP b
 
(29) 
where Lg = vaporization heat of the flammable material at its boiling point [kJ/kg];  
Cp = specific heat capacity at constant pressure [kJ/kg⋅K]; Tb = liquid boiling 
temperature [K]; Ta = ambient temperature [K]. 
For compounding mixed liquids, the major substance defines Ef and m. 
The view factor Fq is defined as:  
 2 2
q V H
F F F   (30) 
 
where 2
V
F , 2
H
F  = factors of irradiancy for vertical and horizontal platforms, defined for 
the platforms located in 90° sector in the direction of the flame inclination with the 
help of the equations (31 to 40); cf. (Atallah 1990): 
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  2 1F b   (40) 
   
where X = distance from the geometrical center source to the receiver [m]; d = pool 
fire diameter [m]; L = flame length [m];  = flame tilt angle (angle between flame 
centerline and surface normal) ‒ according to the Russian ordinance defined as: 
flame deviation angle from a vertical under the influence of a wind. 
For the platforms located out of the specified sector and also in cases of lack of a 
wind, the factors of irradiancy for vertical and horizontal platforms are calculated by 
equations (31 to 40) and (43), accepting  = 0. 
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The pool fire diameter is: 
 
4 F
d


  (41) 
where F = pool surface [m2]. 
Flame length L is calculated as: 
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(44) 
and where m = burning flux at still weather conditions [kg/m2⋅s]; a = density of air 
[kg/m3]; П = vapour density of the flammable materials by boiling point [kg/m
3]; w0 = 
wind velocity [m/s]; g = gravitational acceleration [9.81 m/s2]. 
Flame deviation corner from a vertical under the influence of a wind is:  
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Atmospheric transmissivity   is: 
 
  4exp 7 10 0.5X d          (46) 
 
8.2.2 Dutch approach  
Many readers presumably know the Dutch TNO EFFECTS and the associated 
software tool (cf. TNO EFFECTS 2014). For this, and as the Dutch approach uses 
mainly the same model as the Russian approach, TNO EFFECTS is outlined by its 
input parameters in the following. 
TNO EFFECTS offers data input modes for different model parameter quantification 
options. The options “show only simple parameters” and “show only normal 
parameters” provide default values and bases on standard parameters. The mode 
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“show expert parameters” is discussed next. At a first glance, all specified parameter 
data are demanded from the auditor, i.e. scenario characteristics on pool fire, 
atmospheric and personal injury. However the auditor may use some default input 
data in case of lacking some parameter data. 
TNO EFFECTS comes up with an extended and single data input mask which goes 
beyond the presentation constraints of this chapter. Tables 32 to 34 structure the 
input process according the scenario characteristics mentioned above. Terminology 
is retained unchanged. Substance data are from (CPR18E 2005) database (state: 
22.07.1999). 
 
Table 32. Data input of pool parameter characteristics. 
Description Input Data 
Chemical name … 
Pool size determination Confined or 
Unconfined fixed 
feed 
Total mass release, [kg]  
Pool surface pool fire, [m
2
] … 
Height of the receiver, [m] … 
Height of the confined pool 
above ground level, [m] 
… 
Temperature of the pool, [°C] … 
Pool burning rate, [kg/m
2⋅s] Calculate/Default or 
User defined 
Value of pool burning rate, 
[kg/(m
2⋅s)] 
Default = 0.1 
Fraction combustion heat 
radiate  
Default =0.35 
Soot fraction Calculate/Default or 
User defined 
 
 
As above-mentioned, the auditor may also use some default input values in the 
“show expert parameters” mode (italicised in tables 32 and 34).  
 
Table 33. Data input of the atmospheric characteristics. 
Description Input Data 
Wind speed at 10 [m] height, 
[m/s] 
… 
Ambient temperature, [
o
C] … 
Ambient relative humidity, [%] … 
Amount of CO2 in atmosphere  … 
Predefined wind direction      User defined 
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(N,     
  NNE, etc.) 
Wind comes from  
(North = 0 degrees), [deg] 
… 
 
 
Wind direction in table 33 is defined by the common section of a compass rose. 
 
Table 34. Data input of personal damage characteristics. 
Description Input Data 
Distance from center of the 
pool (Xd), [m] 
… 
Maximum heat exposure 
duration, [s] 
… 
Calculate contours for 
 
1
st
 degree burns, 2
nd
 
degree burns, lethal 
burns, physical 
effects 
Take protective effects of 
clothing into account 
Yes/no 
Percentage of mortality for 
contour calculations, [%] 
Default = 1 
Heat radiation damage  
Probit A, [s⋅(W/m2)n] 
Default = -36.38 
Heat radiation damage  
Probit B 
Default = 2.56 
Heat radiation damage  
Probit N 
Default = 1.33 
 
 
By default, the probit function of equation (47), as given in (CPR16E 2005), has been 
used to calculate the impact of heat radiation on human life:  
 
  4/3Pr 36.38 2.56 ln q t      (47) 
 
where q = the heat radiation level [W/m2] and t = the exposure duration in seconds, 
which is assumed maximal 20 [s].  
This probit value is then mapped to a fraction of mortality in the interval [0; 1]. This 
implies a Probit A of -36.38, Probit B = 2.56, and Probit N = 4/3 for lethal burns. A 
Probit A of -39.83, Probit B = 3.0186, and Probit N = 4/3 for 1st degree burns and   
Probit A of -43.14, Probit B = 3.0186, and Probit N = 4/3 for 2nd degree burns. 
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The quantitative measure of the effect on human life is also defined as probability of 
loss of life. It was defined by the relationship (Less 1986) using the probit function: 
 
    1 2 lnY r k k V    (48) 
   
where Y(r) = the percentage of vulnerable resources which sustain injury or damage; 
k1, k2 = parameters to specify accidents (defined also as “constants” in the majority 
literature); V = the product of intensity or concentration of received hazardous agent 
to an exponent n and the duration of exposure in seconds or minutes. For thermal 
radiation: 
 4/3V I t   (49) 
   
which defines the thermal dose in [(kW/m2)4/3⋅s]. The TNO EFFECTS refer for these 
constants on (Eisenberg at al. 1975)  
The output mask of TNO EFFECTS summarizes the calculation results. Table 35 lists 
all quantified parameters. 
 
Table 35. Quantified parameters in TNO EFFECTS (Data output). 
Parameters Parameters 
Max Diameter of the Pool Fire, [m]  
Heat radiation at X, [kW/m
2
] View factor, Fq 
1% Third degree (Lethal) burns 
distance, [m] 
Atmospheric 
transmisivity, [%] 
Combustion rate, [kg/s] Flame 
temperature, [
o
C] 
Duration of the pool fire, [s] Length of the 
flame, [m] 
Heat emission from fire surface, 
[kW/m
2
] 
Calculated pool 
surface area, 
[m
2
] 
Flame tilt, [deg] Weight ratio of 
CO2/chemical, 
[%] 
 
8.2.3 Comparison 
To resume the described Russian method, the equation (26) of the calculation of the 
heat flux is the same as in (Mudan 1984) or (TNO EFFECTS 2014, CPR14E 2006) 
which is based on (Rew & Hulbert 1996). Equation (28) calculates the SEP similar to 
the equation in (TNO EFFECTS 2014, CPR14E 2006). The difference is in the 
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considered “Fraction of the generated heat radiated form the flame surface”, which is 
determined in equation (28) as the factor 0.4 and in (TNO EFFECTS 2014) as 0.35, 
in spite of the fact that this value depends on properties of substance. The (TNO 
EFFECTS 2014) determines this factor 0.35 because there is no chemical relied 
value available at the time of the development of the (CPR14E 2006) model. 
However the new version tool of the EFFECTS Version 10 will include the so-called 
two zone pool fire model, which is based on the work of (Rew & Hulbert 1996). The 
Russian method uses the equation (27) additionally for oil and oil products. This 
correlation was adapted by (Mudan 1984) using data from gasoil, kerosene and JP-5. 
The calculation of the m burning rate at still weather conditions of equation (29), the 
view factor of equation (30) and the pool diameter of equation (41) are the same in 
both methods. 
By the calculation of the flame length of equation (42) the (TNO EFFECTS 2014) 
uses the version of (Thomas 1963), which implements the influence of the wind on 
the flame length and if 1* u  
then 1* u . The difference to the Russian method is that 
if 1* u , the flame length is calculated by equation (43) of (Thomas 1963) upon 
laboratory measurements of fire on wood. 
An exact calculation of the atmospheric transmissivity   is intricate, depending on the 
radiator temperature, the absorption and the flame temperature. The Russian 
approach uses the simplified equation (50). (TNO EFFECTS 2014) defines   as:  
 
1
a W C
      (50) 
 
The atmospheric transmissivity a measures the absorbed heat, emitted by fire and 
absorbed by the air in between the radiator and the observer. Without absorption 
factors, a equals to 1. The absorption factors W and C depend upon the properties 
of the main absorbing components (H2O and CO2) in the air. The absorption factors 
W  and C are estimated by using the graphs from (Hottel 1967), which can also be 
found in (CPR14E 2006). 
 
8.2.4 Prototype tool of the Russian approach 
To compare the two tools, the Russian approach was transformed into a tool. 
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Chapter 8.2.1 outlined the Russian approach from the side of the equations to have 
an overview about the parameters from which the calculated heat flux depends on, 
and this chapter introduces the method in form of an MS Excel prototype which gives 
the auditor a simple option to calculate the heat flux, depending on the distance, 
maximum diameter of the pool fire and the injury based on the probit function. 
Therefore, the auditor must only enter the next parameters: 
 Substance 
 Total mass released [m3] (marked by the author as Vж);  
 Coefficient of the released mass. It depends on the surface of the drip pan 
(marked by the author as  fp); 
 Pool surface pool fire [m2] (marked by the author as Fpsp). 
The database of the tool prototype is implemented for the following substances: LPG, 
LNG, gasoline, diesel and oil (petroleum product). If the auditor has other substances 
(e.g. hexane) he must enter additional properties of the substance, as the Lg 
vaporisation heat of the flammable material at its boiling point [kJ/kg]; Cp specific heat 
capacity at constant pressure [kJ/kg⋅K]; Tb the liquid boiling temperature [K]; Ta 
ambient temperature [K] – to calculate the m burning rate at still weather conditions 
[kg/m2⋅s] and the HSG heat of combustion [kJ/kg] – to calculate the Ef actual surface 
emissive power of the flame [kW/m2]. 
Also w0 [m/s] wind velocity and П [kg/m
3] vapour density of the flammable materials 
by boiling point can be considered. 
After the input of these data, the results are:  
for a set of heat flux values q=10.5, 7.0, 4.2, 1.4 the tool gives the distance from 
the center of the pool fire [m]. The heat flux figures are chosen from (Siegel et al. 
2001) and (Order No. 404 2009). 
At the same time the tool calculates the probit function Pr for the entered distance 
(table 36) and gives the probability (%) of the lethal outcome (probability of fatality to 
personnel) as output: 
Table 36. Data output table. 
Parameter Output (example) 
Pr  5.570 
Q, [%]  71.555 
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For a set of probabilities of fatality to personnel [%] Q =99.9, 90.0, 50.0, 10.0, 1.0 
the tool gives the distance from the center of the pool fire [m]. 
In the Russian approach the calculated probit function has been used for the 
exposure to heat radiation and used another equation, based on (Tsao and Perry 
1979): 
 
4
3Pr 12.8 2.56 ln t q
 
     
 
 (51) 
where q = the heat radiation level in [W/m2] and t = the exposure duration in [sec], 
which is calculated by:  
 0
x
t t
u
   (52) 
where t0 = time in which the person finds the fire and makes the decision about 
further actions (can be accepted as 5 seconds) [s]; x  = distance from the location of 
the person to a safety zone [m] (the safety zone is defined by heat flux q ≤ 4 
[kW/m²]); u = average speed of the movement of the person to a safety zone [m/s]   
(u = 5 [m/s]). 
The probit value is transferred to a fraction of mortality of 1. 
 
8.2.5 Calculation 
For the comparison of Dutch and Russian standards, three different substances 
(Gasoline, Propane and Methanol) and four kinds of scenarios of a pool fire with a 
pool surface F=1000 [m2] and F=100 [m2], and wind velocity w0=0.1 [m/s] and 
w0=7 [m/s] were chosen. Thus, there is a chance to compare 12 scenarios. As the 
Dutch method measures the heat flux of the height of the receiver in 1.5 meter and 
the Russian method does not consider this parameter, the problem is solved to 
compare the Russian method with two calculated results in TNO EFFECTS in 1.5 
(default value) [m] and 0 [m] of the height of the receiver. (The author assume, that 
the Russian approach uses 0 [m] as default value). 
The results of the comparison of the 12 calculated scenarios are presented in tables 
37 to 39:  
Table 37. Comparison of calculated heat flux q for Gasoline. 
Scenario Approach Distance m [m] from the surface 
  20 45 70 100 
  Heat flux q [kW/m²] 
Gasoline 
1000 m² 
Russian  17.5 6.0 2.8 1.4 
TNO 1.5 50.0 10.8 5.0 2.5 
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0.1 m/s TNO 0.0 33.5 10.3 4.9 2.8 
Gasoline 
1000 m² 
7.0 m/s 
Russian  28.8 18.5 8.1 2.4 
TNO 1.5 118.8 28.1 9.8 3.0 
TNO 0.0 56.6 26.5 9.6 3.0 
Gasoline 
100 m² 
0.1 m/s 
Russian  7.7 1.8 0.8 0.4 
TNO 1.5 6.7 1.5 0.6 0.3 
TNO 0.0 6.1 1.5 0.6 0.3 
Gasoline 
100 m² 
7.0 m/s 
Russian  32.0 3.6 0.8 0.3 
TNO 1.5 20.9 1.5 0.4 0.2 
TNO 0.0 17.8 1.5 0.4 0.2 
 
 
At F=1000 [m2] according to the Russian approach by increase the wind velocity from 
w0=0.1 [m/s] to w0=7 [m/s] the heat flux at 20 meter distance increases on 65%, while 
TNO EFFECTS shows an increase more than twice (at a height of the receiver 1.5 
meter) and approximately same by height of the receiver 0 meter. By the increase of 
the distance the difference in the Russian approach between the heat flux between 
wind velocity w0 = 0.1 [m/s] and w0 =7 [m/s] is bigger than in TNO EFFECTS, 
especially considering a distance of 70 meters.  
By the increase of the distance from the center of the pool fire the calculated heat flux 
in both approaches becomes comparable. 
At F=100 [m2] the calculated heat flux in Russian approach is bigger, but by w0=0.1 
[m/s] the results are comparable. By increase of the wind velocity the difference 
between the approaches increases and the Russian approach gives a higher result. 
 
Table 38. Comparison of calculated heat flux q for Propane. 
Scenario Approach Distance m [m] from the surface 
  20 45 70 100 
  Heat flux q [kW/m²] 
Propane 
1000 m² 
0.1 m/s 
Russian  26.0 9.6 5.0 2.6 
TNO 1.5 50.9 11.0 5.1 2.6 
TNO 0.0 34.1 10.5 5.0 2.5 
Propane 
1000 m² 
7.0 m/s 
Russian  41.1 24.2 13.6 5.6 
TNO 1.5 120.8 28.1 10.0 3.1 
TNO 0.0 57.6 26.9 9.8 3.1 
Propane 
100 m² 
0.1 m/s 
Russian  11.3 3.1 1.3 0.7 
TNO 1.5 6.8 1.5 0.6 0.3 
TNO 0.0 6.2 1.5 0.6 0.3 
Propane 
100 m² 
7.0 m/s 
Russian  37.2 8.5 2.0 0.7 
TNO 1.5 21.3 1.5 0.4 0.2 
TNO 0.0 18.0 1.5 0.4 0.2 
 
 
At F=100 [m2] the differences are bigger in the Russian approach. 
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By the comparison of the scenarios for Gasoline and Propane it can be seen, that for 
the bigger pool surface area, the calculated heat flux is bigger in TNO EFFECTS and 
if the pool surface is smaller, the calculated heat flux is bigger in the Russian 
approach. The reason is that by determining of the surface emissive power Ef for 
Gasoline and Propane the Russian method uses the table 33 and for Methanol table 
41 it uses the equation (28). By increasing of the pool surface (table 31) the surface 
emissive power Ef decreases, but based on the equation (28) with increase of the 
pool diameter the surface emissive power Ef increases too. 
 
Table 39. Comparison of calculated heat flux q for Methanol. 
Scenario Approach Distance m [m] from the surface 
  20 45 70 100 
  Heat flux q [kW/m²] 
Methanol 
1000 m² 
0.1 m/s 
Russian  37.4 10.2 4.2 1.9 
TNO 1.5 28.8 6.1 2.8 1.4 
TNO 0.0 19.3 5.8 2.7 1.4 
Methanol 
1000 m² 
7.0  m/s 
Russian  55.3 23.9 5.2 1.7 
TNO 1.5 66.5 15.4 5.3 1.6 
TNO 0.0 31.6 14.5 5.2 1.6 
Methanol 
100 m² 
0.1 m/s 
Russian  5.2 1.0 0.4 0.2 
TNO 1.5 4.0 0.9 0.4 0.2 
TNO 0.0 3.7 0.9 0.4 0.2 
Methanol 
100 m² 
7.0 m/s 
Russian  13.7 0.8 0.3 0.1 
TNO 1.5 12.1 0.9 0.2 0.1 
TNO 0.0 10.3 0.9 0.2 0.1 
 
 
The overall comparison shows the following results: by a pool surface of F=1000 [m2] 
the difference of the calculated heat flux in the distance near the fire (till 45 meters) is 
very high. This can be seen by the substances Gasoline and Propane. The TNO 
EFFECTS results are twice as big as in the Russian approach.  
Thereby by a pool surface of F=100 [m2] the results in the Russian approach are at 
least twice as big as by TNO EFFECTS, independent from the wind velocity. 
Whereby for a pool surface of F=100 [m2] and F=1000 [m2] and wind velocity        
w0=7 [m/s] the differences are much higher, as by wind velocity w0=0.1 [m/s]. 
Thus, by the increase of the wind velocity the calculated heat flux increases between 
the two methods. 
By F=1000 [m2] and w0=7 [m/s] the heat flux increases in TNO EFFECTS. And by 
F=100 [m2] and w0=7 [m/s] the heat flux is higher in the Russian approach. 
Closest values to each other are in the next scenarios: 
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 Propane, F=1000 [m2], w0=0.1 [m/s] at a distance 70 and 100 meter; 
 Methanol, F=100 [m2], w0=0.1 [m/s] at a distance 70 and 100 meter and by 
w0=7 [m/s] at a distance of 100 meter; 
Most different values are in the next scenarios: 
 Gasoline, F=1000 [m2], w0=7 [m/s] the difference increases from the center of 
the pool fire; considering a distance of 20 meters the difference is between 
28.8 [kW/m²] (Russian approach) and 118.8 [kW/m²] (TNO in 1.5 meter height 
of the receiver). The same scenario considering Propane also shows such a 
huge difference between both approaches.  
 By Propane, F=100 [m2], w0=7 [m/s] from a distance of 45 meters the heat flux 
in the Russian approach is 8.5 [kW/m²] and by TNO EFFECTS 1.5 [kW/m²]. 
As table 39 shows, the results in the scenarios with Methanol are approximately the 
same, but for substances as Gasoline and Propane, and also for supposed others 
like LPG and Diesel, the calculated heat flux can be more or less compared with the 
Russian approach depending on the pool surface area. 
 
8.2.6 Reference values 
Due to the distinction of the corresponding results, they were compared with the 
experimental data described in (Koseki 1989). This report includes experiments with 
incident heat flux measurement data at a distance of 5 times the pool diameter from 
the center of the pool fires. These experiments are done with Heptane, Gasoline, 
Kerosene and Hexane. Because the ambient conditions are not reported, the 
atmospheric conditions are assumed: ambient pressure 1.01325 [Pa], ambient 
temperature 293 [K], relative humidity 70 [%]. Because of the TNO tool version used 
by the author is based on the YAWS Database it was only possible to compare the 
results with one substance – Gasoline. The compared results are presented in table 
40: 
 
Table 40. Comparison of the Russian and Dutch approaches with experimental data tests  
by (Koseki 1989). 
Diameter of the pool fire, 
[m] 
3 6 10 
 
22.3 
Pool fire area, [m
2
] 7.07 28.27 78.5
4 
390.57 
Distance from  
the surface, [m] 
15 30 50 111.5 
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Measured heat flux at 
x/D=5 based on 
experimental data by 
Koseki, [kW/m2] 
1.9 1.1 0.76 
(ave-
rage) 
0.4 
Heat flux calculated by the 
Russian approach, [kW/m
2
] 
1.74 1.45 1.26 0.72 
Heat flux calculated by the 
TNO 1.5 meter height of 
the receiver, [kW/m
2
] 
0.87 0.68 0.57 0.45 
Heat flux calculated by the 
TNO 0 meter height of the 
receiver, [kW/m
2
] 
0.83 0.68 0.57 0.45 
 
 
This comparison shows that the calculated results in the Russian approach are more 
comparable for the small diameters of the pool fire and for the bigger diameters the 
TNO EFFECTS results are comparable. But the downsides of these results are the 
same as in the conclusions based on tables 37 to 39: by the increase of the distance 
from the center of the pool fire the calculated heat flux becomes comparable. 
Table 41 shows the comparison of the results of the Russian approach and the 
experimental data for other substances: 
 
Table 41. Comparison of the Russian approach with experimental data tests by (Koseki 1989). 
 Heptane Kerosene Hexane 
Diameter of the 
pool  
fire, [m] 
6 30 50 3 
 
6 
 
Pool fire 
area, [m
2
] 
28.27 706.9 1963.5 7.07 28.27 
Distance from the 
surface, [m] 
30 150 250 15 30 
Measured heat flux 
at x/D=5 based on 
experimental da-ta 
by Koseki, [kW/m2] 
2.22 0.43 0.23 2.23 1.28 
Heat flux cal-
culated by the 
Russian ap-
proach, [kW/m
2
] 
2.43 0.3 0.21 3.31 2.11 
 
 
This comparison shows that the calculated results in the Russian approach do not 
always differ depending on the surface area (pool fire diameter). It is possible to draw 
the conclusion that the calculated heat flux in both methods does not only depend on 
the surface area of the pool but rather also on which material properties are used and 
considered. 
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8.2.7 Synopsis 
As mentioned in chapter 8.2.5, Gasoline and Propane computations result in most 
different values. This section scrutinizes the causes in detail. The main reason is the 
different calculation of SEP in the Russian and Dutch approach. The Dutch use 
equation (28) for all substances in consideration (CPR14E 2006):   
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(53) 
The Russian approach uses a slightly different equation (28) (Factor 0.4 instead of 
0.35) for one-component liquids only (cf. chapter 8.2.5). As a consequence, the 
results for, e.g. one-component liquid Methanol, are broadly similar. The influence of 
the small difference for the scenarios with Methanol can be observed in the different 
calculation of the atmospheric transmissivity  (cf. equations 46 and 50), as well as 
they have an impact on the equation of the heat flux (cf. equation 26) 
For substances as Gasoline, Propane among others, the Russian approach uses 
experimental data, as given in table 31. As shown in table 31, the SEP value 
becomes smaller when increasing pool diameter d. This is in contrast to equation 
(28) in which the increasing of the pool diameter, the SEP increases too. 
In summary, the Dutch approach only relies on equation (53) for all substances, 
whereas the Russian approach also uses experimental outcomes (cf. table 31) and 
differentiates between substances ( one-component liquids, oil and oil products). For 
this, the Russian approach is considered to be closer to reality. 
Further the Dutch approach is conservative for the scenarios of pool fires for 
Gasoline and Propane (i.e, F=1000 [m2], w0=7 [m/s] and w0=0.1 [m/s]). Which in turn, 
it overestimates the needed level of measures in the field of fire safety and, in 
consequence, financial expenses. 
Moreover, the Dutch results are often unexpected for Gasoline, Propane and 
Methanol computations when considering heat fluxes in 0 and 1.5 meters. The 
results differ in twice the amount and are bigger at 1.5 meters. 
 
8.2.8 Conclusions 
“… both approaches rest upon the same physical models of an idealized black 
body, the implementation shows differences. For instance, also different probit 
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function and constants are used in both approaches. For this, it is not surprising that 
the models in use are slightly different. Furthermore both ordinances are industry 
standards which imply their design for practical oriented purposes and eased 
feasibility. Again, there are differences. The comparison of models, results, contact 
with reality and feasibilities gives hints towards methodological improvements and 
tool development. 
The differences can raise the question on closeness to reality of analysis results of 
both approaches. As there is a common lack of data, it is impossible for anyone to 
verify models and results” (Leksin et al. 2015). Logically, in both approaches it should 
be questioned: „Do the calculated heat flux values reflect real conditions?” 
The answer to this question can be found in large-scale tests by the Technical 
Research Institute of Sweden SP (ETANKFIRE 2015) performed in the ETANKFIRE 
project 2015. 
“The thermal radiation from pool fires burning ethanol is less than that from similar 
fires of petrol, which is confirmed by test results from 2 m2 pool fires…… The 
difference between petrol and ethanol fires is expected to increase further for even 
larger fuel surface areas, as ethanol seems to be less dependent on the size of the 
fuel surface area. As present-day fuel storage tanks for ethanol often have a 
considerably larger area than the 250 m2 that were used in the trials…… The 
results (fig. 50) are striking:  close to the fire, an ethanol fire radiates 2-3 times as 
much heat as a petrol fire, with the radiant density still being about twice as high 
further away” (Firesafetysearch 2015). 
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Figure 50. Extract from (Firesafetysearch 2015). 
 
“Radiant heat fluxes from the 254 m² tank trial of ethanol (E97) (blue) and calculated 
values for a corresponding petrol fire (green/red lines).  For comparison, the (fig. 50) 
also shows some experimental results from similar petrol fires (grey symbols)” 
(Firesafetysearch 2015). 
The analytical comparison of Dutch and Russian standards demonstrates that the 
Russian approach with the calculated results of the heat flux values for gasoline and 
methanol reflects the real conditions properly. 
“As shown, the Russian approach and the according MS Excel tool prototype, is 
easier to apply - as it requires less inputs (only 3 inputs), which gives a better 
chance for the auditor to view the serviceability (e.g. with regard to operational 
resource requirements and efficiency). The Dutch tool TNO EFFECTS has also the 
possibility to view the option called “show only simple parameters” or using the 
“Defaults” – however the defaults are not appropriate and safe for every scenario” 
(Leksin et al. 2015).  
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8.3 Comparison of the fire ball models 
The standards, described in chapter 8.1, consider the fire ball models. Both 
standards figure out different understanding of formation of a fire ball. For instance 
the Dutch approach considers the fire ball from a BLEVE (boiling liquid expanding 
vapour cloud explosion) effect. This is described in more detail in chapter (8.3.2). The 
input data also differ. So, the Dutch approach, e.g. needs the burst pressure of the 
vessel due to the BLEVE effect and other atmospheric characteristics. The Russian 
approach uses the mass which is released and the thermal parameters of the 
substance. For the calculation of a typical BLEVE effect the Russian approach uses a 
model described in (GOST 12.3.047-2012 2012) in order to calculate the 
overpressure by an explosion of the vessel and the positive phase duration. 
Thus, the comparison of the Dutch and Russian approaches cannot be significant 
because of different models. Nevertheless, both approaches can be compared with 
different scenarios. 
 
8.3.1 Russian approach  
There are three possibilities for the formation of a fire ball: 
 Emission of combustible gas and its instant ignition; 
 Emission of LPG or LNG, its instant evaporation and ignition; 
 Emission of vapours of overheated liquid, instant evaporation stills part of 
liquid and its ignition. 
All notations in this chapter are translated and harmonized by (A. Leksin) from the 
Russian ordinance, i.e. (Order No. 404 2009) and its addition (Order No. 649 2010). 
All references and data are from this ordinance unless specified otherwise. 
The heat radiation (heat flux) q [kW/m2] of the fire ball is determined by the same 
equation (26) in pool fire: 
 
 f qq E F     (26) 
where Ef = actual surface emissive power (SEP) of the flame [kW/m
2] (notation 
according to (CPR14E 2006)); Fq = view factor;  = atmospheric transmissivity. 
Ef can be quantified by experimental data (table 31) or uses 350 kW/m
2 as default 
value. 
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The view factor is defined with the equation by: 
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where H = height from the center of the fire ball [m]; DS = effective diameter of the fire 
ball [m]; r = distance measured over the ground of the projected centre of the fire ball 
on the ground under the fire ball, and the object [m]. 
The effective diameter of the fire ball is defined as: 
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where m = total mass released [kg]; DS = effective diameter of the fire ball [m]. 
The height from the center of the fire ball H can be equal DS. 
The duration time of the fire ball is defined as: 
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The Atmospheric transmissivity   for the fire ball is defined as: 
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8.3.2 Dutch approach  
The Dutch approach and the associated software tool (cf. TNO 2015) distinguish the 
fire ball model in two different calculations. The first one is the “Fireball: 
Instantaneous gas release”, which calculates only the total mass released and the 
radius of a fireball. The heat flux is not considered in the calculation results. The 
second model is the so-called: Static BLEVE model – the heat flux of a fire ball is 
caused by a BLEVE and starts the computation with the estimation of the amount of 
fuel which is involved in the BLEVE.  
Similar to chapter 8.2.2 the mode “shows expert parameters” is discussed next. The 
auditor may use default input data in case of lacking parameter data.  
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Tables 42 to 44 structures the input process. Terminology is retained unchanged. 
Substance data are from (CPR18E 2005) database (state: 22.07.1999). 
 
Table 42. Data input of vessel characteristics. 
Description Input Data 
Chemical name … 
Type of BLEVE calculation Static BLEVE model or 
Dynamic BLEVE model 
Total mass in vessel, [kg]  
Initial temperature in vessel, [°C] … 
Burst pressure of the vessel, [bar] … 
Height of the receiver [m] … 
 
As above-mentioned, the auditor may also use some default input values in the 
“show expert parameters” mode (italicised in tables 42 and 44).  
 
Table 43. Data input of the atmospheric characteristics. 
Description Input Data 
Ambient temperature, [
o
C] … 
Ambient relative humidity, [%] … 
Amount of CO2 in atmosphere … 
 
 
Depending on the contours for effects or consequences, table 44 gives the chance to 
calculate the physical effects (heat radiation level) or burn degrees (heat radiation 
damage basted on probit function). 
 
Table 44. Data input of personal damage characteristics. 
Description Input Data 
Distance from center of the vessel (Xd), [m] … 
Maximum heat exposure duration, [s] … 
X – coordinate of release, [m] … 
Y – coordinate of release, [m] … 
Calculate contours for 
 
1
st
 degree burns, 2
nd
 
degree burns, lethal 
burns, physical effects 
Heat radiation level (lowest) for first contour plot, [kW/m
2
] Default = 1 
Heat radiation level for second contour plot, [kW/m
2
] Default = 3 
Heat radiation level (highest) for third contour plot, [kW/m
2
] Default = 10 
Take protective  effects of clothing into account Yes/No 
Correction lethality protection clothing Default = 0.14 
Percentage of mortality for contour calculations, [%] Default = 1 
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Heat radiation damage Probit A, [s⋅(W/m2)n] Default = -36.38 
Heat radiation damage Probit B Default = 2.56 
Heat radiation damage Probit N Default = 1.333 
 
The probit function is identically calculated as the pool fire model (chapter 8.2.2). 
The output mask of TNO EFFECTS summarizes the calculation results. Table 45 lists 
all quantified parameters. 
 
Table 45. Quantified parameters in TNO EFFECTS (Data output). 
Parameters Parameters 
Duration of the Fire Ball, [s] (Max.) view factor at Xd 
Max. diameter of the Fire Ball, [m] Atmospheric transmissivity at Xd, [%] 
Max. height of the Fire Ball Heat radiation dose at Xd, [s(kW/m
2
)
4/3
] 
Surface emissive power (max.), [kW/m
2
] Percentage first degree burns at Xd, [%] 
Heat radiation first contour at, [m] Percentage second degree burns at Xd, [%] 
Heat radiation second contour at, [m] Percentage third degree burns at Xd, [%] 
Heat radiation third contour at, [m] Flame temperature, [
o
C] 
(Max.) heat radiation level at Xd  
 
8.3.3 Comparison 
To resume the described Russian method, the equation (26) of the calculation of the 
heat flux differs from the Dutch approach, which uses instead the actual emissive 
power (SEP) the maximum surface emissive power from a flame without soot. Thus, 
the equation (28) is also different in both approaches and the maximum surface 
emissive power SEPmax from a flame without soot (TNO EFFECTS 2014) is: 
 
  max / 1 4 /S CSEP F m H L D      (58) 
 
where FS = fraction of the generated heat which is radiated from the flame surface; 
m = burning rate [kg/m2 s]; ΔHC = heat of combustion [J/kg]; L = average height of the 
flame [m]; D = pool diameter [m]. 
According to (Roberts 1982) “the thermal radiation output from a fireball was 
characterised in terms of the fraction of combustion energy released through 
radiation, and its dependence on the release pressure” (CPR14E 2006), which 
follows the equation: 
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  
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where PSV = saturated vapour pressure before the release [N/m
2]; c6 = 0.00325 
[(N/m2)-0.32]. 
The calculations of the view factor differ in both methods. The Dutch approach 
“estimates the heat radiation surrounding a fire requires the characterization of the 
flame geometry. The computation of the heat intensity at a given location around a 
fire requires the computation of the geometric view factor. The current (TNO 
EFFECTS 2014) implementation contains the calculation algorithms for several flame 
geometries” as described by (Mudan 1987). The view factor at a distance X from the 
fire ball is calculated as:  
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where rfb = radius of the fire ball [m]; X = distance from the centre of the fire ball to 
the radiated object [m]. 
The calculation of the DS effective diameter of the fire ball (equation (55)) and the tS 
duration time of the fire ball (equation (56)) are the same in both methods. 
The calculation of the atmospheric transmissivity  by the Dutch approach is the 
same as in the pool fire model. However the Russian approach uses the simplified 
equation (46). 
 
8.3.4 Prototype tool of the Russian approach 
To compare the two tools, the Russian approach was transformed into a tool as in 
the example with the pool fire model. 
Chapter 8.3.1 outlines the Russian approach from the side of the equations and the 
procedure of the calculated model.  
This chapter introduces the method by MS Excel prototype tool which gives the 
auditor an option to calculate the heat flux, depending on the distance; duration time 
of the fire ball; effective diameter and radius of the fire ball; the injury based on the 
probit function. The auditor only must enter the next parameters: 
 Total mass released kg (marked by the author as m); 
 Actual surface emissive power (SEP) kW/m2 (marked by the author as Ef). 
The MS Excel prototype tool uses the value 350 kW/m2 by default. 
After the input of these data, the results are:  
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for a set of heat flux values  10.5, 7.0, 4.2, 1.4q   the tool gives the distances from 
the center of a fire ball [m]. The heat flux figures are chosen from (Siegel et al. 2001) 
and (Order No. 404 2009). 
At the same time the tool calculates the heat flux and the probit function Pr for the 
entered distances (table 46) and gives the probability (%) of the lethal outcome 
(probability of fatality to personnel) as output: 
 
Table 46. Data output table. 
Parameter Output (example) 
Pr  6.555 
Q, [%]  94.00 
 
 
For a set of probabilities of fatality to personnel [%] Q =99.9, 90.0, 50.0, 10.0, 1.0 
the tool gives the distance from the center of a fire ball [m]. 
The probit function is calculated identically to the pool fire model (see chapter 8.2.4)  
 
8.3.5 Calculation 
For the comparison of Dutch and Russian standards, the scenarios:  
 1000 kilogram propane gas release and its instant ignition  
 40000 kilogram gasoline release and its instant ignition 
were chosen. The Dutch approach uses 25 bar for the burst pressure of the vessel as 
a default value. Most gas tanks have exactly this burst pressure (some burst 
pressures are 16 bar), therefore it is assumed, that the Russian approach uses the 
same default value but does not consider it in the calculations. The changing of the 
burst pressure of the vessel from 25 bar to 16 bar does not have big influence on the 
calculated heat flux depending on the distance to the radiated object. 
As the Dutch method measures the heat flux of the height of the receiver in 1.5 meter 
and the Russian method does not consider this parameter (the height of the receiver 
is 0 meter). The problem is solved by determination of the height of the receiver in 
TNO EFFECTS as 0 meters and by the recalculation of the distance from the centre 
of the fire ball to the radiated object (fig. 51): 
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Figure 51. Fire ball. Distances in Russian and Dutch approaches. 
 
where Xbleve = distance from the centre of the fire ball to the radiated object according 
to the Russian approach [m]; X = distance from the centre of the fire ball to the 
radiated object according to the Dutch approach [m]; Hbleve = radius of the fire ball 
[m]. 
Thus, if Xbleve = 100 meters, then X = 104.57 meters. These recalculations depending 
on the distances must be considered in the results of the comparison of approaches. 
Table 47 presents the calculated heat flux for propane gas release: 
 
Table 47. Comparison of the calculated heat flux q depending from the distance from the centre of the 
fire ball to the radiated object for propane. 
Approach Heat flux q [kW/m²] 
 10.5 7.0 4.2 1.4 
 Distance m [m] from the surface 
Russian  156.8 194.2 250.5 417.3 
TNO  114 144 190 330 
 
The diameter and duration of the fire ball are the same in both approaches (DS = 
61.175 meters; tS = 5.1338 seconds). The calculated distances depending on the 
heat flux have a distinction of ca. 30%. There can be different influences of the 
calculated results: from the burst pressure value of the vessel to the consideration of 
the different models in both approaches (Russian fire ball approach vs. Dutch fire ball 
(Static BLEVE model) approach). The Russian approach also uses a default value of 
SEP 350 kW/m2 and calculated result of the Dutch of SEP is 247.6 kW/m2. This 
difference has an influence on the calculated results: 
 
Table 48. Comparison of the calculated heat flux q depending from the distance from the centre of the 
fire ball to the radiated object for propane by an SEP value of 247.6 in both approaches. 
Approach Heat flux q [kW/m²] 
 10.5 7.0 4.2 1.4 
 Distance m [m] from the surface 
Russian  128.9 161.7 210.9 356.6 
TNO  114 144 190 330 
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By the changing in the Russian MS Excel prototype tool of the input parameter – SEP 
form 350 to 247.6 kW/m2 the calculated distances depending on the heat flux has a 
distinction of ca. 10%. 
Table 49 presents the calculated heat flux for gasoline release: 
 
Table 49. Comparison of the calculated heat flux q depending from the distance from the centre of the 
fire ball to the radiated object for gasoline. 
Approach Heat flux q [kW/m²] 
 10.5 7.0 4.2 1.4 
 Distance m [m] from the surface 
Russian  465.7 566.9 712.1 1086.9 
TNO  435 545 714 1230 
 
The calculated results are similar in both methods. The major difference lies in the 
distances for the heat flux value of 1.4 kW/m². The calculated value of TNO 
EFFECTS is bigger which can be explained by the different calculation of the 
atmospheric transmissivity . The calculated SEP (340 kW/m2) value in TNO 
EFFECTS is near to the Russian default value. 
 
8.3.6 Conclusions 
As mentioned in chapter 8.3 both standards based on different fire ball models that 
can raise the question in the significance of their comparison and the conservative 
sides of both approaches at first sight. The associated TNO EFFECTS tool with the 
option “shows only simple parameters” is also easy in the handling for the auditor, as 
the Russian MS Excel prototype tool. Although, both standards are based on 
different models, the results are surprisingly similar. It is not possible to exclude that 
both approaches are close to reality.  
Depending on the used value of SEP in the Russian approach, the calculated 
distances in some scenarios could be bigger in comparison to the calculated results 
of the Dutch approach, but not more than ca. 30%.  If the Russian approach 
calculates the SEP value separately or uses the experimental data from table 31, the 
calculated results of the heat flux will be similar or identical in both approaches. 
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8.4 Comparison of the jet fire models 
The standards, described in chapter 8.1, consider the jet fire model (named also as 
jet flames or torch fire in different literature). Both standards based on different 
understanding and visualization of the formation of a jet flame. (For a better 
understanding of the differences, it is necessary to consider both models in the 
following chapters). The Dutch approach only calculates the jet flames for LPG and 
LNG is the gas phase. The Russian approach can be used for the calculations of a 
jet flame of compressed combustible gases, steam and liquid phase LPG, LNG, 
flammable liquid and combustible liquid under pressure. The input data also differ. 
The Russian approach only needs the mass flow rate and the surface emissive 
power of the substance in the input data’s. But additionally data are needed for the 
calculation of the mass flow rate. In contrast the Dutch approach needs more input 
data. These data are also important for determination of the mass flow rate. 
Thus, the comparison of the Dutch and Russian approaches is complicated because 
of the different visualization and understanding. These factors will be analyzed and 
compared in the next chapters.  
 
8.4.1 Russian approach  
All notations in this chapter are translated and harmonized by (A. Leksin) from the 
Russian ordinance, i.e. (Order No. 404 2009) and its addition (Order No. 649 2010). 
All references and data are from this ordinance unless specified otherwise. 
When carrying out an assessment of fire hazards of the burning torch at the jet 
expiration of the compressed combustible gases, steam and liquid phase LPG, LNG, 
flammable liquid and combustible liquid under pressure, it is allowed to accept the 
following boundary conditions: 
 the zone of direct contact of a flame with surrounding objects is defined by the 
torch sizes; 
 length of a torch of LF does not depend on the direction of the expiration of a 
product and of a wind speed; 
 bigger danger is constituted by horizontal torches where conditional probability 
of realization should be accepted equal 0.67; 
 defeat of the person in a horizontal torch happens in 30° sector with a radius 
which is equal to the torch length; 
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 impact of a horizontal torch on the equipment leading to its destruction 
(cascade development of accident) happens in 30° sector, which is limited by 
the radius. The radius is equal to the length of a torch LF; 
 outside the specified sector at distances from LF to 1.5LF, the heat flux from a 
horizontal torch is 10 kW/m2; 
 the heat flux from vertical torches can be determined by the same equations 
as in the pool fire model (eq.26, 30-40 and 46), accepting the L equal LF, d 
equal DF, θ equal 0, Ef can be determined  with the equations  (27-29) or the 
table 31 depending on the type of fuel. In the absence of data and 
impossibility to calculate Ef it is allowed to accept as 200 kW/m
2; 
 by an expiration of the liquid phase of LPG or LNG from a hole with an 
equivalent diameter up to 100 mm at instant ignition there is a full combustion 
of the expiring product in a torch without formation of an pool fire; 
 by an instant ignition of a stream of gas, the possibility of formation of 
overpressure is allowed not to be considered 
 horizontal torches are not considered in the Russian approach. 
The flame length m (length of frustum) by a jet flame is defined as: 
 
 
0.4
F
L K G   (61) 
where G = mass flow rate [kg/s]; K = empirical coefficient (12.5 expiration of 
compressed gases; 13.5 expiration of the steam phase of LPG or LNG; 15 expiration 
of the liquid phase of LPG or LNG). 
The torch length by the jet expiration of combustible liquids is defined by the range 
(height) of a stream of liquid. 
The width of a torch DF m by a jet flame is defined as: 
 
 0.15F FD L   (62) 
 
8.4.2 Dutch approach  
The Dutch approach base on a geometric solid flame shape model (Chamberlain 
1987) and is modified according to (Cook et al. 1987, Boot 2016). 
 
 
110 
This model was developed by wind tunnel experiments and a wide range of natural 
gases among other field tests onshore and offshore. “The model represents the flame 
as a frustum of a cone, radiating as a solid body with a uniform surface emissive 
power. Correlation describing the variation of flame shape and surface emissive 
power under a wide range of ambient and flow conditions” (CPR14E 2006). As 
mentioned in chapter 8.4, the Dutch approach only calculates the jet flames for 
gases. 
TNO EFFECTS comes up with an extended and single data input mask (expert 
parameters) which goes beyond the presentation constraints of this chapter. Tables 
50 to 52 structure the input process according the scenario characteristics mentioned 
above. Terminology is retained unchanged. Substance data are from (CPR18E 2005) 
database (state: 22.07.1999). 
 
Table 50. Data input of jet fire characteristics. 
Description Input Data 
Chemical name … 
(Calculated) Mass flow rate, [kg/s]  … 
Exit temperature, [°C]  
Exit pressure, [bar] … 
Hole diameter, [mm] … 
Hole rounding User defined, 
rounded edges, 
sharp edges, pipe 
contraction 
Discharge coefficient Default = 1 
Outflow angle in XZ plane (0° = horizontal; 90° = vertical), [deg] Calculate/Default or 
User defined 
Release height (Stack height), [m] Default = 0.1 
Flame temperature, [°C] Default =0.35 
Max. heat exposure duration, [s]  Calculate/Default or 
User defined 
Height of the receiver, [m]  
 
 
The problem in the input data of jet fire characteristics is in the value of the mass flow 
rate. If the auditor uses the “defaults”, the tool considers this parameter as 10 kg/s 
by a default value of the exit pressure 6.5 [bar] and exit temperature 20 [°C] 
independent from the substance. Such “defaults” are not appropriate and safe for 
every scenario. The input mask shows, that the mass flow rate must be calculated. 
(TNO EFFECTS 2014) has a separate option to calculate the mass flow rate, but 
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parameters of the pipeline (e.g. initial temperature in equipment, initial (absolute) 
pressure within the pipeline, pipeline length, pipeline diameter, hole diameter etc.) 
must be known.  
 
Table 51. Data input of the atmospheric characteristics. 
Description Input Data 
Wind speed at 10 [m] height, [m/s] … 
Ambient temperature, [°C] … 
Ambient relative humidity, [%] … 
Amount of CO2 in atmosphere  … 
Percentage of the flame covered by soot, [%] … 
Predefined wind direction      User defined (N, NNE, etc.) 
Wind comes from  (North = 0 degrees), [deg] … 
 
 
Wind direction in table 51 is defined by the common section of a compass rose. 
 
Table 52. Data input of personal damage characteristics. 
Description Input Data 
Distance from release (Xd), [m] … 
X - coordination, [s] … 
Y - coordination, [s] … 
Calculate contours for 
 
1
st
 degree burns, 2
nd
 degree 
burns, lethal burns, physical 
effects 
Heat radiation level (lowest) for first contour plot, [kW/m
2
] Default = 1 
Heat radiation level for second contour plot, [kW/m
2
] Default = 3 
Heat radiation level (highest) for third contour plot, [kW/m
2
] Default = 10 
Take protective effects of clothing into account Yes/no 
Correction lethality protection clothing  
Percentage of mortality for contour calculations, [%] Default = 1 
Heat radiation damage Probit A, [s⋅(W/m2)n] Default = -36.38 
Heat radiation damage Probit B Default = 2.56 
Heat radiation damage Probit N Default = 1.333 
Resolution for surface discretization Low, medium, high, very high 
 
 
The probit function is calculated identical to the pool fire model (chapter 8.2.2). 
The output mask of TNO EFFECTS summarizes the calculation results.  
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Table 53 lists all quantified parameters. 
 
Table 53. Quantified parameters in TNO EFFECTS (Data output). 
Parameters Parameters 
Type of flow of the jet Surface emissive power (max), [kW/m
2
] 
Exit velocity of expanding jet, [m/s] Surface emissive power (actual), [kW/m
2
] 
Angle between hole and flame axis (alpha) , [deg] Atmospheric transmissivity at Xd, [%] 
Frustum lift off height (b), [m] View factor at Xd 
Width of frustum base (W1), [m] Heat radiation at Xd, [kW/m
2
] 
Width of frustum tip (W2), [m] 1% First degree burns distance, [m] 
Length of frustum (flame) (Rl), [m] 1% Second degree burns distance, [m] 
Surface area of frustum, [m
2
] 1% Third degree (Lethal) burns distance, [m] 
 
8.4.3 Comparison  
To resume the described Russian method, the equation (26) of the calculation of the 
heat flux differs to the Dutch approach, which uses instead the actual emissive power 
(SEP) the actual surface emissive power of the frustum (SEPact), which is the 
average radiation emittance (emissive power) of the flame surface: 
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   (63) 
where FS = fraction of the combustion energy radiated from the flame surface; Q’ = 
combustion energy per second [J/s]; A = surface area of the flame [m2]. 
To determine the fraction of the heat radiated from the flame surface the equation 
(64) is used: 
  
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 ' ' CQ m H   (65) 
where uj = jet velocity [m/s]; m’ = mass flow rate [kg/s]; ∆Hc = heat of combustion 
[J/kg]. 
As shown, the fraction of the heat radiated from the flame surface is based on the 
equation (64) “but potentially modified with molar mass correction according to (Cook 
et al. 1987, Boot 2016)  
Calculations of the parameter, which are considered in the equation, are complicated 
to comprehend due to the absence this data in the TNO EFFECTS tool “Help” Desk. 
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It is supposed, that equations from ((CPR14E 2006) chapters 6.5.3.1 – 6.5.3.5) are 
used.  
The calculation of the view factor is similar in both methods and uses the equations 
(30 to 40) of the pool fire model. The difference is that the Dutch approach “takes into 
account the lift-off of the flame, change in distance to the object due to lift-off and the 
change of the angle under which the object observes the flame” (CPR14E 2006): 
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where X’ = distance from the centre of the bottom plane of a lifted-off flame to the 
object [m]; X = distance from the centre of the flame without lift-off to the object [m]; 
Θ’ = angle between the centreline of a lifted-off flame and the plane between the 
centre of bottom of the lifted-off flame and the object [°]; b = frustum lift-off height [m]; 
Θj = angle between hole axis and the horizontal in the vertical plane [°]; 𝛼 = angle 
between hole axis and the flame axis [°]; W1 = width of frustum base [m]; W2 = width 
of frustum tip [m]; R = radius of the flame [m]. 
In the equations (42, 43 and 45) of the pool fire model the X X ' , 1L R  , ' . 
 
 
Figure 52. Distances, lengths and angles required for the calculation of a lifted-off flame (CPR14E 
2006). 
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As the (fig. 52) shows, there are two widths of the frustum contrary to the Russian 
approach.  
 
Figure 53. Tourch fire in the Russian approach. 
 
The length of frustum (flame) in the Dutch approach differs to the Russian 
calculation: 
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where Lb = flame length, flame tip to centre of exit plane [m]; X = distance from the 
centre of the flame without lift-off to the object [m]; b = frustum lift-off height [m]. 
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where K = 0.185×e-20Rw+0.015; RW = ratio of wind speed to the jet speed. “In still air 
(α = 0°), b is equal to 0.2 × Lb. For ‘lazy’ flames pointing directly into high winds 
(α = 180°), b = 0.015 × Lb ” (CPR14E 2006). The Russian tool does not consider the 
wind velocity. 
Therefore, both approaches use different models for the calculation of the heat flux, 
flame length and the widths of a jet fire. 
 
8.4.4 Synopsis 
Due to the complexity of the Dutch approach: not full distinctness between equations 
described in (CPR14E 2006) and used in the associated tool TNO EFFECTS (TNO 
EFFECTS 2014) the solution was to recalculate the example from (CPR14E 2006) 
chapter “6.6.2 Jet flames”. This gives the author the chance to compare the 
calculations between (CPR14E 2006) and (TNO EFFECTS 2014). The scenario is: 
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decompression of a high pressure pipeline (hole diameter 100 mm, choked flow) 
with methane gas and a distance release point to receiver 150 m: 
 
Table 54. Comparison of the example between (CPR14E 2006) and (TNO EFFECTS 2014) (Data 
output). 
Parameters CPR14E 2006 TNO EFFECTS 2014 
Width of frustum base (W1), [m] 0.7169 0.1405 
Width of frustum tip (W2), [m] 40.8475 9.4703 
Surface emissive power (actual), [kW/m
2
] 21.95 375.11 
Atmospheric transmissivity at Xd, [%] 67.302 66.072 
View factor at Xd 0.0282 0.0018 
Heat radiation at Xd, [kW/m
2
] 0.417 0.466 
 
The comparison shows that the associated tool TNO EFFECTS calculates the 
parameters with additional corrections, which could not be found out in the “Help” 
Desk of the tool. Also it is not found out how was calculated the initial pressure of 
100 bar for the input data.  
 
8.4.5 Prototype tool of the Russian approach 
To compare the two tools, the Russian approach was transformed into a tool alike 
before. 
Chapter 8.4.1 and 8.4.3 outlined the Russian approach from the side of the equations 
and the procedure of the calculated model.  
This chapter introduces the method in form of an MS Excel prototype which gives the 
auditor a simple option to calculate the heat flux, depending from the distance; flame 
length; width of a torch; the injury based on the probit function. The auditor must 
enter the next parameters: 
 Substance 
 Mass flow rate [kg/s] (marked by the author as G); 
 Actual surface emissive power (SEP) [kW/m2] (marked by the author as Ef); 
 Burning flux at still weather conditions [kg/m2⋅s] (marked by the author as m); 
 Empirical coefficient (marked by the author K) 
The database of the tool prototype is programmed for the following substances: LPG, 
LNG, gasoline, diesel and oil (petroleum product). If the auditor has other substances 
(e.g. hexane) he must enter additional properties of the substance, as the 
Lg vaporisation heat of the flammable material at its boiling point [kJ/kg]; Cp specific 
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heat capacity at constant pressure [kJ/kg⋅K]; Tb the liquid boiling temperature [K]; Ta 
ambient temperature [K] – to calculate the m burning rate at still weather conditions 
[kg/m2⋅s] and the HSG heat of combustion [kJ/kg] – to calculate the Ef actual surface 
emissive power of the flame [kW/m2]. 
The w0 [m/s] wind velocity and П [kg/m
3] vapour density of the flammable materials 
at the boiling point is not considered in the Russian approach and tool.  
There is also a problem in the calculation of the mass flow rate in the Russian 
approach, as in the Dutch, described in chapter 8.4.3. The Russian approach uses 
an equation (71) from (Order No. 404 2009) to determine the mass flow rate: 
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where Ahol = area of the hole [m
2]; PV = initial pressure in the pipeline [Pa; γ = heat 
capacity ratio of the gas; μ = flow coefficient 0.8; ρV =  density of gas at the initial 
pressure in the pipeline (PV ) [kg/m
3]. This equation is used for the calculation of the 
mass flow rate from a tank, but due to the lack of an equation for a pipeline, the mass 
flow rate is calculated as presented. 
The output results are: 
for a set of heat flux values  10 5 7 0 4 2 1 4q . , . , . , .  the tool gives the distance from 
the center of the jet fire (fig. 53) [m]. The heat flux figures are chosen from (Siegel et 
al. 2001) and (Order No. 404 2009). 
At the same time the tool calculates the heat flux and the probit function Pr for the 
entered distance (table 55) and gives the probability (%) of the lethal outcome 
(probability of fatality to personnel) as output: 
 
Table 55. Data output table. 
Parameter Output (example) 
Pr  3.720 
Q, [%]  10.03 
 
 
For a set of probabilities of fatality to personnel [%] Q =99.9, 90.0, 50.0, 10.0, 1.0 
the tool gives the distance from the center of a jet fire [m]. 
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8.4.6 Calculation 
For the comparison of Dutch (TNO EFFECTS 2014) and Russian standards, three 
scenarios with hydrogen, methane and propane gas release and its instant ignition 
were chosen. The hole diameter in the pipeline is 100 mm; exit temperature          
20 [°C]; exit pressure, as the default value of (TNO EFFECTS 2014) is 6.5 bar. It 
has been solved to use the equation (71) from the Russian approach to calculate the 
mass flow rate of the hydrogen: 
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ρV =  density of the hydrogen by the initial pressure in the pipeline (PV  = 650000 Pa) 
can be calculated with the ideal gas law: 
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Definition of density is:  
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Therefore: 
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The heat capacity ratio of hydrogen at the exit temperature 20 oC  is γ = 1.410. 
Therefore, the mass flow rate is:  
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The Dutch method (TNO EFFECTS) measures the heat flux of the height of the 
receiver in 1.5 meter and the Russian method does not consider this parameter. The 
results of the comparison are presented in tables 56 to 58: 
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Table 56. Comparison of the calculated heat flux q depending on the distance from the centre of the 
jet fire to the radiated object for hydrogen. 
Approach Heat flux q [kW/m²] 
 10.5 7.0 4.2 1.4 
 Distance m [m] from the surface 
Russian  2.4 3.5 5.6 14.2 
TNO  - - 16 38 
 
The length of frustum (flame) is similar in both methods: the Russian approach 
calculates the value with 18.0 [m] and the Dutch approach with 20.3 [m]. The Russian 
approach calculates the value of the surface emissive power (SEP) which is 
29.7 kW/m2 while the Dutch calculated result is 147.9 kW/m2. However, the 
maximum heat flux value in the Dutch approach is 5.6 kW/m2 by a distance from 
release of 6 m. 
 
The same scenario is compared for methane.  
The density of the methane by the initial pressure in the pipeline is: 
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The heat capacity ratio of methane by exit temperature 20 [°C]  is γ = 1.320. 
Therefore, the mass flow rate is: 
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Table 57. Comparison of the calculated heat flux q depending on the distance from the centre of the 
jet fire to the radiated object for methane. 
Approach Heat flux q [kW/m²] 
 10.5 7.0 4.2 1.4 
 Distance m [m] from the surface 
Russian  21.2 28.2 38.2 71.2 
TNO  - - 12 39 
 
The length of frustum (flame) is similar in both methods: the Russian approach 
calculates the value with 27.4 [m] and the Dutch approach with 26.2 [m]. The Russian 
approach use the default value of the surface emissive power (SEP) which is 
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220 kW/m2 while the Dutch calculated result is 99 kW/m2. However the maximum 
heat flux value in the Dutch approach is 4.5 kW/m2 at a distance from release of 
7 m. 
 
The same scenario is compared for propane.  
The density of the methane at the initial pressure in the pipeline is: 
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The heat capacity ratio of propane at exit temperature 20 [°C]  is γ = 1.130. 
Therefore, the mass flow rate is: 
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Table 58. Comparison of the calculated heat flux q depending on the distance from the centre of the 
jet fire to the radiated object for propane. 
Approach Heat flux q [kW/m²] 
 10.5 7.0 4.2 1.4 
 Distance m [m] from the surface 
Russian  11.7 16.8 25.4 52.6 
TNO  - 13 31 68 
 
The length of frustum (flame) is similar in both methods: the Russian approach 
calculates the value with 35.4 [m] and the Dutch approach with 33.1 [m]. The Russian 
approach uses the default value of the surface emissive power (SEP) which is 
80 kW/m2 while the Dutch calculated result is 151.9 kW/m2. However the 
maximum heat flux value in the Dutch approach is 7.4 kW/m2 at a distance from 
release of 9 m. 
 
8.4.7 Conclusions 
In all three scenarios the maximum heat fluxes are the biggest in the Russian 
approach. This is due to the different understanding and visualization of the jet flame. 
The Dutch approach considers the beginning of the burning of the jet flame not 
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directly at the depressurized hole (e.g. with a hole diameter of 100 mm), as 
considered the Russian approach, but with a calculated distance from the 
depressurized hole (fig. 54): 
 
Figure 54. Visualization of a jet flame on basis of the Dutch model (TNO EFFECTS 2014). 
 
Such understanding and visualization of the jet flame can be closer to the reality for 
certain scenarios. But at the same time it depends on the mass flow rate respectively 
on the pressure in the pipeline. Such model explains the small values of the heat 
fluxes in the Dutch approach. The heat radiation in such a scenario is spread 
differently. For a better overview, an extract of the associated TNO EFFECTS tool is 
present in the following (fig. 55): 
 
Figure 55. Heat radiation vs. distance. Propane release scenario (TNO EFFECTS 2014). 
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The overall comparison of both approaches shows the following results: 
 Scenario with hydrogen:  
the distances from the centre of the jet fire to the radiated object are twice as 
big as in the Dutch approach; 
 Scenario with methane:  
the distances from the centre of the jet fire to the radiated object are bigger in 
the Russian approach; 
 Scenario with propane:  
the distances from the centre of the jet fire to the radiated object are similar in 
both approaches. 
Such distinctions are explained by the difference in the building of the jet flame and 
substance properties.  
Despite of the different equations for calculating of the length of the frustum, the 
results are similar. This hints at the high quality of the complicated calculations in the 
Dutch approach and right empirical coefficients in the equation of the Russian 
approach.  
Unfortunately the literature research of data taken from experimental studies of jet 
flames has not given the desirable results in comparison to the described scenarios 
with reference values. As described in (Order No. 404 2009, Order No. 649 2010) 
and (CPR14E 2006) both models are based on a scale of experiments, which does 
not allow to draw conclusions which model is closer to reality. The advantage of the 
Russian approach consists of the possibility to calculate the jet flame for different 
substances, inter alia for steam and liquid phase of LPG and LNG, flammable liquids, 
combustible liquids under pressure and the probit function for the considered 
scenario. 
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8.5  Comparison of the explosion models 
The standards, described in chapter 8.1, consider similar vapour cloud explosion 
models based on the multi energy concept. This concept is described more detailed 
in the chapter 8.5.2 of the Dutch approach.  
 
8.5.1 Russian approach  
All notations in this chapter are translated and harmonized by (A. Leksin) from the 
Russian ordinance, i.e. (Order No. 404 2009) and its addition (Order No. 649 2010). 
All references and data are from this ordinance unless specified otherwise. 
Basic data for calculation of the vapour cloud explosion are:  
 type of the combustible substance containing in a cloud; 
 concentration of combustible substance in the mixture СG (in the Russian 
original СГ); 
 stoichiometric concentration of combustible substance with the air СST (in the 
Russian original ССТ); 
 mass quantity of flammable part of the cloud МТ with a concentration between 
the lower explosive limit (LEL) and upper explosive limit (UEL). It is allowed to 
accept the МТ equal to the mass of the combustible substance containing in a 
cloud taking into account a coefficient Z – participations of combustible 
substance in explosion. In absence of the data, coefficient Z can be accepted 
as 0.1. At a jet stationary expiration of combustible gas, the МТ should be 
calculated taking into account the stationary distribution of concentration of 
combustible gas in a jet stream. 
 heat of combustion HSG  [kJ/kg] (in the Russian original ЕУД) 
 speed of sound in ambient air C0 (usually is accepted equal 340 m/s) 
 degree of obstruction (Information about the degree of the clutter surrounding 
surface 
 Total combustion energy (of the combustible mixture) E: 
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 (74) 
At the calculation of the parameters of the combustion cloud located at the earth 
surface, the size of a total (effective) energy stock doubles. 
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The expected mode of combustion cloud depends on the type of combustible 
substance and degree of clutter of surrounding space. 
 
Classification of combustible substances by sensitivity degree 
Substances, which are capable to build an explosive atmosphere with the air, are 
divided into four classes dependent on the sensitivity to initiation of explosive 
processes: 
Class 1 – especially sensitive substances; 
Class 2 – sensitive substances; 
Class 3 – moderately sensitive substances; 
Class 4 – slightly sensitive substances. 
Few examples are given in table 59. If the auditor cannot find the required substance 
in table 59, it should be classified by analogy with the substances which are available 
in the table. If there are not specific data of the substance, the worst case must be 
considered using the Class 1.  
 
Table 59. Classification of combustible substances by sensitivity degree. 
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3 Class 4 
Acetylene Acrylonitrile Acetaldehyde Benzene 
Vinyl acetylene Acrolein Acetone Decane 
Hydrogen Butane Gasoline Orthodichlorobenzene  
Hydrazine Butene Vinyl acetate Dodecane 
Isopropyl nitrate 1,3-Butadiene Vinyl chloride Methane 
Methylacetylene (Propyne) 1,3-Pentadiene Hexane Toluene 
Nitromethane Propane Isooctane Methyl mercaptan 
Propylene oxide Propylene (Propene) Methylamine Chloromethane 
Ethylene oxide Carbon disulfide Methylacetate Carbon monoxide 
Ethyl nitrate 
Ethane Methyl butyl ketone 
(MBK or 2-Hexanone) 
Styrene 
 
Ethylene Methyl propyl ketone 
(MPK or 2-Pentanone) 
 
 
Dimethyl ether Methyl ethyl ketone 
(MEK or Butanone) 
 
 
Divinyl ether Octane  
 
Methylbutyl ether 
(MTBE) 
Pyridine  
 
The broad fraction of 
light hydrocarbons 
Hydrogen sulfide  
 
 Methanol  
 
 Ethanol  
 
 1-Propanol  
 
 Amyl alcohol  
 
 Isobutanol  
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 Isopropyl alcohol  
 
 Cyclohexane  
 
 Ethyl formate  
  Chloroethane  
 
During an assessment of scales of defeat at the overpressure (shock waves) the 
distinction of chemical compounds on the heat of combustion, which is used for 
calculation of the total energy reserve, has to be considered. For typical 
hydrocarbons the value of specific heat of combustion is taken into consideration 
HSG0 = 44 MJ/kg. For other combustible substances at the calculations the specific 
energy release is used: 
 0SG SGH H   (75) 
where  = correction parameter. For some substances the correction parameter  
can be found in table 60:  
 
Table 60. Classes of combustible substances in combination with the correction parameter . 
Class of combustible substances   Class of combustible substances  
Class 1  Class 2  
Acetylene 1.10 Cumene 0.84 
Methylacetylene (Propyne) 1.05 Methylamine 0.70 
Vinyl acetylene 1.03 Methanol 0.45 
Ethylene oxide 0.62 Ethanol 0.61 
Hydrazine 0.44 1-Propanol 0.69 
Isopropyl nitrate 0.41 Amyl alcohol 0.79 
Ethyl nitrate 0.30 Cyclohexane 1.00 
Hydrogen 2.73 Acetaldehyde 0.56 
Nitromethane 0.25 Vinyl acetate 0.51 
  Gasoline 1.00 
Class of combustible substances   Hexane 1.00 
Class2  Isooctane 1.00 
Ethylene 1.07 Pyridine 0.77 
Diethyl ether 0.77 Cyclopropane 1.00 
Diphenyl ether 0.77 Ethylamine 0.80 
Propylene oxide 0.70   
Acrolein 0.62 Class of combustible substances   
Carbon disulfide 0.32 Class 4  
Butane 1.00 Methane 1.14 
Butene 1.00 1,1,1-Trichloroethane 0.15 
1,3-Butadiene 1.00 Chloromethane 0.12 
1,3-Pentadiene 1.00 Benzene 1.00 
Ethane 1.00 Decane 1.00 
Dimethyl ether 0.66 Dodecane 1.00 
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Diisopropyl ether 0.82 Toluene 1.00 
The broad fraction of light 
hydrocarbons 
1.00 Methyl mercaptan 0.53 
Propylene (Propene) 1.00 Carbon monoxide 0.23 
Propane 1.00 Dichloroethane 0.24 
  Dichlorobenzene 0.42 
Class of combustible substances     
Class 3    
Vinyl chloride 0.42   
Hydrogen sulfide 0.34   
Acetone 0.65   
 
Classification of the obstruction (clutter surrounding surface) 
The character of the surface obstruction has an influence on the flame speed in the 
combustion cloud and, therefore on the parameters of the pressure wave. The 
characteristics of the surface obstruction are divided into four classes: 
Class I – existence of long pipes, cavities, the cavities filled with gas mixture at which  
combustion it is possible to expect formation of turbulent streams of the 
products of combustion having not more than three times the size of a 
detonation cell of this mixture. If the size of a detonation cell for this mixture 
is not known, the minimum characteristic size of streams is accepted as 5 
cm for substances of a Class 1, 20 cm for substances of a Class 2, 50 cm 
for substances of a Class 3 and 150 cm for substances of a Class 4; 
Class II – highly cluttered surface: existence of half-closed volumes, high density of  
placement of processing and technological equipment, wood, large number 
of repeating obstacles; 
Class III – average cluttered surface: freestanding processing and technological  
plants, storage tanks; 
Class IV – little clutter and free surface. 
 
 
Classification of combustion modes clouds 
For an assessment of the impact of combustion of a cloud the possible modes of 
combustion are divided into six classes based on the speed of their distribution: 
Class 1 – detonation or burning with a speed of the flame front 500 m/s and more; 
Class 2 – deflagration, flame front speed 300 – 500 m/s; 
Class 3 – deflagration, flame front speed 200 – 300 m/s; 
Class 4 – deflagration, flame front speed 150 – 200 m/s; 
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Class 5 – deflagration, the flame front speed is calculated as: 
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where k1 = constant = 43; MT = mass quantity of flammable part of the cloud kg; 
 
Class 6 – deflagration, the flame front speed is calculated as: 
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where k2 = constant = 26; MT = mass quantity of flammable part of the cloud kg. 
 
The expected mode of a combustion of a cloud is assigned with the help of the table 
61, depending on the class of combustible substance and the class of clutter of 
surrounding surface: 
 
Table 61. Determination of the combustion mode. 
Class of the 
combustible substance 
Class of the obstruction 
 I II III IV 
1 1 1 2 3 
2 1 2 3 4 
3 2 3 4 5 
4 3 4 5 6 
 
By the determination of the maximum speed of the flame front, for the modes of 
combustion classes 2 – 4, the visible speed of the flame front must be calculated with 
the equation (76): 
 
1/6
1 T
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If the calculated value is more than the maximum speed of the corresponding speed 
(corresponding to the determinate class), this new value must be accepted to the 
upper bound of range of the expected speeds of combustion of a cloud. 
 
Calculation of the maximum overpressure and positive impulse 
Parameters of the pressure wave (overpressure ΔP and positive impulse I+) are 
calculated proceeding from the expected combustion mode of a cloud (depending on 
the distance from the center of a cloud). 
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Class 1 mode of combustion of a cloud 
The corresponding dimensionless distance is calculated with the equation (78): 
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R R E P  (78) 
where R = distance from the center of the cloud m; P0 = atmospheric pressure Pa; 
E = total combustion energy J. 
Values of the dimensionless pressure Px and the impulse Ix are determined by 
equations (79, 80) (for gas-steam-air mixes): 
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The equations (79, 80), are fair for values Rx more than Rk = 0.2. If Rx < Rk, the 
Px=18 and in the equation (80) instead Rx must be used the value Rx=0.14. 
 
Values of the overpressure and the positive impulse are determined: 
 0xP P P    (81) 
 
2/3 1/3
0 0
/
x
I I P E C     (82) 
  
Class 2-6 mode of combustion of a cloud 
The corresponding dimensionless distance is calculated with the equation (78). 
Values of the dimensionless pressure Px and the impulse Ix are determined by 
equations (83, 84):
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where  = extent of expansion of combustion products (for gas-steam-air mixes it is 
allowed to accepted as 7, for the dust-air mixes it is allowed to accepted as 4); 
u = visible speed of the flame front m/s. 
By the deflagration of the dust-air explosive atmosphere the total combustion energy 
E must be multiplied with the coefficient (-1)/.  
Equations (83, 84) are fair for values Rx more than Rkp1 = 0.34. If Rx < Rkp1 instead Rx 
in the equations (83, 84) the value must be used Rkp1. 
Values of the overpressure and the positive impulse are calculated with the 
equations (81, 82). Instead of Px and  Ix the auditor uses the values Px1 and  Ix1 in the 
equations (81, 82). 
 
8.5.2 Dutch approach  
The Dutch approach uses the so-called Multi-Energy model to calculate the vapour 
cloud explosion. “The Multi-Energy concept is based on the observation that the 
explosive potential of a vapour cloud is primarily determined by the obstructed and/or 
partially confined parts of the cloud” (Mercx et al. 2000). However the (CPR14E 
2006) describes the concept of the Multi-Energy method as an generally accepted 
practical model, which represent best mechanics of an unconfined vapour cloud 
explosion, but at the same time “the application in practice though is hampered due 
to the lack of appropriate guidance for application as some aspects are still not yet 
fully described due to the lack of experimental data”. 
More information about the Multi-Energy model can be found in (Eggen 1998, 
CPR14E 2006, K. van Windergen et al. 1995). 
Similar to chapter 8.2.2 the mode “shows expert parameters” is discussed next. As in 
the pool fire example (chapter 8.2.2) the auditor may use some default input data in 
case of lacking some parameter data. Table 62 structures the input process. 
Terminology is retained unchanged. Substance data are taken from (CPR18E 2005) 
database (state: 22.07.1999). 
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Table 62. Data input. Model: Explosion (Multi Energy model) version: 5.03. 
Description Input Data 
Chemical name … 
Ambient pressure, bar … 
Total mass in explosive range, kg … 
Fraction of flammable cloud confined User defined/Default = 0.08 
Curve number User defined 
Distance from release (Xd), m … 
Offset between release point and cloud centre, m User defined/Default = 0 
Threshold overpressure, mbar User defined/Default = 100 
X-coordinate of release, m User defined/Default = 0 
Y-coordinate of release, m User defined/Default = 0 
Predefined wind direction User defined (N, NNE, etc.) 
Wind comes from (North = 0 degrees), deg … 
 
 
where: 
 “Total mass in explosion range is the explosive mass at time t – explosive  
mass in gas cloud at time of study t (semi-continuous and instantaneous releases) or 
at any time (continuous releases). [This mass must be calculated or determine. TNO 
EFFECTS (CPR14E 2006) framework uses another model]. 
 Fraction of flammable cloud confined – that’s the volume percentage of the  
explosive cloud (part of the vapour cloud within explosive limits) which is 
confined/obstructed.  
As a default, the value from the System Parameters value "Fraction confined mass 
ME" will be used. 
The fraction of flammable cloud confined is of great importance, as the mass of 
chemical found in the confined region is the one used by the model to do the 
calculations. This means that for a given scenario, the results obtained will be the 
same if we put 2,000 kg in "Total mass in explosive range" and 50% in "Fraction of 
flammable cloud confined" (so 1,000 kg of confined explosive mass) or we input 
10,000 kg in "Total mass in explosive range" and 10% in "Fraction of flammable 
cloud confined" (1,000 kg of confined explosive mass as well). 
It has been experimentally demonstrated, as can be found in the 3rd edition of the 
Yellow Book, that only the confined/obstructed parts of the explosive cloud contribute 
to the deflagration/detonation phenomenon” (TNO EFFECTS 2014). 
 Curve Number 
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As described in (CPR14E 2006, Kinsella 1993) three blast source strength factors 
must be defined by the choice of the explosion type: 
– degree of obstruction by obstacles inside the vapour cloud, 
– ignition energy, 
– degree of confinement. 
For more information see (paragraph 5.5.2 CPR14E 2006). 
As described in (TNO EFFECTS 2014): “the multi-energy method is based upon 
experimental graphs in which the required value depends upon the distance from the 
vessel and the type of explosion. 10 different types of explosion are considered, and 
have a curve associated to them”. Those are: 
 
-        1: Very weak deflagration  
-        2: Very weak deflagration  
-        3: Weak deflagration  
-        4: Weak deflagration  
-        5: Medium deflagration  
-        6: Strong deflagration  
-        7: Strong deflagration  
-        8: Very strong deflagration  
-        9: Very strong deflagration  
-        10: Detonation  
 
The results of categorising are expressed in table 63 which assigns the class (curve) 
numbers corresponding to the various combinations of the boundary and initial 
conditions: 
 
Table 63. Initial blast strength index (CPR14E 2006). 
Blast strength 
category 
Ignition strength 
(High / Low) 
Obstruction 
(High / Low / None) 
Parallel plane 
(Confined / Unconfined) 
Class 
1 H H C 7 - 10 
2 H H U 7 - 10 
3 L H C 5 - 7 
4 H L C 5 - 7 
5 H L U 4 - 6 
6 H N C 4 - 6 
7 L H U 4 - 5 
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8 H N U 4 - 5 
9 L L C 4 - 5 
10 L L U 2 - 3 
11 L N C 1 - 2 
12 L N U 1 
 
Here, the (CPR14E 2006) gives a remark: “as this information is not available 
presently it is advised to choose a source strength class number 10. The result will 
be conservative as the class number is lower in almost all cases.”  
 Offset between release point and cloud center – this is the distance between  
the point where the release of the chemical started (from a vessel, a broken pipe, an 
evaporating pool) and the position of the center mass of the confined explosive 
cloud. See figure in ‘Distance from release (Xd)’ for more information (TNO 
EFFECTS 2014). 
 Threshold overpressure – this is the overpressure value (in mBar) for which 
the auditor wants to calculate the distance from the center mass position 
where it is reached (output value). It is also the threshold value to be used 
when calculating the output contour plot of all the positions where this 
overpressure is reached (TNO EFFECTS 2014). 
The output mask of TNO EFFECTS summarizes the calculation results. Table 64 lists 
all quantified parameters: 
 
Table 64. Quantified parameters in TNO EFFECTS (Data output). 
Parameters Parameters 
Confined mass in explosive range, [kg] Dist. from center mass of cloud at 
threshold overpressure, [m] 
Total combustion energy, [MJ] Blast-wave shape at Xd 
Peak overpressure at Xd, [mbar] Damage (general description) at Xd 
Peak dynamic pressure at Xd, [mbar] Damage to brick houses at Xd 
Pressure impulse at Xd, [Pa·s] Damage to typical American-style 
houses at Xd 
Positive phase duration at Xd, [ms] Damage to structures (empirical) at Xd 
 
8.5.3 Comparison 
For the calculation of the 
dyn
p  – peak dynamic pressure in blast-wave (in Russian 
version P – overpressure) both approaches use the same equation (81). In the 
Dutch approach the same equation looks as: 
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 'dyn dyn ap p p   (86) 
there '
dyn
p = scaled dynamic pressure in blast-wave (in Russian approach it is the 
x
P – 
dimensionless pressure). Here the first difference between the approaches can be 
observed. In the Russian approach the dimensionless pressure is determined with 
the equation (79) or equation (83) depending on the class: mode of combustion of a 
cloud. For the determination of the scaled dynamic pressure in blast-wave the Dutch 
approach uses the graph (fig. 56): 
 
 
Figure 56. Multi-Energy method blast chart: peak dynamic pressure (CPR14E 2006, p. 5.36). 
 
To determine the scaled dynamic pressure (dimensionless pressure) it is necessary 
to know the scaled distance 'r  (in Russian version – dimensionless distance). Both 
approaches use the equation (78).  
For the calculation of the 
S
i  – positive side-on impulse of blast-wave (in Russian 
version – positive impulse, determined with the equation (82) the Dutch approach 
uses a similar equation (87) : 
 
 
1
2
S S p
i P t    (87) 
there 
S
P = peak side-on overpressure of blast-wave Pa; pt = positive phase duration 
of blast-wave s. 
  
1/3
' / /
p p a a
t t E p a   (88) 
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there '
p
t = scaled positive phase duration of blast-wave;E = total combustion energy 
J;  
a
p = ambient pressure Pa;
a
a = speed of sound in ambient air m/s. 
 
 'S S aP P p   (89) 
there '
S
P = scaled peak side-on overpressure of blast-wave. 
For the determination of the scaled peak side-on overpressure of blast-wave and the 
scaled positive phase duration of blast-wave, the Dutch approach uses the graphs 
(fig. 57, 58): 
 
Figure 57. Multi-Energy method blast chart: 
peak side-on overpressure (CPR14E 2006, p. 
5.35). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 58. Multi-Energy method blast chart: 
positive phase duration and blast-wave shape 
(CPR14E 2006, p. 5.37). 
 
                      
The difference to the Dutch approach is that the Russian approach, which uses the 
equation (82) to calculate the positive impulse, is supported by equations (80) and 
equations (84, 85) (depending form the class: mode of combustion of a cloud). 
Equation (82) (1 class mode of combustion of a cloud – detonation) is based on 
natural logarithmic function and depends on the dimensionless distance too. 
 
8.5.4 Comparison in the risks calculations 
The Dutch approach only evaluates the degree of injury of buildings and not the risks 
or the probabilities of the injury. It is classified as: 
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 Damage (general description) for the release distance   
 
Total destruction Zone A: > 83 kPa 
Heavy damage Zone B: 35 - 83 kPa 
Moderate damage Zone C: 17 - 35 kPa 
Minor damage  Zone D: 3.5 - 17 kPa 
 
 
 Damage to brick houses for the release distance   
 
More than 75% of all outer brick walls have collapsed 70 kPa 
The damage is not repairable; 50% to 75% of the outer brick walls are 
lightly to heavily damaged. The remaining brick walls are unreliable  
35 kPa 
Not habitable without major repair works. Partial roof failures, 25% of 
all brick walls have failed, serious damage to the remaining carrying 
elements. Damage to window frames and doors   
7-15 kPa 
Habitable after relatively easy repairs. Minor structural damage  3 kPa 
Damage to roofs, ceilings, minor crack formation in plastering, more 
than 1% damage to glass panels 
1 - 1.5 kPa  
 
 
 Damage to typical American-style houses for the release distance   
 
Total collapse of building   70 kPa 
Serious damage. Collapse of some walls  30 kPa 
Moderate to minor damage. Deformed walls and doors; failure of 
joints. Doors and window frames have failed. Wall covering has fallen 
down   
15 kPa 
Minor damage. Comparable to a damage due to a storm; wooden 
walls fail, breakage of windows  
7 - 10 kPa 
 
 Damage to structures (empirical) for the release distance   
 
The supporting structure of a round storage tank has collapsed  100 kPa 
Brickstone walls (20-30 cm) have collapsed  50 kPa 
Displacement of a cylindrical storage tank, failure of connecting pipes  50 - 100 kPa 
Loaded train carriages turned over 50 kPa 
Collapse of a pipe-bridge  40 - 55 kPa 
Displacement of a pipe-bridge, rupture of piping 35 - 40 kPa 
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The Russian approach uses determined criteria to evaluate the injury to personnel, 
located in buildings or on open air: 
 
Degree of injury Peak overpressure , kPa 
Total collapse of building 100 
50 % collapse of building 53 
Middle  injury of building 28 
Moderate damages of buildings (damage of internal partitions, 
frames, doors, etc.) 
12 
Lower threshold of injury to the personnel by a pressure wave   5 
Minor damage (breakage of windows) 3 
 
For the calculation of the probability (%) of the lethal outcome (probability of fatality to 
personnel) the Russian approach uses also the probit function Pr, which is related to 
the destruction of buildings:
 
 
 
 Pr 5.0 0.26 lnV    (90) 
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 (91) 
The value of conditional probability of fatality to personnel ( )
di
Q a  is calculated 
depending on the calculated probit function Pr: 
 
  
Pr 5 21
exp
22
di
U
Q a dU



 
   
  
  (92) 
 
Because the integral belongs to special functions, the decision was made to calculate 
it with the help of the trapezoidal rule (fig. 59): 
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Figure 59: An animation showing how the trapezoidal rule approximation improves with more strips. 
From (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trapezoidal_rule#/media/File:Trapezium.gif V.: June, 2016). 
 
The calculation of the conditional probability of fatality to personnel diQ (a )  is used for 
every fire (pool fire, jet fire, fire ball) and explosion (vapour cloud explosion) models. 
 
8.5.5 Prototype tool of the Russian approach 
To compare the two tools, the Russian approach was transformed into a tool as in 
the example with the pool fire model. 
Chapter 8.5.1 outlines the Russian approach from the side of the equations and the 
procedure of the calculated model.  
This chapter introduces the method in form of an MS Excel prototype which gives the 
auditor a simple option to calculate the overpressure of a vapour cloud explosion, 
positive impulse and injury based on the probit function, depending on the distance. 
The auditor must enter the next parameters: 
 
 Mass quantity of flammable part of the cloud, МТ  
 Class of the combustible substance 
 Class of the obstruction 
 Correction parameter  (from table 60) 
 Extent of expansion of combustion products,   
 Correction coefficient for the vapour cloud location (1 = if the vapour cloud is 
located in the air; 2 =  if the vapour cloud is located at the earth surface) 
 
As described in chapter 8.5.1 the mass quantity of flammable part of the cloud МТ  
must by calculated by the auditor separately before it can be entered in the input 
mask. 
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After the input of all data, the results are:  
for a set of overpressure values in kPa (kilopascal)  100, 53, 28, 12,  5,  3P   the 
tool gives the distance from the vapour cloud [m]. The minimum distance, there the 
overpressure does not change is also given for the calculated corresponding 
dimensionless distance (Rx). For this distance the exact value of the maximum 
overpressure is calculated.  
For a set of probabilities of fatality to personnel [%] Q =99.9, 90.0, 50.0, 10.0, 1.0 
the tool gives the distance from the center of the vapour cloud [m]. At the same time 
the tool calculates the probit function Pr for the entered distance (table 65) and gives 
the probability (%) of the lethal outcome (probability of fatality to personnel) as 
output: 
Table 65. Data output table. 
Parameter Output (example) 
Pr  10.965 
Q, [%]  100.00 
 
8.5.6 Calculation 
For the comparison of Dutch and the Russian standards, three different substances 
(hydrazine, propane and methyl mercaptan) and two kinds of scenarios (in 
dependence of the type of explosions – detonation and different deflagrations) were 
chosen. The total mass of explosive range is 1000 kg for every scenario. 
Dutch approach uses the “Default value” 0.08 by the determination of the fraction of 
flammable cloud confined. Russian approach uses as a “Default value” 0.1, that 
corresponds 10%. It means that the fraction of flammable cloud confined is the 
volume percentage of the explosive cloud (part of the vapour cloud within explosive 
limits). Therefore, in both tools the fraction of flammable cloud confined is accepted 
as 0.1.  
The results of the comparison are presented in tables 66 to 72: 
 
1st Scenario: 1 class of the substance (Hydrazine) and II Class of the obstruction, the 
combustion mode is selected as Class 1 – detonation. The Dutch approach 
determines for such scenario the same explosion type: 
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Table 66. Comparison of calculated overpressure for hydrazine (high class of obstruction).  
Curve number – Detonation. 
Approach 
Overpressure values [kPa] 
100 53 28 12 5 3 
Distance m [m] from the vapour cloud 
Russian  18 26 37 66 147 304 
TNO (detonation) 19 26 37 66 141 220 
 
The scenario of detonation in a high class of obstructions shows the same result 
values in both approaches. The Russian approach calculates the maximum 
overpressure 289 [kPa] by a distance of 11 meters. However the Dutch approach 
calculates the maximum overpressure 1363 [kPa] by a distance of 7 m.  
 
2nd scenario: 1 class of the substance (Hydrazine) and IV Class of the obstruction, 
the combustion mode is selected as Class 3 – deflagration, flame front speed 200 – 
300 m/s. The Dutch approach determines the class (curve) number – 5: Medium 
deflagration – for such a scenario. 
 
Table 67. Comparison of calculated overpressure for hydrazine (low class of obstruction). 
Approach 
Overpressure values [kPa] 
100 53 28 12 5 3 
Distance m [m] from the vapour cloud 
Russian  - 28 61 151 371 623 
TNO (medium 
deflagration) 
- - - 26 66 107 
 
The Russian approach calculates the maximum overpressure 83 [kPa] by a distance 
of 11.1 m. The Dutch approach calculates the maximum overpressure 12 [kPa] by a 
distance of 26 m. 
The results of both methods are completely different. As described in chapter 8.5.1 
the Russian approach uses table 61 to define the combustion mode. Thus, an 
influence of the type of the explosion of the calculated results is observed.  
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3th scenario: change of the class (curve) number of a highest – 7: Strong deflagration 
 
Table 68. Comparison of calculated overpressure for Hydrazine by a strong deflagration  
(low class of obstruction). 
Approach 
Overpressure values [kPa] 
100 53 28 12 5 3 
Distance m [m] from the vapour cloud 
Russian  - 28 61 151 371 623 
TNO (strong 
deflagration) 
12 25 38 68 140 310 
 
Also by the changing of the class (curve) number of a highest – 7: Strong deflagration 
– the results are similar only for an overpressure of 53 [kPa]. For overpressure values 
the distances of the Russian approach are twice as big as the Dutch approaches 
values. 
 
4th scenario: 2 class of the substance (Propane) and II Class of the obstruction, the 
combustion mode is selected as Class 2 – deflagration, flame front speed 300 – 500 
m/s (Russian approach).  
The Dutch approach determines the class (curve) number – 7 – 10 for such a 
scenario: (strong deflagration – detonation). There are no differences between the 
calculated results for the “strong deflagration” and “detonation” in the (TNO 
EFFECTS 2014). 
 
Table 69. Comparison of calculated overpressure for Propane (high class of obstruction).  
Curve number – Detonation. 
Approach 
Overpressure values [kPa] 
100 53 28 12 5 3 
Distance m [m] from the vapour cloud 
Russian  60 122 238 567 1370 2289 
TNO (detonation) 25.5 34.5 50.5 92 190 295 
 
By the comparison of the scenarios for Hydrazine and Propane it can be seen, that 
by the explosion type of a “detonation”, the results in both methods can differ. An 
influence of the class of the substance plays an important role. 
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The Russian approach calculates the maximum overpressure 230 [kPa] at a distance 
of 15 m. The Dutch approach calculates the maximum overpressure 1474 [kPa] at a 
distance of 9 m. 
 
5th scenario: 2 class of the substance (Propane) and IV Class of the obstruction, the 
combustion mode is selected as Class 4 – deflagration, flame front speed 150 – 200 
m/s (Russian approach). The Dutch approach determines the class (curve)    
number – 5: Medium deflagration – for such a scenario 
 
Table 70. Comparison of calculated overpressure for Propane (low class of obstruction). 
Approach 
Overpressure values [kPa] 
100 53 28 12 5 3 
Distance m [m] from the vapour cloud 
Russian  - - 29 84 213 360 
TNO (medium 
deflagration) 
- - - 36 90 143 
 
As in the comparison of the Hydrazine, the results of the Russian approach are twice 
as big as the Dutch approach values for the similar type of an explosion. 
The Russian approach calculates the maximum overpressure 37 [kPa] at a distance 
of 15 m. The Dutch approach calculates the maximum overpressure 20.6 [kPa] at a 
distance of 20 m. 
 
6th scenario: 4 class of the substance (Methyl mercaptan) and II Class of the 
obstruction, the combustion mode is selected as Class 4 – deflagration, flame front 
speed 150 – 200 m/s (Russian approach). The Dutch approach determines the class 
(curve) number 7 – 10 for such a scenario. 
 
Table 71. Comparison of calculated overpressure for Methyl mercaptan (high class of obstruction).  
Approach 
Overpressure values [kPa] 
100 53 28 12 5 3 
Distance m [m] from the vapour cloud 
Russian  - - 24 68 172 291 
TNO (detonation) 20.5 28 40 73 150 239 
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Such comparison is not expedient as it only compares the different types of an 
explosion. But the results are similar to each over beginning for least overpressures. 
The Russian approach calculates the maximum overpressure 37 [kPa] at a distance 
of 12 m. The Dutch approach calculates the maximum overpressure 1584 [kPa] at a 
distance of 7 m. 
 
7
th scenario: 4 class of the substance (Methyl mercaptan) and IV Class of the 
obstruction, the combustion mode is selected as Class 6 – deflagration, the flame 
front speed is calculated as:
  
1/6
2 T
u k M   (77) 
where k2 = constant = 26; MT = mass quantity of flammable part of the cloud kg. 
The Dutch approach determines for such scenario the class (curve) number – 4 – 5: 
 
Table 72. Comparison of calculated overpressure for Methyl mercaptan (low class of obstruction). 
Approach 
Overpressure values [kPa] 
100 53 28 12 5 3 
Distance m [m] from the vapour cloud 
Russian  - - - - - - 
TNO (4 weak 
deflagration) 
- - - - 40 95 
TNO (5 medium 
deflagration) 
- - - 29 71 115 
 
The Russian approach calculates the maximum overpressure 2.8 [kPa] at a distance 
of 12.2 m. Such result is possible in the Dutch approach if the class (curve) number 
is 1 – 2: very weak deflagration. It is possible if the ignition strength is low (table 63 of 
the Dutch approach). But it also has an influence on other scenarios with the same 
substance.  
 
8.5.7 Conclusions 
The deflagration scenarios with higher flame front speed give larger calculated 
results in the Russian approach. In fact if the overpressure is lower, the variation 
between both approaches is bigger. The deflagration scenario with weak flame front 
speed gives lower calculated results in the Russian approach. The determination of 
the curve number according to the table 63 is rather subjective and makes the 
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selection of the deflagration speed more complicate for an auditor. There is a high 
probability in a wrong definition of the flame front speed. In contrast to the Dutch 
approach the Russian approach uses the substance properties, supported by the 
tables 59, 60 and the class of the obstruction. Thus, the definition of the flame front 
speed is easier in the Russian approach. The results of the calculated overpressure 
have automatically an influence on the probit function and as a consequence on the 
estimated risk. Thus, the potential risk is incredibly higher in the Russian approach. 
The differences can pose the question how close the analyzed results of both 
approaches are to reality. Nevertheless, the Russian and Dutch ordinances refer the 
developed vapour cloud explosion models on the experimental data tests. 
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9 Conclusions to the extended quantitative approach for 
consequence assessment  
“The Russian and Dutch ordinances for calculating physical effects of hazardous 
substances differ in their origin and legal context. For this it is not surprising that the 
models, which are compared, are slightly different. The chapter 8 explains  these 
varieties. Furthermore both ordinances are industry standards which imply their 
design for practical oriented purposes and eased feasibility. Again there are 
differences. The comparison of models and results … gives hints towards 
methodological improvements and application development. 
As shown in this dissertation, the Russian approach and the prototype tool 
according MS Excel … is easier and it requires in most instances less input … 
data, which gives a better chance for the auditor to view the serviceability. 
The final version of the MS Excel prototype tool expects to show similar analysis 
properties as (TNO EFFECTS 2014). This gives auditors the possibility to make an 
accelerated progress in risk analysis of … scenarios and they will have more 
detailed output data about the scenarios, risk contours and probit functions. Graphs, 
e.g. visualized on a site map, supplement this approach” (Leksin et al. 2015). 
The advantages of the suggested MS Excel prototype tool, which is based on the 
Russian approach, is that it considers the probit function in all scenarios in 
comparison to the Dutch ordinance. It gives a better overview about the risk spectrum 
and risk limits for the audited enterprise. Another benefit lies in the exact defined risk 
limit for an individual, e.g. by fire models the heat flux scale  10.5, 7.0, 4.2, 1.4q   
and by explosion model the overpressure scale  100, 53, 28, 12,  5,  3P  . Such 
unambiguous limit values make a consequence assessment easier and furthermore 
the process of deciding for a risk nomination to develop precautions measurements.  
The extended quantitative approach for consequence assessment can be also used 
not only for typical storage facilities but also for processes and plants (e.g. separator, 
pumps etc.), which gives the assessment another beneficial factor. 
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10 Results and Outlook  
In the context of this dissertation methodological challenges occurred that were 
discussed in detail in the respective chapters.  
On the whole it was observed that the risk analysis in CPI in the field of EFP has to 
be considered as a complicated and complex system. This dissertation seeks to 
contribute to the enhancement of the individual risk assessment.  
As the literature research showed today’s business environment is far more 
competitive, demanding continuous improvement of financial performance as well as 
requirement compliance with safety legislation. The reported methodological gaps 
existing in the process of risk analysis, when duly considered in the development of a 
new method, strive to be in accordance with the industry’s needs. The presented 
developed method results in a detailed semi-quantitative risk and quantitative 
consequence assessment in the field of explosion and fire risks. 
Such an analysis provides more flexibility due to the detailed risk evaluation, 
additionally considering the range of the majority of possible scenarios. Possible 
improvements of the MS Excel prototype tool which is based on the developed 
method cannot be excluded due to the overall complexity of the system. 
Nevertheless, the mathematical procedures working in the background of the MS 
Excel prototype tool rule out possible faults due to their universality.  
The presented extended method can be adapted for other kinds of risk analyses, e.g. 
to assess the financial impact of a risk to which a plant or building is exposed. In 
other words this also allows a risk estimation concerning material damage, building 
damage or interruption damage. Although, it is important to consider that the financial 
risk analysis needs further research and an adaption of the check list, additional 
parameters for the developed equations and furthermore the acquisition of data in 
the examined surveyed area of interest.  
In general the presented method needs an additional survey to gather further data in 
order to improve the risk relevant parameters. Under these conditions a more 
comprehensive risk analysis can be carried out as a medium-term target. Naturally a 
supplementary examination of explosion and fire accidents in CPI is needed which 
naturally results in the development of a new database.  
The presented extended quantitative approach for consequence assessment has 
manifold advantages, e.g. simpler application which give the auditor a better chance 
to view the serviceability based on the reduced amount of input data. As a 
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consequence the MS Excel prototype tool based on this approach does not only 
need to be used by experts in the area of EFP. In addition to that the numerous 
output data cannot only be used for the individual risk calculation but also for the 
estimation of damages. This is possible due to the usage of the probit function which 
can possibly optimize the presented prototype tool. However as mentioned in the 
chapters comparing the Russian and Dutch approaches the question on closeness to 
reality was raised for the presented models (pool fire, fire ball, torch fire and vapour 
cloud explosion). The MS Excel prototype tool gives information to the auditor 
concerning hazards, worst case scenarios and based on this the auditor has to come 
to a conclusion on how the risk can be reduced.  
Therefore, the set aims are achieved and the knowledge gaps are bridged. In order 
to distribute the new approaches among experts the next step will be the realization 
of the MS Excel prototype tools and its implementation as a commercial tool. Thus, 
chemical enterprises which have already signaled their interest will have the chance 
to apply the new method in practice.  
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Attachment: Possible role of the Bayesian network in the 
determined weighting factors 
The Bayesian framework can be most useful (Paté-Cornell 2002) for the reliability 
check of the offered weighting factors, whose conditional probabilities are actually 
presented in a graph (fig. 16). The introduction of the Bayesian framework in the 
dissertation mainly follows (Friedman et al. 1999). A Bayesian network for random 
variables X = {X1, X2, …, Xn} is a pair G = G, . G is a directed acyclic graph whose 
vertices are associated with X.   “ … represents the set of parameters that 
quantifies the network”. “It contains a parameter xiPa(Xi) = Pxi Pa(Xi) for each 
possible value xi of Xi, and pa(Xi) of Pa(Xi)”. Then, “a Bayesian network B specifies a 
unique joint probability distribution over X” (Leksin et al. 2013) given by: 
 
 
    1
1
,...,
n
B n B i i
i
P X X P X X

  Pa  (I) 
In the graphical representation of a Bayesian network, nodes represent Bayesian 
random variables and are associated with a probability function. Edges show 
conditional dependencies. The variables interconnected with each node can be 
discrete or continuous. The causal relations between variables are expressed in 
terms of conditional probabilities. 
An example of three nodes is presented in (fig. Example of Bayesian net), where the 
graphical structure shows that the variable C is influenced by variables A and B, and 
the variables A and B are independent. Each node has two possible values, 
corresponding to the working (true function) and failure (false function) states of the 
components of an assessed system, e.g. a fire protection system. 
 
Figure. Example of Bayesian net. 
 
For complex engineering constructions and structures the revaluation of the reliability 
on the basis of the Bayesian network has to be carried out with the simultaneous 
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accounting of two important features of structural systems: existence of various 
options of sequence of multiple damages and correlation of limit states (Mahadevan 
et al. 2001).The Bayesian approach gives a chance to identify and structure a set of 
possible hypotheses, examining all existing data of the conditional probabilities of 
every node and presenting the risk analysis results along with the quantification of 
uncertainties (Apostolakis 1990, Press 1989). “Some of these benefits are the 
capability to model complex systems, …, to compute exactly the occurrence 
probability of an event or scenario, …, to represent multimodal variables and to 
help modelling user-friendly by a graphical and compact approach” (Weber et al. 
2012). 
Further information about Bayesian networks and inference can be found in literature, 
e.g. (Pearl 2000, Druzdzel et al. 2000, Heckerman et al. 1995). 
The Bayesian network approach enables the model developer to check input data 
and model factors against operational experience, e.g. from auditors of engineering 
companies. This formalisation will also increase the confidence into procedures and 
results. This and the comprehension of scenarios into the QRA approach can 
increase the potential of the audit tool. 
The weighting factors can be assessed for more complex scenarios by means of the 
Bayesian tools. However this was not the objective target of this dissertation. As a 
means of help Bayesian tools are made available under the link 
(http://www.cs.iit.edu/~mbilgic/classes/fall10/cs595/tools.html). Some recommended 
of them are: 
 Bayesialab (http://www.bayesia.com/en/products/bayesialab) 
 Bayesian Knowledge Discoverer (http://kmi.open.ac.uk/projects/bkd/) 
 Bayesian Network tools in Java (BNJ) (http://bnj.sourceforge.net/) 
 Bayes Net Toolbox for Matlab (http://code.google.com/p/bnt/) 
The last one, the Bayes Net Toolbox for Matlab, is auspicious because of the 
spreading and recognition of the Matlab in the R & D world. Moreover, they simplify 
the handling with a such tool, e.g. allowing liberties to visualize the results. Many 
instructions and examples for this tool can be found in the internet.  
For simpler graphs the training expenditure probably keeps to a certain extent. 
However it is necessary to consider that for more complicated graphs with a larger 
number of nodes and, as a possible result, a larger possibility of their interconnection, 
the assessment procedure of the weighting factors becomes complicated repeatedly. 
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Bayesian network Application  
The practical application of the Bayesian network modelling approach in the context 
of this dissertation needs a link to EFP scenarios as relevant for, e.g. audited 
enterprises. The application is shown by the text book example of (Murphy 1998) well 
known in the area of Bayesian inference. The notation is slightly adapted. Similar 
examples are, e.g. given in (Lauritzen et al. 1988). 
The starting point of modelling is similar to ETA in (fig. 14) and the resulting Bayesian 
graph and variables are shown in (fig. I): 
 
Fuel + ignition 
source
(I)
Fire 
suppresion 
system
(S)
Fire alarm 
system 
(A)
Fire
(B)
 
Figure I:  Bayesian network “Fire Spreads” 
 
The nodes and variables Xi are 
 I:  Fuel and ignition source (start) 
 S: Fire suppression system (technical equipment; barrier) 
 A: Fire alarm system (technical equipment; barrier) 
 B: Fire (“blaze”; endpoint) 
Supposed, an auditor evaluates the compliance of alarming system A as “acceptable” 
and suppression system S as “accepted”. Following a table I with determined 
weighting factors this is associated with unreliability’s 0.2 and 0.1: 
 
Table I. Weighting factors for safety parameters 
Compliance Weighting Factors 
Irrelevant 1.00 
Unacceptable 0.50 
Acceptable 0.20 
Accepted 0.10 
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The nodes in (fig. I) are binary denoted by true (T) or false (F). The variable states 
are associated with probabilities according to compliance levels. 
The Bayesian network quantification of this audit example needs a further 
assumption: as there is no a priori information about the presence of source I at the 
audited enterprises, the probabilities are set as P(I = T) = P(I = F) = 0.5. Table II 
summarises these probabilities.  
 
Table II: (Conditional) probabilities of I, A, and S 
I P(S=F) P(S=T)  P(I=F) P(I=T)  C P(A=F) P(A=T) 
F 0.5 0.5  0.5 0.5  F 0.8 0.2 
T 0.1 0.9     T 0.2 0.8 
 
Table II considers the audit evaluation results whereas the adaption of Murphy’s 
example needs a careful adaption of binary states.  
The true states of node variables are associated with “success” as far as possible: 
 Ignition source present  T 
 EFP equipment operable  T 
 No fire  T 
Then, the probability of an inoperable suppression system S is expected to be low, 
e.g. P(S = F) = 0.1 (P(A = F) = 0.2, resp.). As there is no information about the 
reaction of suppression system S in dependency of I, the probability P = 0.5 is used. 
With this, the joint probability function is 
 
P(B, S, A, I)= P(B|S, A)·P(S|I)·P(A|I)·P(I)                                       
 
Table III shows the estimated conditional probabilities for the “final” B node, i.e.: 
 P(B = T):  Prob. of no fire (fire extinguished) 
 P(B = F): Prob. of fire (not extinguished). 
 
Table III: Conditional Probabilities 
S A P(B=F) P(B=T) 
F F 1.0 0.0 
T F 0.1 0.9 
F T 0.1 0.9 
T T 0.01 0.99 
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For instance, if S and A are operable, then probability of no fire (true state) is 0.99.  
Using a Bayesian network, the conditional probabilities are computed as follows: 
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where 
 ,
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0.70
0.5 0.5 0.2 0.99
0.5 0.5 0.8 0.9
P S T B T
I T S T A T B T
I T S T A F B T
I F S T A T B T
I F S T A F B T
  
      
   
   
    
      
   
      
 
 
and 
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The probability of no fire, which is computed by the same procedure, is P(B =T) = 
0.75, and is the normalising constant. The final conditional probabilities are 
 
 P(S = T|B = T) = 0.89 
 P(A = T|B = T) = 0.65. 
 
Thus, it is more likely of extinguished fire because of an operating suppression 
system. The probabilities looks reasonable for a fully compliant suppression and a 
weakening alarm system as found by the auditor. This was an example with a 
combination to the ETA. The ETA is linked with a check list, as described in chapters 
7.1 – 7.2.2. The practical application of the Bayesian network modelling approach in 
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the field of EFP QRA development needs a link to a typical check list. Next example 
shows a more complex application, which is exemplified by (Magdeburg, 2015) who 
calculates the probability of fatality to personnel by a fire (Fig.II).  
Within an QRA audit, the auditor determines the basic elements, which have to be 
evaluated. The proposed Bayesian network uses the already given elements of the 
check list (as mentioned above) and calculates the likelihoods of those events which 
might have several independent causes. 
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rescue success
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 level
 
Figure II: Example of the calculation of the probability of fatality to personnel by a fire by Bayesian 
network 
 
As re-using basic elements of given check lists, the approach semi-automatically 
supports the auditor who has to follow three steps: 
 I. Questionary level – evaluation of the relevant elements for the risk audited 
area (enterprise, plant processes, escape routes which are relevant for the 
individual risk of personnel).  
 II. Consequence level – evaluation of the consequences which are 
appropriable from the negative or positive side (determination of the linking 
with each other nodes and there dependences). 
 III. Top event level – calculation of the probability of the top event supported 
by the Bayesian approach. 
This Bayesian network allows calculating the final conditional probabilities for 
scenarios as given in table VII. 
Following step I, the relevant elements are already evaluated. In this example the 
auditor evaluates the compliance of the estimated conditional probability of the 
“Adequate escape behavior” (table IV). One task in step II is the evaluation of the 
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consequence, e.g. of “Post-flashover” (table V), which has one predecessor node 
(also determined by the auditor). 
 
Table IV:  Adequate escape behavior             Table V:  Post-flashover (Node with 1 predecessor node) 
 (Node without predecessor nodes) 
Yes  0.65 
No 0.35 
 
 
If there are more predecessor nodes, the auditor has to evaluate them too. 
 
Table VI:  Fatality to personnel by a fire (Node with 4 predecessor nodes) 
Foreign 
rescue 
 
 
 Yes            No  
Self-rescue   Yes      No      Yes  
Toxic effect  Yes   No   Yes   No    Yes  
Post- 
flashover 
Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No  Yes  No 
Dead 0.1  0.65 0  0 0.6  0 0  0  0.1  0.65 
Alive 0.9  0.35 1  1 0.4  1 1  1  0.9  0.35 
 
Finally, step III gives an overview about the top event, the dependences of the linked 
nodes and the probabilities the scenarios: 
 
Table VII:  Evidence of the event 
Evidence  Probability of fatality to personnel by a fire   
 
None                              
   
    11,45% 
  
Mobility restricted  
Mobility not restricted  
Self-recue successful 
Self-recue unsuccessful 
Without a Post-Flashover  
    13,03% 
      9,87% 
      8,97% 
    19,23% 
      9,93% 
  
 
 
With a Bayesian approach, the already available knowledge in the auditor’s’ check 
list can be used and enriched with additional information about the determined 
weighting factors, which actually represent the conditionally probabilities.  
The results can be checked against generic data of operating EFP systems in order 
to improve the input data and weighting factors of the QRA model, if necessary. 
 
Extinguishing attempt Yes No   
Yes 0.3 0.9   
No 0.7 0.1   
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Attachment: Example of an check list survey 
The use of the semi-quantitative part of the approach requires a backbone of safety 
and hazard aspects and their evaluation. A check list example of questions and 
requests is given in table VIII and IX. These will be evaluated by the auditor based on 
the weighting factors (table 9). 
 
Table VIII. Check list of hazard parameters. 
1. Further factors 
1.1 Substance temperature 
1.2 Amount of dangerous substance / fire loading 
1.3 Technological process 
1.4 Room category 
… 
… 
1.x Ambient temperature                      
2.Fire hazards 
2.1 Ignition temperature 
2.2 Dispersion of substance (Unintentional surface  
      expansion by mechanical means) 
2.3 Sedimented Dust 
2.4 Potential of  ignition source 
2.5 Potential quantity of a smoke by fire 
2.6 Potential amount of toxic substances by burning 
2.7 Potential speed of distribution of a flame 
2.8 Amount of combustible substances 
2.9 Combustibility 
2.10 Availability of an oxidizer 
2.11 Interaction with other substances 
2.12 Oxidising solids 
… 
… 
2.y Spontaneously combustible solids 
3. Explosion hazards 
3.1 Instability/Reactivity  
3.2 Classification of combustible substances  
3.3 Flash point 
3.4 Dispersed Dust 
3.5 Capable of detonation or explosive   
       decomposition at normal temperatures and   
       pressures (e.g. according to NFPA 780) 
3.6 Undergoes violent chemical change at elevated  
       temperatures and pressures, reacts violently with  
       water, or may form explosive mixtures with  
       water (e.g. white phosphorus, potassium,  
       sodium) (e.g. according to NFPA 780) 
3.7 Upper explosive limit 
3.8 Potential of  ignition source 
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3.9 Potential amount of toxic substances by explosion 
… 
… 
3.z Maximum explosion pressure 
  
An example of indicative list for safety measures and parameters is given as an 
example in the table IX. These will be evaluated by the auditor based on the 
weighting factors (table 8). 
 
Table IX. Check list of safety measures. 
I. Architects measures 
I.1 Evacuation routes 
I.2 Amount of dangerous substance / fire loading 
I.n … 
II. Technical measures 
II.1 Gas detection system 
II.2 Lightning protection 
II.3 Fire alarm system 
II.4 Fire suppression system 
II.5 Emergency control systems 
II.6 Fire extinguisher, Fire hydrant etc. 
II.7 Electrical installations and systems 
II.8 Emergency light 
II.9 Heat and Smoke Vents / Positive Pressure Ventilation 
II.10 Emergency Power Supply 
II.11 Special extinguishing systems and equipment 
II.12 Air-technical systems 
II.13 Automatic interruption of processes 
II.14 Constructive explosion protection measures 
II.m … 
III. Organization measures 
III.1 Safety officer 
III.2 Emergency organisation 
III.3 Instructors for the protection of health and safety 
III.4 Evacuation plans 
III.5 Safety briefings 
III.6 Maintenance of safety-related equipment  
III.7 Intervention group (fire fighters) 
III.8 General requirements for fire protection 
III.9 Fire protection self-monitoring 
III.10 Safety signposting 
III.11 Fire protection plans 
III.12 Change of technologycal processes and  
         documentation of these 
III.13 Hazard prevention plan 
III.14 Determination and announcement of evacuation assistants  
III.15 Marking of explosive zones 
III.16 Explosion-proof designed work equipment in explosive zones 
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III.17 Regular inspections of the grounding and equipotential bonding devices 
III.k   … 
 
A check list serves as a means for the determination of the actual state of a situation 
as well as the systematic detection of vulnerabilities. Such check lists are a well-used 
method. However it is often the case that there is only sparse knowledge about the 
audited situation. A certain preknowledge of the auditor concerning the topic in 
question should not be renounced. Furthermore the temporal documentation is to be 
stressed positively as it can be consulted as a source of argumentation in assessing 
meetings. This might be the danger that the check list provides a false feeling of 
safety which could obscure possible deficiencies and problems. In such cases the 
check list cannot be extended and the necessity of the addition of important contents 
is neglected. The best-case scenario would be to describe the single contents in 
detail as well as the thematic design has to be mentioned (Peterjohann 2013) (e.g. a 
check list can be extended based on the hazard and operability study (HAZOP 
analysis) if carried out (Hucke 2016)). Therefore, a check list has to be set up for 
every enterprise and its individual needs. The problem of the universality is that a 
check list has to comprise all factors to be assessed. 
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Attachment: Correlations between the Excel cells for II step 
 
 
 
 
 
Attachment: Overview of the interconnections and function of the II step 
 
II.1 Further factors Evaluated by auditor Value_0 Coeff. True value_0C*TV_0 Deviation +ACD -ACD
1 Substance temperature Hazard free 0,95 1 0,95 0,95 0,342225 0,05 0,05 0,05 5,1529
2 Amount of dangerous substance / fire loading Hazard free 0,95 1 0,95 0,95 0,342225 0,05 0,05 0,05 5,1529
3 … Low 0,75 1 0,75 0,75 0,148225 0,25 0,25 0,25 4,2849
4 … Average 0,5 10 0,5 5 0,018225 0,5 0,5 5 7,1824
5 … High 0,25 1 0,25 0,25 0,013225 0,75 0,75 0,75 2,4649
6 … Maximum 0,05 10 0,05 0,5 0,099225 0,95 0,95 9,5 51,5524
7 … Maximum 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,099225 0,95 0,95 0,95 1,8769
8 … Maximum 0,05 5 0,05 0,25 0,099225 0,95 0,95 4,75 5,9049
9 … Maximum 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,099225 0,95 0,95 0,95 1,8769
10 Ambient temperature (rooms, technol. process) Maximum 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,099225 0,95 0,95 0,95 1,8769
11 …
Maximum value 0,448 0,999 0,365 3,2 0,88 9 2,32 9
Normal value 0,275 0,725 0,275 0,123 0,448 0,102 0,725 0,985 1,760 -0,310
Minimum value 0,102 0,001
II.1 Further factors Evaluated by auditor Value_0 Coeff. True value_0C*TV_0 Deviation +ACD -ACD
1 Substance temperature Hazard free 0,95 1 0,95 0,95 0,342225 0,05 0,05 0,05 5,1529
2 Amount of dangerous substance / fire loading Hazard free 0,95 1 0,95 0,95 0,342225 0,05 0,05 0,05 5,1529
3 … Low 0,75 1 0,75 0,75 0,148225 0,25 0,25 0,25 4,2849
4 … Average 0,5 10 0,5 5 0,018225 0,5 0,5 5 7,1824
5 … High 0,25 1 0,25 0,25 0,013225 0,75 0,75 0,75 2,4649
6 … Maximum 0,05 10 0,05 0,5 0,099225 0,95 0,95 9,5 51,5524
7 … Maximum 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,099225 0,95 0,95 0,95 1,8769
8 … Maximum 0,05 5 0,05 0,25 0,099225 0,95 0,95 4,75 5,9049
9 … Maximum 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,099225 0,95 0,95 0,95 1,8769
10 Ambient temperature (rooms, technol. process) Maximum 0,05 1 0,05 0,05 0,099225 0,95 0,95 0,95 1,8769
11 …
Maximum value 0,448 0,999 0,365 3,2 0,88 9 2,32 9
Normal value 0,275 0,725 0,275 0,123 0,448 0,102 0,725 0,985 1,760 -0,310
Minimum value 0,102 0,001
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Attachment: MS Excel prototype tools 
Table X. Extended semi-quantitative approach for 
individual risk assessment. Input data 
 
Table XI. Extended semi-quantitative approach 
for individual risk assessment. Output data 
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
I Evaluated by auditor
1 Branche of industry Branche 15
2 Area of a fire compartment, m2 1000
3 Personnel presence, h 8
4 Existing violations Be absent
1 Combustible solids (CS) Many
2 Combustible dust (CD) Middle
3 Combustible liquids (CL) A lot of
4 LPG/ LNG A lot of
5 Combustible gas (CG) A lot of
II.1 General hazard Evaluated by auditor
1 Substance temperature Hazard free
2 Amount of dangerous substance / fire loading Hazard free
3 … Low
4 … Average
5 … High
6 … Maximum
7 … Maximum
8 … Maximum
9 … Maximum
10 Ambient temperature (rooms, technol. process) Maximum
11
Maximum value 0,448 0,999
Normal value 0,275 0,725
Minimum value 0,102 0,001
II.2 Fire hazard
1 Ignition temperature Hazard free
2 Dispersion of substance Hazard free
3 Sedimented Dust Hazard free
4 Potential of  ignition source Average
5 Potential quantity of a smoke by fire Hazard free
6 Potential amount of toxic substances by burning Hazard free
7 Potential speed of distribution of a flame Maximum
8 Combustibility Maximum
9 Availability of an oxidizer Maximum
10 Interaction with other substances … Maximum
11
Maximum value 0,737 0,647
Normal value 0,545 0,455
Minimum value 0,353 0,263
II.3 Explosion hazard
1 Flash point Hazard free
2 Dispersed Dust Hazard free
3 Capable of detonation or explosive Hazard free
4 Undergoes violent chemical change at elevated Hazard free
5 Maximum explosion pressure Hazard free
6 Upper explosive limit Hazard free
7 … Hazard free
8 … Maximum
9 … Maximum
10 … Maximum
11
Maximum value 0,867 0,507
Normal value 0,680 0,320
Minimum value 0,493 0,133
III.1 Space-planning activities
1 Evacuation routes Irrelevant
2 Emergency exits Accepted
3
Maximum value 0,868
Normal value 0,500
Minimum value 0,132
III.2 Technical measures
1 Gas detection system Irrelevant
2 Lightning protection Irrelevant
3 Fire alarm system Irrelevant
4 Fire suppression system Irrelevant
5 Emergency control systems Irrelevant
6 Fire extinguisher, Fire hydrant etc. Irrelevant
7 Electrical installations and systems Accepted
8 Emergency light Accepted
9 Heat and Smoke Vents / Positive Pressure Accepted
10 Emergency Power Supply Accepted
11 Special extinguishing systems and equipment Accepted
12  Air-technical systems Accepted
Maximum value 0,753
Normal value 0,568
Minimum value 0,382
III.3 Organizational measures
1 Safety officer Accepted
2 Emergency organisation Accepted
3 Instructors for the protection of health and safety Accepted
4 Evacuation plans Accepted
5 Safety briefings Accepted
6 Maintenance of safety-related equipment Accepted
7 Intervention group (fire fighters) Irrelevant
8 General requirements for fire protection Irrelevant
9 Fire protection self-monitoring Irrelevant
10 Safety signposting Irrelevant
11 Fire protection plans Irrelevant
12 Change of technologycal processes and Irrelevant
13
Maximum value 0,686
Normal value 0,500
Minimum value 0,314
IV Probability of the fire 1,90E-02
Probability of personnel presence 0,3333
For Index For Risk
Maximum value of hazard factorial indicator 0,28619 0,3277609
Normal value of hazard factorial indicator 0,10192 0,10556
Minimum value of hazard factorial indicator 0,01777 3,492E-05
Maximum value of safety factorial indicator 0,44837
Normal value of safety factorial indicator 0,14188
Minumum value of safety factorial indicator 0,01582
Maximum value of the safety coefficient 1,47E-01
Normal value of the safety coefficient 1,50E-02
Minimum value of the safety coefficient 5,52E-07
Maximum value of the individual risk 9,31E-04 1
Normal value of the individual risk 9,49E-05 1
Minimum value of the individual risk 3,50E-09 0
Maximum value of the safety index 25,23328164 1
Normal value of the safety index 1,392091449 1
Minimum value of the safety index 0,055270987 0
Common class of hazard Middle 4,5
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Table XII. Extended quantitative approach for 
consequence assessment. Input data. 
 
 
Table XIII. Extended quantitative approach for 
consequence assessment. Output data. 
 
 
Table XIV. Extended quantitative approach for 
consequence assessment. Input data. 
 
Table XV. Extended quantitative approach for 
consequence assessment. Output data. 
 
 
 
 
№ 1
Substance Oil
Other Oil
V ж 4.768,0 m
3
f р 1 m
-1
F psp m
2
E f kW/m
2
m` 3,50E-02 kg/(m2*s)
m` 0,035 kg/(m2*s)
E f 20,01 kW/m
2
F 4768,0 m2
d 77,9 m
Pool fire
Нсг #NV kJ/kg
Lg 364,0 kJ/kg
Cp 1,7 kJ/(kg*K)
Tb 110,6 °С
Ta 40 °С
ρп 1,601 kg/m3
w0 0 m/s
Note 1
Note 1
Note 1
kW/m2 m
10,5 46
7 60
4,2 81
1,4 139
% m
100,0% 39,0
90,0% *
50,0% *
10,0% *
1,0% 39,9
r 38,969 m
q 14,117 kW/m2
Pr 2,982
Q 2,18 %
№ 1
m 1.000 kg
E f 350 kW/m
2
Fire ball
D s 61,2 m
t s 5,1 s
ts 5,1 s
R 30,6 m
kW/m2 m
10,5 156,8
7 194,2
4,2 250,5
1,4 417,3
% m
99,9% -
90,0% 18,3
50,0% 46,2
10,0% 68,7
1,0% 87,5
r 0,0 м
q 85,646 kW/m2
Pr 6,578
Q 94,27 %
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Table XVI. Extended quantitative approach for 
consequence assessment. Input data. 
 
 
Table XVII. Extended quantitative approach for 
consequence assessment. Output data. 
 
 
Table XVIII. Extended quantitative approach for 
consequence assessment. Input data. 
 
Table XIX. Extended quantitative approach for 
consequence assessment. Output data. 
 
 
 
 
№ 1
Substance Oil
G 10,0 кг/с
E f kW/m
2
m` кг/(м2*с)
K 15
Jet fire 
Нс 35200 kJ/kg
Lg 364,00 kJ/kg
Cp 1,72 kJ/(kg*K)
Tb 110,6 °С
Ta 40 °С
Note 2
Note 1
E f 80,90 kW/m
2
L F 37,7 m
D F 5,7 m
kW/m2 m
10,5 12,6
7 18,0
4,2 27,3
1,4 56,4
% m
99,9% 2,8
90,0% 3,1
50,0% 4,2
10,0% 5,9
1,0% 7,7
r 5,9 m
q 23,304 kW/m2
Pr 3,713
Q 9,90
Нс 35200 kJ/kg
Lg 364,00 kJ/kg
Cp 1,72 kJ/(kg*K)
Tb 110,6 °С
Ta 40 °С
Note 2
Note 1
№ 1
Substance Oil
М 18.461 kg
Class 1 3
Class  2 3
β 1,00
σ 7
Coeff. 2
Class 4
Explosion
kPa m
Rx = 0,34 39,3
100,0 *
53,0 *
28,0 77,5
12,0 221,1
5,0 562,1
3,0 950,9
% m
99,9% 39,3
90,0% 64,1
50,0% 143,5
10,0% 277,8
1,0% 463,0
R 400,0 m
P 6,923 kPa
Pr 2,974
Q 2,14 %
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Attachment: Symbols for extended semi-quantitative approach for 
individual risk assessment 
Ind
R   individual risk [1/a] 
F
F   frequency of a fire at the enterprise [m2/a] 
P
   probability of presence of the personnel - 
S
C    safety coefficient - 
   working time of a person [h] 
S
F    factorial indicator of safety, which depends on the safety measures - 
Hrisk
F   factorial indicator of hazard, which is dependent on the worst case path of 
an event tree (relative to indexing factor, which is dependent on the 
hazard measures) - 
archM    arithmetic mean of safety architectural measures - 
techM   arithmetic mean of safety technical measures - 
orgM    arithmetic mean of safety organizational measures - 
futH    arithmetic mean of further (general) hazards (e.g. amount of dangerous 
substance, room category, technological process etc.) - 
fH    arithmetic mean of fire hazards - 
exH   arithmetic mean of explosion hazards - 
HInd
F    factorial indicator of hazard, which is dependent on the best case path of 
ETA (relative to indexing factor, which is dependent on the hazard 
measures) - 
E
V     existing violations - 
AC
R     risk acceptance criteria - 
AC     acceptance criteria for the safety index - 
S
I    safety index - 
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Attachment: Symbols for pool fire models 
Ef   actual surface emissive power (SEP) of the flame [kW/m
2]  
Fq   view factor - 
   atmospheric transmissivity -  
d   pool fire diameter [m] 
m   burning flux at still weather conditions [kg/m2⋅s]  
HSG   heat of combustion [kJ/kg] (in the Russian original HСГ) 
L   average height of the flame (flame length) [m] 
Lg   vaporization heat of the flammable material at its boiling point [kJ/kg] 
Cp  specific heat capacity at constant pressure [kJ/kg⋅K] 
Tb   liquid boiling temperature [K] 
Ta   ambient temperature [K] 
2
V
F , 2
H
F    factors of irradiancy for vertical and horizontal platforms - 
X   distance from the geometrical center source to the receiver [m] 
   flame tilt angle - 
a   density of air [kg/m
3] 
П   vapour density of the flammable materials by boiling point [kg/m
3] 
w0   wind velocity [m/s] 
g   gravitational acceleration [9.81 m/s2] 
Pr   probit function - 
Y(r)   percentage of vulnerable resources which sustain injury or damage - 
k1, k2   parameters to specify accidents -  
V   thermal radiation [(kW/m2)4/3⋅s] 
W, C   absorption factors - 
q  heat radiation level in [W/m2] 
t   exposure duration in seconds [s] 
Vж   total mass released [m
3] 
fp   coefficient of the released mass - 
Fpsp   pool surface pool fire [m
2] 
Q   probabilities of fatality to personnel [%] 
t0   time in which the person finds the fire and makes the decision about 
further actions (can be accepted as 5 seconds) [s] 
   distance from the location of the person to a safety zone [m] 
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Attachment: Symbols for fire ball models 
Ef   actual surface emissive power (SEP) of the flame [kW/m
2]  
Fq   view factor -  
   atmospheric transmissivity - 
H   height from the center of the fire ball [m] 
DS   effective diameter of the fire ball [m] 
r   distance measured over the ground of the projected centre of the fire ball 
on the ground under the fire ball, and the object [m] 
m   total mass released [kg] 
FS   fraction of the generated heat which is radiated from the flame surface - 
m'  burning rate [kg/m
2 s]  
ΔHC   heat of combustion [J/kg] 
L   average height of the flame [m] 
PSV   saturated vapour pressure before the release [N/m
2] 
c6   0.00325 [(N/m
2)-0.32] 
rfb   radius of the fire ball [m] 
X   distance from the centre of the fire ball to the radiated object [m] 
q   heat radiation level in [W/m2] 
Pr   probit function - 
Q   probabilities of fatality to personnel [%] 
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Attachment: Symbols for jet fire models 
Ef actual surface emissive power (SEP) of the flame [kW/m
2]  
Fq view factor -  
  atmospheric transmissivity - 
LF  flame length (length of frustum) m  
Lg vaporization heat of the flammable material at its boiling point [kJ/kg] 
G mass flow rate [kg/s] 
K  empirical coefficient - 
DF   width of a torch m  
FS   fraction of the combustion energy radiated from the flame surface - 
Q’  combustion energy per second [J/s] 
A  surface area of the flame [m2] 
uj  jet velocity [m/s] 
m’ mass flow rate [kg/s] 
∆Hc  heat of combustion [J/kg] 
X’  distance from the centre of the bottom plane of a lifted-off flame to the 
object [m] 
X distance from the centre of the flame without lift-off to the object [m] 
Θ’  angle between the centreline of a lifted-off flame and the plane between 
the centre of bottom of the lifted-off flame and the object [0] 
b frustum lift-off height [m] 
Θj  angle between hole axis and the horizontal in the vertical plane [
0] 
𝛼  angle between hole axis and the flame axis [0] 
W1  width of frustum base [m] 
W2   width of frustum tip [m] 
R  radius of the flame [m] 
Lb   flame length, flame tip to centre of exit plane [m] 
Cp specific heat capacity at constant pressure [kJ/kg⋅K] 
Tb liquid boiling temperature [K] 
Ta ambient temperature [K] 
m   burning flux at still weather conditions [kg/m2⋅s]  
HSG  heat of combustion [kJ/kg] (in the Russian original HСГ) 
a  density of air [kg/m
3] 
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П  vapour density of the flammable materials by boiling point [kg/m
3] 
w0   wind velocity [m/s] 
Ahol   area of the hole [m
2] 
PV   initial pressure in the pipeline [Pa 
γ   heat capacity ratio of the gas - 
μ   flow coefficient 0.8 - 
ρV    density of gas at the initial pressure in the pipeline [kg/m
3] 
q   heat radiation level in [W/m2] 
Q   probabilities of fatality to personnel [%] 
Pr   probit function - 
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Attachment: Symbols for vapour cloud explosion models 
k1  constant = 43 - 
k2  constant = 26 - 
MT  mass quantity of flammable part of the cloud kg 
u  visible speed of the flame front m/s 
R  distance from the center of the cloud m 
P0  atmospheric pressure Pa 
E  total combustion energy J 
Px  dimensionless pressure - 
Ix  dimensionless impulse Ix 
  extent of expansion of combustion products - 
dyn
p   peak dynamic pressure in blast-wave Pa, in Russian version P ) 
'
dyn
p   scaled dynamic pressure in blast-wave (in Russian version
x
P ) - 
S
i   positive side-on impulse of blast-wave - 
S
P   peak side-on overpressure of blast-wave Pa 
p
t   positive phase duration of blast-wave s 
'
p
t  scaled positive phase duration of blast-wave - 
a
p   ambient pressure Pa 
a
a   speed of sound in ambient air m/s 
'
S
P   scaled peak side-on overpressure of blast-wave - 
Q  probabilities of fatality to personnel [%] 
Pr  probit function - 
  correction parameter - 
  extent of expansion of combustion products - 
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Attachment: Event trees  
Outlet (outlet -
under pressure) 
out of a tank/plant
______________
LNG
Overheated liquid
ETA – outlet of LNG or overheated liquids out of a tank/plant. 
Toxic gas burden
Development of 
gas cloud 
outdoors
Development of 
liquid leakage
Discharge of gas 
stream (under 
presure)
Poisoning of air in work space 
(toxic space)
Explosion/Deflagration in 
workspace
Toxic effect of surrounding 
(environment)
Deflagration of toxic gas
Fire of cloud
Fireball (thermal radiation)
(In case: upper explosion limit air 
gas mixture, concentration)
Fire of leakage
Toxic effect of surrounding 
(environment)
Fire in form of a torch (torch 
fireing)
 
 
Outlet (outlet -
under pressure) 
out of a tank/plant
______________
Liquid
ETA – outlet of liquid out of a tank/plant. 
Development of 
leakage and toxic 
gas strain indoors
Development of 
gas cloud 
outdoors
Development of 
hydrodynamic 
wave
Poisoning of air in work space 
(toxic space)
Explosion/Deflagration indoors
Development of air-gas-mixture 
of cloud
Deflagration of air-gas-mixture 
cloud
Fire of leakage
Toxic effect of surrounding 
(environment)
Toxic effect of surrounding 
(environment)
Fire of leakage
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Attachment: Event trees  
Outlet (outlet -
under pressure) 
out of a tank/plant
______________
Gas (gas phase)
ETA – outlet of gas out of a tank/plant. 
Toxic gas strain 
indoors
Development of 
gas cloud 
outdoors
Jet outlet of gas 
phase
Poisoning of air in work space 
(toxic space)
Explosion/Deflagration indoors
Deflagration of air-gas-mixture 
cloud
Distribution of toxic cloud
Toxic effect of surrounding 
(environment)
Fire in form of a torch (torch 
fireing)
 
 
 
 
Outlet (outlet -
under pressure) 
out of a tank/plant
______________
Solid phase (dust)
ETA – outlet of solid phase (dust) out of a tank/plant. 
Dust exposure in workspace. 
Development of dust deposit 
in room
Explosion/Deflagration of dust in 
workspace
Fire of dust layer (dustcloud)
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Attachment: Event trees  
Decompression 
Tank
development of 
leakage
Liquidation of leak is without 
dangerouse consequences
evaporation out of 
leakage
fire of leakage
formation of 
explosiv cloud
without dangerouse 
consequences
dispersion of 
explosiv cloud
deflagration
impact of blast wave
without dangerouse 
consequences
without dangerouse 
consequences
thermic radiation
effect BLEVE
without dangerouse 
consequences
ETA – full decompression tank (Storage – next to additional tanks) outdoors. (BF) 
 
 
Decompression 
Tank
development of 
leakage
Liquidation of leak is without 
dangerouse consequences
evaporation out of 
leakage
fire of leakage
formation of 
explosiv cloud
without dangerouse 
consequences
dispersion of 
explosiv cloud
deflagration
impact of blast wave
without dangerouse 
consequences
without dangerouse 
consequences
thermic radiation
ETA – full decompression of each tank (railway cistern ect.) (BF) 
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Attachment: Event trees  
 
Formation of 
explosive gas-air 
mixture while 
cleaning, filling 
ect.
iginition source 
available
Ignition source not present
explosion in tank
no explosion / without 
dangerouse consequences
impact of blast 
wave, splinters ect.
without dangerouse 
consequences
ETA – explosion in tank/plant. (BF) 
 
 
Decompression 
Pump
development of 
leakage
Liquidation of leak is without 
dangerouse consequences
evaporation out of 
leakage
fire of leakage
formation of 
explosiv cloud
Dispersion off cloud 
without dangerouse consequences
dispersion of 
explosiv cloud
deflagration
impact of blast wave
without dangerouse 
consequences
without dangerouse 
consequences
thermic radiation
ETA – decompression of pump indoors/outdoorsank (the probability for indoors is less then i.e. during evaporation out of leakage
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Attachment: Event trees  
 
 
decompression pipeline
outflow of liquid
development of 
leakage
Liquidation of leak is without 
dangerouse consequences
fire of leakage
thermic radiation
without dangerouse 
consequences
ETA – decompression of pipline indoors/outdoorsank (the probability for outdoor fire is less then an indoor fire
without dangerouse 
consequences
 
 
 
 
 
Decompression 
Tank
fast emission 
of gas phase
fast inflammation
„fire ball“
formation of 
explosiv cloud
dispersion of 
explosiv cloud
deflagration
impact of blast wave
without dangerouse 
consequences
without dangerouse 
consequences
thermic radiation
ETA – full decompression of each tank (tank in Vehicle and train) outdoors. (BF) 
development
 of leakage (liquid 
phase)
dispersion from 
leakage
fire of leakage
without dangerouse 
consequences
thermic radiation
Liquidation of 
leakage without any 
consequences
deflagration
impact of blast wave
without dangerouse 
consequences
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Attachment: Event trees  
Decompression 
above liquid level 
(LPG)
Fast ignition
Fire in form of a torch 
(torch firing) 
formation of 
explosiv cloud
Dispersion of cloud 
without dangerouse consequences
deflagration
impact of blast wave
without dangerouse 
consequences
without dangerouse 
consequences
thermic radiation
ETA – decompression part of stand alone tank above liquid level (tank of vehicel and train) outdoor (LPG)
 
 
 
Decompression 
under liquid level 
(LPG)
Fast ignition
Fire in form of a torch 
(torch firing) 
formation of 
explosiv cloud
Dispersion of cloud 
without dangerouse consequences
deflagration
impact of blast wave
without dangerouse 
consequences
without dangerouse 
consequences
thermic radiation
ETA – decompression part of stand alone tank under liquid level (tank of vehicel and train) outdoor (LPG)
Liquidation of 
leakage without any 
consequences
dispersion form 
leakage
development 
of leakage
fire ofl eakage
without dangerouse 
consequences
thermic radiation
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Attachment: Event trees  
Decompression 
Tank
LPG
fast emission 
of gas phase
fast inflammation
„fire ball“
formation of 
explosiv cloud
dispersion of 
explosiv cloud
deflagration
impact of blast wave
without dangerouse 
consequences
without dangerouse 
consequences
thermic radiation
ETA – full decompression of each partly over surface (underground) storage Tank for LPG 
development
 of leakage (liquid 
phase)
dispersion from 
leakage
fire of leakage
without dangerouse 
consequences
thermic radiation
Liquidation of 
leakage without any 
consequences
deflagration
impact of blast wave
without dangerouse 
consequences
 
 
 
 
Decompression 
over liquid level 
LPG
Fast ignition
Fire in form of a torch 
(torch firing) 
formation of 
explosiv cloud
dispersion of cloud 
without dangerouse consequences
deflagration
impact of blast wave
without dangerouse 
consequences
without dangerouse 
consequences
thermic radiation
ETA – decompression part of  partly over surface (underground) storage tank for LPG over surface level (LPG)
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
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Attachment: Event trees  
Decompression 
under liquid level 
(LPG)
formation of 
explosiv cloud
Dispersion of cloud 
without dangerouse consequences
deflagration
impact of blast wave
without dangerouse 
consequences
without dangerouse 
consequences
ETA – decompression part of  partly over surface (underground) storage tank for LPG under surface level (LPG)
Liquidation of 
leakage without any 
consequences
dispersion form 
leakage
development 
of leakage
fire ofl eakage
without dangerouse 
consequences
thermic radiation
 
 
 
Decompression of 
pipeline from 
evaporation plant
LPG
Fast ignition
Fire in form of a torch 
(torch firing) 
formation of 
explosiv cloud
Dispersion of cloud 
without dangerouse consequences
deflagration
impact of blast wave
without dangerouse 
consequences
without dangerouse 
consequences
thermic radiation
ETA – decompression of a pipeline in front of an evaporation plant (LPG)
Liquidation of 
leakage without any 
consequences
dispersion form 
leakage
development 
of leakage
fire ofl eakage
without dangerouse 
consequences
thermic radiation
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Attachment: Event trees  
 
Decompression of 
pipeline in front 
of boiler
LPG
Dispersion of cloud 
without dangerouse consequences
Deflagration of 
air-gas mixture
impact of blast wave
without dangerouse 
consequences
ETA – decompression of a pipeline in a heating plant (in front of the boiler, steam boiler ect.) (LPG)
C1
C2
C3
0,2
0,8
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